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He knows not the law who knows not the reason thereof, and the
known certainty of the law is the safety of all.'
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I. INTRODUCTION
This is a study in reasons. Since at least the time of Lord Coke, it
has been received wisdom in Anglo-American law that courts should
write opinions for the purpose, among others, of explaining and justifying
their decisions. The reasons for decision serve both to legitimate the de-
cision and to provide a principled basis for the decision of later cases that
may differ in one or more ways from cases already decided.
My thesis in this Article is that reasons are entirely absent from the
Supreme Court's decisions on the troublesome question of bargained
guilty pleas. When the Supreme Court first dealt directly with bargained
pleas in 1970, in the now-famous Brady Trilogy,2 it had developed a sub-
2. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759
(1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as the Trilogy].
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stantial body of doctrine in apparently analogous areas which did not
compel any particular conclusion about the constitutionality of plea bar-
gaining. Nevertheless, it did provide a framework for analysis and sug-
gested the questions that would be relevant to decision.
In Brady v. United States3 and its companion cases, however, the
Court denied the relevance not merely of some but of all prior doctrine.
Having determined that plea bargaining was a topic sui generis, uncon-
nected with any prior constitutional experience, the Court then an-
nounced its conclusion that plea bargaining was constitutional and
disposed of the cases before it. Although the Court agreed that guilty
pleas were invalid if not "voluntary," its treatment of voluntariness cut
that concept loose from its moorings in the law. The opinions are analyt-
ically incoherent. They clearly affirm the legitimacy of plea bargaining.
However, they do not provide any adequate explanation for jettisoning
the prior law on voluntariness, nor do they present anything explicit to
replace the jettisoned concept.
This is not of itself a criticism of the Trilogy. When a new legal
principle first clamors for recognition, it may be enough that the Court
recognize the principle-clear elucidation of its contours can wait for
another day. The history of the Court is replete with instances of new,
valuable and productive legal doctrine first announced in obscure and
even incoherent opinions.4 However, in the seventeen years since Brady,
the Court has dealt with bargained guilty pleas in a variety of contexts.
There has been ample time for public and professional comment, reflec-
tion and explanation.5 If plea bargaining is truly sui generis, a coherent
The Trilogy was originally a tetralogy, but the fourth case, North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S.
25 (1970) was set for reargument and decided early the following term.
3. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
4. See, ag., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to autonomy in deciding
whether to bear children); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (right against state-
imposed segregation); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (variable standard of review
in nonracial equal protection cases); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (inadmissibility
of coerced confessions). Cf. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L.
REV. 349, 349-52 (1974) (wittily and eloquently making a similar point).
5. Quite a few professionals have commented-far too many to cite in any Article not
intended as a bibliography. Particularly provocative commentary includes: M. FEELEY, THE
PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT (1979); M. HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPER-
IENCES OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS (1978); Alschuler, Implement-
ing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U.
CHI. L. REV. 931 (1983); Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CALIF. L. REV.
652 (1981); Church, In Defense of "Bargain Justice," 13 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 509 (1979);
Enker, Perspectives on Plea Bargaining, in PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT &
ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 108 (1967); O'Brien, Plea Bargain-
ing and the Supreme Court: The Limits of Due Process and Substantive Justice, 9 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 109 (1981); Philips, The Question of Voluntariness in the Plea Bargaining Contro-
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and principled body of doctrine should have developed by now around
this unique subject.
It has not. Since the Trilogy, the Supreme Court's cases move irreg-
ularly in different directions, like drunks scattering from a bar. Princi-
ples announced in one case are forgotten or ignored in the next. The
result has been law without reason. Reason could be supplied, but it
never has been. Looking back to the empty Trilogy for their founda-
tions, instead of using the passage of time to develop something solid, the
later cases build upon foundations of sand. They remain inconsistent
and incoherent.
The result of all this, as I hope to demonstrate, has been to leave
plea bargaining in a kind of constitutional black hole. I shall first survey
the law on voluntariness as it had developed by 1970. Prior law had
established that a guilty plea was valid only if it was "voluntary."6 The
Supreme Court's cases on voluntariness in the guilty plea context were
ambiguous about the precise meaning of the term. They did, however,
strongly imply that the standards for voluntariness of guilty pleas were at
least as strict as the standards of voluntariness applied in other contexts.
By the late 1960's, those standards had crystallized-an individual's ac-
tions were not constitutionally "voluntary" if they were the product of
unconstitutional pressure or inducement from the government. A re-
lated line of cases had established that an inducement or pressure was
unconstitutional if its only purpose was to discourage the exercise, or
encourage the waiver of a constitutional right. Even if a pressure or in-
ducement had other, legitimate purposes, if it had the effect of discourag-
ing the exercise or encouraging the waiver of constitutional rights, it was
unconstitutional unless it was necessary to achieve a governmental pur-
pose of substantial importance. Since plea bargaining consists of induce-
ments that have the purpose and effect of encouraging defendants to
waive their rights to trial, under these cases a plea entered in order to
obtain a sentencing concession would be "voluntary" only if the induce-
versy: A Philosophical Clarification, 16 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 207 (1981-82); Schulhofer, Is Plea
Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 HARv. L. REv. 1037 (1984). Most of the commentary has been
unfavorable. See Israel, Criminal Procedure, the Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Warren
Court, 75 MIcH. L. REv. 1320, 1357-58 (1977).
6. The language has varied; the Court has said that a guilty plea must have "the charac-
ter of a voluntary act," Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962); that it must be
"voluntary and knowing," McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969), and that it
must be "voluntarily made," Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969).
I will generally use "voluntariness" in this Article to refer to concepts of this kind, includ-
ing both the "voluntary" and the "knowing" or "intelligent" aspects of the concept.
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ments were necessary to achieve some governmental purpose of substan-
tial importance.
I will then analyze the Trilogy in some detail, concluding that the
Court scrapped existing law on voluntariness without any analytically
adequate justification-indeed, with virtually no attempt at justification
whatsoever. In addition, I hope to show that the Court provided no co-
herent analytical foundation in the Trilogy upon which to build a body of
doctrine by which bargained pleas could be judged.
Following my analysis of the Trilogy, I will examine the Court's
subsequent cases on plea bargaining, all of which look back to the Tril-
ogy for guidance. However, the Trilogy offers no guidance, and the later
cases remain analytically inconsistent and incoherent. Finally, I will
briefly discuss some implications of a hint contained in the Trilogy but
never developed-that the government may not offer inducements of a
kind that are likely to lead innocent defendants to plead guilty. I will
conclude that this principle, if applied to judge the validity of bargained
pleas, could lead to the development of a body of law governing plea
bargaining that would at least eliminate some of the worst potential for
abuse.
II. DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT TO 1970
A. A Brief Summary
In 1970, when the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality
of plea bargaining, it had available to it the product of nearly a century of
increasingly frequent exposure to the problems of the criminal process.
Federal criminal cases had become a familiar staple of the Court's diet
since 1889. 7 State criminal cases, long a mere drop in the bucket,8 be-
7. Federal criminal cases were not originally within the Supreme Court's jurisdiction on
writ of error, although in rare instances they could be reviewed on certification of a division of
opinion in the circuit court. United States v. More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159 (1805). See B.
CURTIS, JURISDICTION, PRACTICE, AND PECULIAR JURISPRUDENCE OF THE COURTS OF THE
UNITED STATES 82 (1880). The Act of February 6, 1889, allowed appeals in all cases where
the defendant was convicted of a capital crime. Act of February 6, 1889, ch. 113, 25 Stat. 655
(1889). In 1891, Congress, inadvertently, allowed appeals in all cases in which the accused
might have been sentenced to the penitentiary. See F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSI-
NESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 109-10 (1928). See also In re Classen, 140 U.S. 200 (1891)
(interpreting Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891)). Since then, notwithstanding
jurisdictional modifications, federal criminal cases have been an important part of the Court's
docket.
8. Jurisdiction to review state court judgments has never depended on characterization of
the judgment as "civil" or "criminal." E.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
But these cases became a substantial part of the Court's docket only after the growth of a body
of law which made the Constitution relevant to a significant number of state criminal cases.
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came a trickle after 1936 and became a substantial river by 1969.1
1. Guilty pleas
Nevertheless, the Court had given relatively little judicial considera-
tion to pleas of guilty." Like convictions after trial, convictions on pleas
of guilty may be directly appealed-but they rarely are."' Collateral at-
9. The Supreme Court had reviewed (and even reversed) occasional state criminal cases
before 1936. But in that year, the Court decided Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 287
(1936) and held that state criminal convictions were reviewable under the due process clause
when they involved coerced confessions. Brown became a fertile source of claims of error. See
generally Amsterdam, The Rights of Suspects, in THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS: WHAT THEY
ARE-WHAT THEY SHOULD BE 419-24 (N. Dorsen ed. 1971). As the Supreme Court gradu-
ally held the various provisions of the Bill of Rights applicable to state criminal trials, and did
so with increasing frequency after Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the trickle became a
river. At October Term, 1968, the Court decided 120 cases with full opinions. Fifty of these
cases were criminal cases, 19 involving federal and 31 involving state defendants. Note,
Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 280-81 (1969).
10. The Court had, of course, from time to time promulgated and amended the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, and these Rules contained provisions relating to guilty pleas.
However, there is good reason to believe that the Court gave very little attention to the Rules
in the process of their promulgation. For example, in 1979, the Court amended the Rules of
Civil Procedure to deal specifically with the problem of jurisdiction over appeals taken too
early-typically, after the judge had stated his opinions but before judgment had been en-
tered-and thereafter granted certiorari to consider just that question. When counsel brought
the amendment to the Court's attention, certiorari was dismissed as improvidently granted.
Montgomery v. Century Laminating, Ltd., 444 U.S. 987 (1979); Respondent's Suggestion of
Mootness passim, Montgomery v. Century Laminating, Ltd., 444 U.S. 987 (1979). See also
Amendment of Rules of Civil Procedure, 374 U.S. 865, 865-70 (1963) (Black, J., Douglas, J.,
opposing submission of Rules to Congress); Amendment of Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure, 406 U.S. 981, 982 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("we are only a conduit for the
Rules"). Since my concern here is with the development of constitutional doctrine, I shall not
deal substantially with the rulemaking process in this Article.
11. The relevant statute defining appellate jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976), does not
distinguish between appeals of convictions based on pleas (of guilty or nolo contendere) and
appeals of convictions after trial. Convictions based on guilty pleas are occasionally appealed,
e.g., McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969). However, the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, since their promulgation, have distinguished between the two types of conviction in
making provision for notifying the defendant of his right to appeal. The original Rules re-
quired the court to notify a defendant not represented by counsel of his right to appeal if he
was sentenced "after trial." FED. R. CRiM. P. 37(a)(2), 327 U.S. 821, 857-58 (1946). The 1966
amendments transferred the provision to Rule 32(a)(2), and required that notice be given to all
defendants sentenced after "trial on a plea of not guilty." Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, 383 U.S. 1087, 1107 (1966). The 1975 amendments, presently in force,
continue that provision and add that "tihere shall be no duty on the court to advise the
defendant of any right of appeal after sentence is imposed following a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere." FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(a)(2). A recent survey indicated that about a quarter of
federal district judges explicitly misinform defendants by telling them that they do not have
the right to appeal after a plea of guilty. Borman, The Hidden Right to Direct Appeal from a
FederalPlea Conviction, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 319, 322, 374 (1979). It seems likely, therefore,
that most federal criminal defendants are unaware of their right to appeal when they have
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tack on convictions that are based on guilty pleas was practically impos-
sible until the expansion of federal habeas corpus in the 1930's, and
difficult thereafter.12 The difficulty was exacerbated when the attack was
on a bargained plea, for until recently, bargains were almost always
dehors the record and thus particularly difficult to attack. 3 Neverthe-
less, by 1969 the Court had considered the requirements for a valid plea
of guilty in about half a dozen cases. 14 In consequence there existed a
small body of law, generally vague and frequently dicta, stating that a
plea of guilty must be "voluntary and knowing.""5
2. Self-incrimination and coerced confessions
The guilty plea cases themselves gave little content to this vague
standard. They did, however, suggest that the terms could be elucidated
by reference to the law governing confessions of guilt under the fifth and
fourteenth amendments. The fifth amendment provides, in part, that
"[n]o person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself . ... "16 Several of the guilty plea cases intimated that a
plea of guilty should be looked upon as the ne plus ultra of self-incrimi-
nation. 7 One could therefore look to cases construing this constitutional
pleaded guilty. Cf. FED. R. CiuM. P. 11(c)(4) (requiring the court to tell a pleading defendant
that if he pleads guilty or nolo contendere, "there will not be a further trial of any kind").
Although many defendants who plead guilty do not know they can appeal their conviction,
failure to do so is still mentioned as a reason for limiting the claims available on collateral
attack. E.g., United States v. Benchimol, 471 U.S. 453 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring); United
States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 784 (1979).
State practice varies. Appeals are occasionally taken following conviction on a guilty
plea, eg., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 241 (1969) (five death sentences imposed on
petitioner after he pleaded guilty to five indictments for armed robbery), but no state appears
to notify pleading defendants of a right to appeal as a matter of course. The rarity of such
appeals presumably represents both general satisfaction with (or at least resignation to) the
consequences of the plea, at least initially, and lack of knowledge that such an appeal can be
taken.
12. The Court first considered a federal collateral attack on a guilty plea in Walker v.
Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 (1941). For a history of the expansion of habeas corpus through the
1960's, see Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1038, 1045-
72 (1970).
13. Typically, although the plea was the result of an agreement between the prosecution
and the defense, the defendant would be called upon to state in open court that his plea was
not the result of any promises by the prosecutor. See A. AMSTERDAM, B. SEGAL & M.
MILLER, TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES § 216 (2d ed. 1971). A
typical plea-taking procedure of this kind is reproduced in Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63,
66 n.1 (1977).
14. See infra notes 31-90 and accompanying text.
15. See supra note 6.
16. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
17. E.g., Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242; McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 466; Kercheval v. United States,
274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927).
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provision for guidelines to determine when a guilty plea had been im-
properly "compelled." If relevant, this body of law might be particularly
useful in considering plea bargaining. For the guilty plea cases had con-
sidered only one side of the problem-that presented by defendants who
had pleaded guilty and later wanted to undo the plea. The self-incrimi-
nation cases sometimes dealt with people who had talked, and later
wished they had not. However, they also considered the problem of pen-
alties imposed on individuals who resisted pressures to talk. In a func-
tioning system of plea bargaining, defendants who refuse to plead guilty
(and who therefore receive harsher treatment if they are convicted) may
be thought situated similarly to individuals who had resisted pressure to
speak.18 If so, the second prong of self-incrimination law could prove
immensely useful.
A second and closely related body of doctrine had developed under
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Until 1964, the
Supreme Court consistently refused to hold the privilege against self-in-
criminatioi applicable against the states. 19 However, since 1936, the
Court had held that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
was violated when a state criminal defendant was convicted by use of a
"coerced" confession.2" "Coerced" confessions are obviously related to
18. Unless it is to be based on wholly illusory benefits, a functioning system of plea bar-
gaining must provide defendants with an incentive to plead guilty. Therefore, defendants who
insist on trial must suffer in some way if they are convicted. It is ordinarily assumed that this
suffering will be in the form of harsher sentences, and in all probability this is often true.
It is not necessarily true, however. Defendants might bargain not to receive any ultimate
benefit, but simply to reduce uncertainty. For example, suppose that defendants charged with
a particular crime are offered a guaranteed five-year sentence on plea of guilty. If they insist on
trial, assume that 80% of those convicted will receive three-year sentences, but that 20% will
be sentenced to 13 years. The average sentence (five years) will be the same for the pleading
and nonpleading groups. But defendants aversive to risk might still prefer to plead guilty.
And of course, the particular defendants who insisted on trial and received 13-year sentences
would, indeed, have received harsher treatment because of their refusal to plead guilty, even
though the groups as a whole are treated the same.
One study of plea bargaining in the District of Columbia concluded that no difference
existed in the average sentences given to defendants charged with assault, larceny and bur-
glary, whether they pleaded guilty or insisted on trial. A statistically significant difference did
occur in sentences given to defendants charged with robbery. W. RHODES, PLEA BARGAIN-
ING: WHO GAINS? WHO LosEs? 39-60 (1978). It may be that defendants pleading guilty to
the first three of these crimes do so because they wrongly believe they will get a sentence
concession. But it is also possible that they are pleading guilty simply to reduce the uncer-
tainty about their sentence.
19. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 50-51 (1947); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78,
114 (1908). The Court effectively overruled these cases in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3
(1964), holding that the privilege against self-incrimination is binding on the states through the
due process clause.
20. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) was the first. For good reviews of the co-
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"compelled" self-incrimination.2" Some of the Court's guilty plea cases
had analogized guilty pleas to the confessions subject to review under the
fourteenth amendment.22 Moreover, the body of law on what became
known as "involuntary" confessions was unusually rich.23 Accordingly,
the involuntary confession cases might be a productive source of
doctrine.24
3. Waiver and unconstitutional conditions
Finally, some of the guilty plea cases noted that a defendant who
pleads guilty is more than simply a "witness against himself," for he
gives up more than does a defendant who merely confesses.25 One who
pleads guilty gives up a bundle of rights related to the trial process-the
right to a trial itself, the right to a trial by jury, the right to make an
argument and to call witnesses in his defense, the right to put the state to
its proof, and so on. This implies the relevance of cases dealing, in one
way or another, with the waiver of constitutional rights. A good deal of
law on this subject existed by 1969. Particularly important to the consti-
tutionality of plea bargaining was a line of cases that had considered
what kinds of pressures could permissibly be placed on people in an at-
tempt to persuade them to waive constitutional rights, and what kind of
burdens could permissibly be placed on people who refused to do so. By
and large, the source of law in these cases was the due process clause, and
the doctrine labeled the doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions"; occa-
sionally, however, the Court would perform a similar analysis under the
equal protection clause.2 6 One case in particular seemed to cry out for
erced confession doctrine, see Kamisar, What is an "Involuntary" Confession?, 17 RUTrERS L.
REv. 728 (1963); Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79 HARV. L. Rlv. 935, 961-83
(1964).
21. Cf Malloy, 378 U.S. at 6-8, opining that the coerced confession cases had for all prac-
tical purposes adopted the fifth amendment "compulsion" test as the test for "coercion."
22. Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104 (1942) (relying on Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S.
227 (1940), a coerced confession case).
23. See, eg., Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 568-635 (1961) (opinion of Frank-
furter, J., joined only by Stewart, J., announcing judgment).
24. One might expect that the coerced confession cases would, like the compelled self-
incrimination cases, have developed a second line of doctrine, detailing impermissible coercion
in cases where defendants had been pressed to confess but remained silent. No such cases
reached the Supreme Court. It is unclear whether this is because the police, once started,
inevitably continued until they got their confession, or because such cases would be difficult to
litigate. See Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. Rnv.
493 (1955).
25. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243; McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 466.
26. For a review of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, see Note, Another Look at
Unconstitutional Conditions, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 144 (1968). For a similar analysis under the
equal protection clause, see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 631-33, 638 n.21 (1969).
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consideration. In United States v. Jackson,27 the Court struck down the
death penalty provisions of the Federal Kidnaping Act28 because a de-
fendant who insisted on trial by jury could be sentenced to death, while
one who pleaded guilty or agreed to a bench trial could not.2 9 In the
Court's view, the vice of the statute was "not that it necessarily coerce[d]
guilty pleas and jury waivers but simply that it needlessly encourage[d]
them."30 The practice of offering sentence concessions for pleas of guilty
would seem to be subject to a similar analysis.
Thus, in 1970, four strands of doctrine were woven into the fabric of
the law and were apparently relevant to plea bargaining. No strand was
entirely without knots. In order to understand the relationship of these
doctrines to each other and to plea bargaining, more detailed considera-
tion of each doctrine is required.
B. The "Voluntary" Plea of Guilty
Pertinent to the question of plea bargaining are cases in which the
Supreme Court has discussed the requirements for a valid plea of
guilty.3" By 1969, the Court had decided ten such cases. Unfortunately,
none of these cases focuses with any precision on the question of what
standards must be met before a plea of guilty can be entered. Most of the
cases involved collateral issues-whether the petitioner was entitled to a
hearing on disputed factual allegations, what kind of record must be
made when the plea is taken and so forth. On close examination, the
cases do show the existence of some commonly held, unstated assump-
tions about the requisites for a valid plea of guilty. Unfortunately, those
assumptions are difficult to discern with precision.
The Court first discussed guilty pleas in 1927, in Kercheval v. United
States.32 The question directly presented in Kercheval was whether a
27. 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
28. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1964), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1978).
29. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. at 572.
30. Id. at 583 (emphasis in original).
31. One might hope for guidance from cases discussing pleas of nolo contendere, but one
would not find it. In Sullivan v. United States, 348 U.S. 170 (1954), the petitioner claimed
inter alia that his plea was invalid because he had been misled by a promise of probation. Id.
at 174. However, the district court found as a fact that no such promise had been made, and
the Supreme Court agreed that Sullivan and his lawyer "were not and could not have been
misled." Id at 175. The other cases deal entirely with collateral questions. See Lott v. United
States, 367 U.S. 421 (1961) (time for taking appeal); United States v. Norris, 281 U.S. 619
(1930) (factual issues not open after plea); Hudson v. United States, 272 U.S. 451 (1926) (jail
term may be imposed after plea).
32. 274 U.S. 220 (1927). The judgment was unanimous, but Justice Stone concurred only
in the result.
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plea of guilty, once withdrawn, could be used as evidence against the
defendant at trial.33 The Court held that it could not, because the with-
drawn plea "could not be received as evidence without putting ... [the
defendant] in a dilemma utterly inconsistent with ... awarding him a
trial."34 On its way to this conclusion, the Court made a few remarks
about pleas of guilty and the circumstances in which they should be
accepted:
A plea of guilty differs in purpose and effect from a mere admis-
sion or extra-judicial confession; it is itself a conviction. Like a
verdict of a jury it is conclusive. More is not required; the
court has nothing to do but give judgment and sentence. Out of
just consideration for persons accused of crime, courts are care-
ful that a plea of guilty shall not be accepted unless made vol-
untarily after proper advice and with full understanding of the
consequences. When one so pleads he may be held bound.
But, on timely application, the court will vacate a plea of guilty
shown to have been unfairly obtained or given through igno-
rance, fear or inadvertence. Such an application does not in-
volve any question of guilt or innocence. The court in exercise
of its discretion will permit one accused to substitute a plea of
not guilty and have a trial if for any reason the granting of the
privilege seems fair and just.35
Kercheval is at best inconclusive on the requisites for a valid plea.
To begin with, the language just quoted is clearly dicta. Given the
Court's explanation of its result, the question when a defendant should
be "award[ed] a trial" was not pertinent. Whether the Court believed
itself to be merely describing judicial behavior-"courts are careful"-or
prescribing it was not clear. Even if the Court was gently prescribing
behavior, it was not clear whether common law or the Constitution was
the source of the prescription. It is clear that the Court believed pleas
should be made "voluntarily after proper advice and with full under-
standing of the consequences. "36 But the import of these terms was
never explained. Since "voluntariness" had long been the standard by
which confessions of guilt were judged,37 the Court might have been
drawing an analogy between guilty pleas and extrajudicial confessions,
33. Id. at 221-23.
34. Id at 224.
35. Id at 223-24 (citations omitted). The Court referred to several state court cases and to
United States v. Bayaud, 23 F. 721 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1883), where a circuit court refused to
vacate a plea which the U.S. Attorney swore had not been induced by him in any way.
36. Kercheval, 274 U.S. at 223.
37. See infra notes 109-68 and accompanying text.
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and suggesting that circumstances which would invalidate a confession
would also invalidate a plea of guilty. If so, however, its failure even to
mention Bram v. United States,"8 the then leading case on confessions is
puzzling.
The Court returned to pleas of guilty in three cases in the early
1940's. In Walker v. Johnston, 9 a federal prisoner sought habeas corpus
alleging that he had pleaded guilty only after he had asked to see a law-
yer and was told that he could not, and after he was warned that he
would get "twice as great"oa sentence if he refused to plead guilty.40
There seems to have been little dispute that his allegations, if true, enti-
tled him to relief.4" The primary issue in the case was whether the dis-
trict court could deny a hearing on the basis of affidavits denying
Walker's version of the facts.42 The Supreme Court held that it could
not: "If he did not voluntarily waive his right to counsel, or if he was
deceived or coerced by the prosecutor into entering a guilty plea, he was
deprived of a constitutional right."43 In Smith v. O'Grady,4 the Court
made it clear that Walker applied to prisoners in state as well as federal
custody." Finally, in Waley v. Johnston,46 the Court reversed per curiam
the denial of a hearing on allegations that a guilty plea had been induced
by the FBI's threat to manufacture false evidence that would get Waley
38. Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
39. 312 U.S. 275 (1941) (unanimous decision).
40. Id at 281.
41. The government did argue that Walker's waiver of counsel need not be intentional, but
could be "implied as a matter of law" when justified "by reasons of extrinsic policy." Id. at
277-78.
42. Id. at 283.
43. Id at 286 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). For the first proposition, the Court
cited Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), which held that a criminal defendant must be
aware that he has a right to counsel before he can waive that right. For the second proposi-
tion, the Court relied on Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935), which involved the prose-
cution's knowing use of perjury to obtain a conviction.
44. 312 U.S. 329 (1941) (unanimous decision).
45. Smith alleged that he had been arrested and, two days later, told he was charged with
simple burglary. Ido at 332. Then, he said, an agreement was made on the phone between him
and someone identified as the prosecutor that if he pleaded guilty he would get no more than
three years. Id He thereafter asked for a copy of the charge and was denied it; he pleaded
guilty and was immediately sentenced to 20 years. Id. He protested, asked to withdraw the
plea and asked for a lawyer. Id. All of the requests were refused. Id. Only in the penitentiary
did he find that he had pleaded not to simple but to aggravated burglary (burglary with explo-
sives). Id. Not surprisingly, the Court held that the allegations, if proved, made out a denial
of due process. Id. at 334. It cited Walker, Johnson, and Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227
(1940) (coerced confession case). Id. at 334 n.5.
46. 316 U.S. 101 (1942) (per curiam). The Solicitor General had confessed error under
Walker. Id. at 104.
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hanged on other charges. 47 "[A] conviction on a plea of guilty coerced
by a federal law enforcement officer is no more consistent with due pro-
cess than a conviction supported by a coerced confession."48
This early Trilogy of guilty plea cases has a number of interesting
features. None of these cases relies on or mentions Kercheval. In the
1940's, at least, the Court had either forgotten the Kercheval dicta or did
not read it as stating a constitutional standard.49 On the other hand, all
of the cases are quite positive that such a standard exists. The question is
hardly discussed. In Walker, the Court said that a constitutional viola-
tion would be made out if a defendant were "deceived or coerced by the
prosecutor" into entering his guilty plea. 0 The Court's sole authority
for this proposition was a case holding that knowing use of perjured testi-
mony by the prosecution rendered a conviction invalid under the due
process clause, thereby suggesting that the vice of a "coerced" plea is
that it is likely to be inaccurate."1 A year later, in Waley, the Court
continued to speak of "coerced" pleas, but this time directly analogized
such pleas to compelled self-incrimination under the fifth amendment 2
and coerced confessions under the due process clause' 3-with no explicit
discussion of what coercion was. Never was there any suggestion of a
separate standard for guilty pleas. But in each of the cases the Court's
central focus had not been on whether the allegations, if true, rendered
the plea invalid, but on whether the lower courts had properly found the
facts against petitioners without an evidentiary hearing." Thus it is
plausible to conclude that slight changes of citation on the coercion point
were inadvertent. Making what it believed to be an obvious and uncon-
47. Waley, a hardy sort, also alleged that the FBI had threatened to beat him up and
throw him out the window, but that "didn't bother" me. 316 U.S. at 103. He, unlike all the
others, was represented by counsel when he entered his plea.
48. Id. at 104 (citing Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); .Bram v. United States,
168 U.S. 532, 543 (1897)).
49. Of the Justices who decided Kercheval, only Justice McReynolds and Justice Stone
(who had not joined the Kercheval opinion) remained in 1941.
50. See supra text accompanying note 43.
51. Mooney, 294 U.S. 103. The Court there stated:
[Due process] cannot be deemed to be satisfied by a mere notice and hearing if a State
has contrived a conviction through the pretense of a trial which in truth is but used
as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty through a deliberate deception of court
and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured.
Id. at 112.
52. Waley, 316 U.S. at 104 (citing Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897)).
53. Id. (citing Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940)). Chambers had played a bit part
in Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334 (1941).
54. None of the lower courts appears to have questioned that the allegations, if true, would
render the pleas vulnerable.
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tested point, the Court merely looked for a convenient case to use as
authority.
For the next twenty years, the Court had little to do with guilty
pleas." Then in 1962 came Machibroda v. United States.56 Machibroda
pleaded guilty to two charges of robbery and was sentenced to forty years
in jail.5 7 He challenged the pleas, arguing that they were not voluntary
because they had been induced by promises made by the Assistant
United States Attorney in charge of the prosecution that Machibroda
would get no more than twenty years if he pleaded guilty." Machibroda
said that the Assistant U.S. Attorney warned him not to tell his own
lawyer about the conversations,"9 and said that if he" 'insisted in making
a scene,' certain unsettled matters concerning two other robberies would
be added to the petitioner's difficulties."'c The lower courts denied relief
on the ground that the assistant's affidavit denying the charges, and the
surrounding circumstances, showed that the charges were untrue.61 The
Supreme Court held that Machibroda was entitled to a hearing on his
claims. The Court reasoned:
There can be no doubt that, if the allegations contained in the
petitioner's motion and affidavit are true, he is entitled to have
his sentence vacated. A guilty plea, if induced by promises or
threats which deprive it of the character of a voluntary act, is
void. A conviction based upon such a plea is open to collateral
attack. "A plea of guilty differs in purpose and effect from a
mere admission or an extra-judicial confession; it is itself a con-
55. There were very few cases, all revolving around the right to counsel. In Von Moltke v.
Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948), a plurality of four Justices would have held an uncounseled plea
invalid in the absence of a sufficient waiver of counsel. Justices Frankfurter and Jackson,
whose votes were necessary for disposition, thought that Von Moltke was entitled to relief only
if she had in fact received legal advice (conceded to be erroneous) from an FBI agent. Id. at
727-31.
Canizio v. New York, 327 U.S. 82 (1946), involved the sole claim that a plea was invalid
because it was entered in the absence of counsel. The Court held that on the facts of the
particular case, where counsel had been appointed prior to sentencing, had actively repre-
sented Canizio, and could have moved but didn't move to vacate the plea, Canizio was not
deprived of his right to counsel. Id. at 87.
Finally, in Pennsylvania ex rel. Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116 (1956), the Court upheld
an attack on guilty pleas to 30 separate charges by an uncounseled defendant to whom the
charges had never been explained. Id. at 121-22. An alternative ground was that the pleas
may have been the product of a prior coerced confession. Id. at 117.
56. 368 U.S. 487 (1962).
57. Id at 488.
58. Id at 489.
59. Id
60. Id. at 490.
61. Id at 488-90.
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vition .... Out of just consideration for persons accused of
crime, courts are careful that a plea of guilty shall not be ac-
cepted unless made voluntarily after proper advice and with
full understanding of the consequences.
62
This looks like strong language. Giving the words their natural
meaning, taking into account the factual background against which they
were written, they cut a broad swath. The case is not even a close one-
"[tihere can be no doubt" that the allegations make out a claim.63 Since
the only threat in the record is the threat to bring additional charges, it
follows that a plea "induced" by such a threat is "void." Similarly, since
the only promises alleged are promises that the maximum sentence
would be no more than twenty years, a plea "induced" by such a promise
must be equally "void." 6 Thus, the Kercheval standard, dormant for
thirty-five years, blossomed in a successful collateral attack on a convic-
tion, suggesting it is not merely a statement of usual practice or even a
rule of federal procedure, but a requirement of constitutional
magnitude.65
Yet Machibroda retains the puzzling vagueness characteristic of the
guilty plea cases. Once again, all parties seem to have accepted without
question that the allegations, if true, made out a claim for relief.66 The
only real dispute was over the procedures to be followed in determining
62. Id. at 493 (citations omitted) (quoting Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223
(1927)) (ellipses in Kercheval quotation added). The omitted citations, which appear immedi-
ately following the sentence about collateral attack, are to Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275
(1941); Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942); Shelton v. United States, 356 U.S. 26 (1958)
and, in a footnote, to a passel of lower court cases. Shelton, the only Supreme Court case
among these not already discussed, accepted the Solicitor General's concession that a specific
plea was involuntary for a variety of factors, including the petitioner's illness at the time the
plea was entered. Id. at 26.
63. Machibroda, 368 U.S. at 493.
64. The district court seems to have taken this view of the law. In a passage quoted with
apparent approval by the Supreme Court, it stated its view that "the 'charges of an agreement
between a former Assistant United States Attorney and the defendant are serious,"' and said
that it would hold a hearing if there were any doubt about their falsity. Id. at 493-94 (quoting
United States v. Machibroda, 184 F. Supp. 881, 883 (N.D. Ohio 1959), affirmed, 280 F.2d 379
(1960), vacated, 368 U.S. 487 (1962)). But see infra note 70.
65. Machibroda sought relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a collateral attack procedure sub-
stantially equivalent to habeas corpus for prisoners in federal custody. Id. at 488. Relief under
section 2255 is generally only available for claims of constitutional error. See Sunal v. Large,
332 U.S. 174 (1949). In Machibroda and a companion case, Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424
(1962), the Court held that failure to follow the formal requirements of then Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 32(a) and to ask the defendant if he has anything to say before sentence is
imposed is not cognizable under section 2255. Hill, 368 U.S. at 428. Hill was recently reaf-
firmed in United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 783 (1979).
66. Machibroda, 368 U.S. at 493.
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whether the allegations were true.67 Thus, the Court's attention was
never closely directed to the issues that concern us here. Machibroda
was represented by counsel during the discussions and when he entered
his plea. If his allegations were true, however, the prosecutor not only
negotiated with him in the absence of counsel but expressly told him not
to mention those discussions to his lawyer.68 The prosecutor's state-
ments were either deliberate lies or disastrously inaccurate predictions,
presented as certainties. In either event Machibroda was wrongly ad-
vised by a government attorney.69 Thus the case did not present the
question of promises made and kept.7" The Supreme Court's statement
that the "threats" in the case would vitiate the plea is only an alternative
ground. And the function of the Kercheval statement in the opinion is
not clear. It may be only a decorative flourish. Even if the reference was
intended to present a substantive standard for the acceptance of guilty
pleas, the key word, "voluntarily," is undefined. If Kercheval did create
a standard, it could be one of the rare cases in which nonconstitutional
grounds formed a basis for collateral attack on a federal conviction.7
Two remaining cases are rich in suggestion, but not in specificity. In
United States v. Jackson,72 the Court held a sentencing scheme that al-
67. The district court felt the allegations stated a claim. The government did not contest
the point in the Supreme Court. Brief for the United States, at 37-44, Machibroda v. United
States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962). Justices Clark, Frankfurter and Harlan, the sole dissenters, ar-
gued only that the allegations were clearly false. See Machibroda, 368 U.S. at 496-501 (Clark,
J., dissenting).
68. Cf Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (prohibiting on right-to-counsel
grounds the use against a defendant of incriminating statements elicited from him after he had
been indicted and in the absence of his lawyer).
69. Machibroda, 368 U.S. at 489-90.
70. Cf Von Moltke, 332 U.S. at 729 (Frankfurter, J., separate opinion) (guilty plea would
be invalid if it were based on bad legal advice from a government agent in the absence of
counsel for the defendant).
Noting that the "charges of an agreement" between the prosecutor and Machibroda "are
serious," the district court suggested that it would have granted relief if they were true. See
Machibroda, 368 U.S. at 493-94. This language, however, might in context have meant not
that all agreements were improper, but only that this particular, unkept one was. The district
judge who heard the section 2255 motion was the one who had taken the plea and imposed the
sentence. He would likely have remembered if he had agreed to a 20-year sentence. If he had
not, the prosecutor's supposed statements would have been false, and the judge would have
known this when he was discussing Machibroda's claim.
71. For the general rule denying collateral relief for error neither constitutional nor juris-
dictional, see Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174 (1947); for the meaning of "jurisdictional" in this
context, see Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19 (1939). For the sole exception explicitly upheld
by the Supreme Court, see Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333 (1974) (statutory claim). See
generally Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, supra note 12, at 1066-72. The
Court regularly states that relief is available "only if [the] custody is in violation of the Federal
Constitution." See, eg., Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504 (1984).
72. 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
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lowed the death penalty to be imposed on defendants who were convicted
by a jury, but not on defendants convicted at bench trials or on guilty
pleas to be unconstitutional.73 The scheme was impermissible because it
"needlessly encourage[d]" guilty pleas and jury waivers.74 In United
States v. Jackson, the United States argued that the scheme was permissi-
ble because trial judges would, in any event, reject coerced pleas of
guilty.7" The Court found this argument insufficient even if it were true.
The Court stated:
A procedure need not be inherently coercive in order that it be
held to impose an impermissible burden .... Thus [our conclu-
sion that the scheme is unconstitutional] ... hardly implies that
every defendant who enters a guilty plea to a charge under the
Act does so involuntarily....
... So, too, in Griffin v. California, the Court held that com-
ment on a defendant's failure to testify imposes an impermissi-
ble penalty on the exercise of the right to remain silent at trial.
Yet it obviously does not follow that every defendant who ever
testified at a pre-Griffin trial in [states following the California
rule] ... is entitled to automatic release upon the theory that
his testimony must be regarded as compelled.76
The importance of this passage is the light that it sheds on the
Court's notion of what an "involuntary" guilty plea was in 1968. Unfor-
tunately, much of the light is at wavelengths beyond human perception.
The Court clearly rejected an argument sub hoc ergo propter hoc-some
guilty pleas under the Act were voluntary even though they were entered
at a time when the unconstitutional penalty scheme was in effect. The
illustrative example suggests that this is so because, in the Court's view,
some defendants who pleaded guilty did so for reasons entirely unrelated
to the existence of the penalty scheme. Certainly, some defendants who
testified in California before Griffin did so because they wanted to get
their testimony to the jury, and not merely to avoid adverse comment by
the prosecutor if they did not. However, the Court's quoted statement
did not answer the question whether a guilty plea is involuntary if it is
73. The sentencing scheme did not compel the death penalty for defendants convicted by
jury trial. Id. at 570-71.
74. Id. at 583 (emphasis omitted). United States v. Jackson is also important in determin-
ing the propriety of the threats used to persuade a defendant to plead guilty. That aspect of the
case is discussed at infra notes 192-216 and accompanying text.
75. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. at 583.
76. Id. at 583 & n.25 (citing Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965)) (citations and
footnote omitted).
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entered in order to avoid a possible death penalty. It would still be con-
sistent with the quoted language to argue that such a motive for entering
a plea is simply irrelevant to "voluntariness."77 United States v. Jackson,
therefore, cannot be used to distinguish between these two polar
alternatives.
Equally suggestive, but in the end equally inconclusive, is McCarthy
v. United States.78 In McCarthy, the Court held that Rule 11 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure required the judge accepting a guilty
plea to question the defendant personally in order to determine whether
the plea was "truly voluntary."7 9 The defendant's underlying claim in
McCarthy was that his guilty plea was based on his mistaken belief that
inadvertent tax errors were criminal under the statute he was charged
with violating.80 Characterizing the guilty plea as a waiver of other
rights, the Court stated that "[flor this waiver to be valid under the Due
Process Clause, it must be 'an intentional relinquishment or abandon-
ment of a known right or privilege.' 1 Consequently, if a defendant's
guilty plea is not equally voluntary and knowing, it has been obtained in
violation of due process and is therefore void."82 The Court returned to
the waiver concept and expressly stated that standards developed for
other waiver situations were identical with, and not merely similar to,
those for guilty pleas. The Court's language also indicates that, by 1969,
it was reading Machibroda as a constitutional decision. But in light of
the claim actually presented, the relevance of all this language is a little
puzzling. McCarthy did not claim that he misunderstood any constitu-
tional rights that he had waived. His actual claim was dealt with in the
sentence following the one quoted above. "Moreover, because a guilty
plea is an admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge, it
cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses an understand-
77. The tenor of the Jackson remarks suggests that the author of the opinion, at least, then
felt a plea of guilty entered solely to avoid the possibility of a death penalty would be "involun-
tary." But the language, advertently or not, is consistent with other possibilities.
78. 394 U.S. 459 (1969). Justice Black, dubiously, concurred only in the result. Id. at 477
(Black, J., concurring).
79. Id. at 472, 477. The Rule has since been substantially amended, and in its present
form requires the court to inquire whether a guilty plea is the result of negotiations. FED, R.
CRiM. P. 1 l(d). If it is, the judge must give the defendant additional information and, in some
cases, allow him to plead anew if the judge does not accept the agreement. FED. R. CRIM. P.
1 l(e).
80. McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 460-62. McCarthy's real unhappiness seems to have been that
he expected but did not get probation. IM. at 462.
81. At this point, the Court cited Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
82. McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 466 (citing eg., Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487,493
(1962); Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948); Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942)
(citation omitted) (emphasis added)).
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ing of the law in relation to the facts."83
The guilty plea cases thus circle like planets around a dim and fuzzy
sun. The central concept of "voluntariness" is critically important, but
its precise contours are hard to discern. Certainly, a pleading defendant
must have some knowledge of the applicable law. A plea of guilty is not
voluntary if the defendant is mistaken in believing that even if his version
of the facts were accepted, he would be guilty of the crime charged.84
Equally certainly, some kinds of improper behavior by the prosecutor
will vitiate a plea. The prosecutor cannot lie, or threaten to manufacture
false evidence, or make an unfulfilled promise of benefit.85 The cases do
imply that some other "threats or promises," perhaps any "threats or
promises," will likewise vitiate a plea. 6 But against this ambiguous im-
plication is the fact that in several cases which actually involved bar-
gained pleas, the Court knew of the bargain and said little or nothing to
indicate its disapproval.8 7 The point was not raised in those cases, and
perhaps the opinions simply reflect a practice not to deal with questions
not presented by the parties.
It is fair to conclude that the Court had not thought very much
about the particular problems of bargained guilty pleas. The cases, how-
83. Id. (emphasis added).
The Court decided two other guilty plea cases that term, neither of which adds anything
of substance to the standards for voluntariness. Halliday v. United States, 394 U.S. 83f
(1969), simply held (without oral argument) that McCarthy was not to be retroactively ap-
plied. The opinion noted that McCarthy involved a prophylactic rule and that previously en-
tered involuntary pleas could still be collaterally attacked. Finally, in Boykin v. Alabama, 395
U.S. 238 (1969), the Court in effect applied the prophylactic rule of McCarthy to the states
through the due process clause. Boykin was something of a horror case, where a black defend-
ant, who had pleaded guilty to five counts of armed robbery, received from an Alabama jury a
sentence of death on each count, even though apparently none of the victims had been harmed.
Id. at 239-40. The petition for certiorari presented only the question whether the death pen-
alty in such circumstances was cruel and unusual punishment, and the case was badly argued
by well-meaning but ill-prepared counsel. In the course of a rambling opinion, the Court
analogized pleas of guilty to confessions, and stated that "the same standard must be applied in
determining whether a plea of guilty is voluntarily made." Id. at 242. Then the Court reiter-
ated the notion of guilty pleas as a waiver of other constitutional rights, several of which it
listed. Id. at 243. Boykin could be important, but the egregious nature of its facts and the
irrelevance of the grounds of decision to anything briefed or argued make it impossible for me
to give weight to the details of the opinion.
84. McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 466, 469.
85. Machibroda, 368 U.S. at 493 (unfulfiled promises, at the least); Waley, 316 U.S. 101
(false evidence); Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329 (1941) (lies).
86. See supra notes 55-71 and accompanying text.
87. In McCarthy, the defendant pleaded guilty to one count of an indictment and the other
two counts were dismissed. 394 U.S. at 460-61. In Canizio, the defendant pleaded guilty to
one charge "on condition" that he not be prosecuted on two others. 327 U.S. at 85. The plea
in Von Moltke also appears to have been the result of a bargain. 332 U.S. at 709-10.
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ever, are clear and consistent on one point-doctrine developed in three
analogous areas are relevant to the constitutionality of pleas of guilty.
Time and again, the Court analogized "involuntary" guilty pleas to
"compelled" self-incrimination,"8 to "coercdd" confessions89 and to the
"involuntary" waiver of constitutional rights in general.9" By 1970, as
will appear below, these three doctrines had substantially cohered.
Before that time, however, they developed independently. I will there-
fore consider them separately.
C. "Compelled" Self-Incrimination
The fifth amendment provides that no person "shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself .... 91 The Supreme
Court's analogy between pleas of guilty and self-incriminatory statements
suggests that standards for guilty pleas could be formed by considering
cases in which the Court had determined that particular statements were
or were not "compelled" within the meaning of the fifth amendment. 92
However, surprisingly few such cases exist.93 The Court has, of course,
88. See, eg., Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242; United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. at 583; Waley,
316 U.S. at 104; cf Kercheval, 274 U.S. at 223.
89. See, eg., Pennsylvania ex rel. Herman, 350 U.S. at 118; Waley, 316 U.S. at 104;
O'Grady, 312 U.S. at 334.
90. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243; McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 466; O'Grady, 312 U.S. at 334; ef
Waley, 316 U.S. at 104.
91. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
92. A second line of self-incrimination cases exists. This second line involves circum-
stances in which pressure has been applied to persuade an individual to talk but no statements
have been forthcoming, and the person pressured seeks judicial review of the legality of the
pressure. These cases are discussed under the doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions" infra
notes 169-216 and accompanying text.
93. At one time, the Court's self-incrimination decisions routinely noted that the privilege
was waived if it was not specifically claimed. Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137, 150 (1949)
(finding no waiver); United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 263-64 (1927) (finding waiver);
Rafel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494, 496-97 (1926) (same); but see Adams v. Maryland, 347
U.S. 179, 181 (1954) (dictum, arguably ambiguous).
Notwithstanding Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897), holding that a confession
violated the privilege against self-incrimination despite the fact that no claim of privilege was
raised at the time of the questioning, the Smith line of cases may have discouraged counsel
from basing their arguments on the fifth amendment. Typical suspects questioned by federal
police agents presumably did not make explicit reference to their privilege against self-incrimi-
nation.
Beginning in 1938, the Court, for a considerable period of time, committed itself to the
proposition that waiver of a constitutional right must be "an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
This rule was specifically applied to the privilege against self-incrimination without discussion
or even mention of the Smith line of cases. Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 70-71 (1969)
(Harlan, J.); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966). There is a continuing tension
between the requirements of Smith and the waiver doctrine of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458.
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frequently dealt with extrajudicial confessions of guilt. But the Court
disposed of most confession cases coming from the federal courts on
grounds independent of the privilege against self-incrimination.94 As late
as 1951 the Court expressed doubt whether, in federal cases, the fifth
amendment was even a relevant source of law governing the admissibility
of confessions obtained from an accused in police custody.95 Addition-
ally, the use of such confessions given to state officers was not generally
governed by the fifth amendment until 1964.96 Even after that date, state
confession cases appear governed far more by due process than by fifth
amendment standards, and will be considered under that rubric.9 7
1. Confessions to the police
There are very few fifth amendment cases which deal with confes-
sions to the police. In Brain v. United States,98 the Court expressly stated
that the relevant source of law regulating confessions taken from those in
police custody was the fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.99 The rule, "expressed in the text-books, ' '1°" was that "a confession
... must be free and voluntary: that is, must not be extracted by any sort
of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises,
however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influence."' 1
That rule was applied in Bran to exclude a confession from a sus-
94. E.g., McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943) (violation of Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (denial of sixth amend-
ment right to counsel).
95. United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36,41 (1951). Mr. Justice Stewart expressed simi-
lar doubts as late as 1968. Grosso, 390 U.S. at 76-77 (Stewart, J., concurring). See generally
Developments in the Law, Confessions, supra note 20, at 960-61.
Some of the Court's federal confession cases exhibit a studied ambiguity towards the rele-
vance of the privilege against self-incrimination. E.g., Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410,
414 n.2 (1948) (Court not deciding "any" fifth amendment claims, due process or self-incrimi-
nation); Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1 (1924) (reversing conviction and citing
Brain, the then leading case on confessions and self-incrimination, but never mentioning the
Constitution or using the phrase "self-incrimination").
96. See supra note 19. If federal officers assisted and the confession was to be used in
federal court, then federal standards would apply. Anderson v. United States, 318 U.S. 350
(1943).
97. See infra notes 109-68 and accompanying text.
98. 168 U.S. 532.
99. Id. at 542.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 542-43 (quoting 3 W. RUSSELL, A TREATISE ON CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS
478 (6th English ed. 1896)). Russell, an English writer, was not purporting to state the law of
the fifth amendment, but only a common-law rule of evidence. Since the Court in Bram felt
that the constitutional provision was merely a crystallization of common-law rules, such cita-
tion was entirely apposite. See Bram, 168 U.S. at 543. As a matter of history the Brain Court
was probably wrong. L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT AGAINST
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pect who had been or who was in the process of being stripped naked.
Other facts persuaded.the Court that the authorities were holding out to
the suspect "a suggestion of some benefit as to the crime and its punish-
ment" if he talked."° 2 After Bram, the Court more or less finessed the
privilege against self-incrimination in extrajudicial confession cases. No
other cases prior to 1964 squarely held a confession was inadmissible
because it was compelled self-incrimination. However, some suggestive
language does exist. Cases occasionally noted that a particular confes-
sion was not in fact the result of any threats or promises. 10 3 Other cases
stated in dicta that a confession would be inadmissible if it were the re-
sult of a threat or promise." Taken together, however, this line of cases
gives little more than a hint of a standard. Bram stated clearly that even
a suggestion of lenience would void a confession on self-incrimination
grounds, but one case in seventy years does not establish a strong
tradition. 105
2. Other circumstances
Occasionally, the Court has been faced with defendants' statements
that were given to government agents who were not police investigators
and that were later attacked as "compelled" under the fifth amendment.
Where testimony is given under a threat of imprisonment or prosecution
if the witness is silent, the Court has routinely concluded that the testi-
mony is "compelled" and thus inadmissible against the witness in a crim-
inal prosecution. 1 6 Similarly, a statement is "compelled" if it is 'nade
SELF-INCRIMINATION 405-32 (1968); McCormick, The Scope of Privilege in the Law of Evi-
dence, 16 TEX. L. REv. 447, 453 (1938).
102. Brain, 168 U.S. at 564-65. The Court also suggested that the confession was inadmis-
sible because it must have been the product of either hope or fear-hope that by talking he
could explain otherwise damaging evidence, and fear that by remaining silent he might be
taken as admitting guilt. Id. at 564. The first of these suggestions is puzzling. The accumula-
tion of evidence tending to show guilt unless satisfactorily explained has not otherwise been
thought a circumstance that would render attempts at explanation "compelled." Indeed, one
is tempted to speculate that this is precisely the explanation for most of the testimony given in
court by defendants in criminal cases.
103. Carignan, 342 U.S. at 40-41 (defendant expressly told that no promises could be made
to him, although "his Maker might think more of him if he told the truth about the crime");
United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65, 69-70 (1944) (spontaneous statements).
104. "In the federal courts, the requisite of voluntariness is not satisfied by establishing
merely that the confession was not induced by a promise or a threat." Ziang Sung Wan, 266
U.S. at 14 (emphasis added).
105. Arguably Bram holds only that afalse promise of lenience will void a confession, since
Bram himself was convicted of murder and sentenced to death-hardly a "lenient" result.
Brain, 168 U.S. at 533.
106. See Adams, 347 U.S. at 181. Compelled statements may be used against the declarant
in a prosecution for perjury in making the statements. United States v. Knox, 396 U.S. 77, 80-
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under a governmental threat of discharge from employment if no state-
ment is forthcoming.1 7 However, the cases do not go beyond this point.
In particular, they are silent about the circumstances-if any-in which
offers of benefit will render an incriminating statement "compelled"
under the fifth amendment. Perhaps this is not surprising, since society
is not in the habit of offering rewards for self-incriminating testimony.108
The Supreme Court's cases considering whether particular state-
ments were "compelled" for purposes of the privilege against self-incrim-
ination, then, are of little more value than the guilty plea cases on the
critical questions surrounding plea bargaining. As with the guilty plea
cases, there is language suggesting that "any threat or promise" will
render a statement "compelled." But no clear holdings appear on this
point, and the general disapproval of "promises" may stand for nothing
more than a disapproval of false or unfulfilled promises. The search for
doctrine applicable to bargained pleas of guilty must continue elsewhere.
D. "Involuntary" Confessions
From at least the eighteenth century, the common law of evidence
developed a body of doctrine limiting the circumstances under which a
confession could be taken if it were later to be introduced into evidence
against its maker.10 9 Although any precise statement of the common-law
rules would have to take account of date and jurisdiction, the cases as a
whole display several common themes. A major concern is to ensure
that unreliable confessions are excluded, although this was never the
rules' sole purpose.110 The language of the cases coheres around the
common requirement that a confession must be "voluntary" to be admis-
sible."' The language and holdings of the cases indicate that a confes-
83 (1969). See also Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 702-13 (1971) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring) (exceptions to the general statement).
107. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
108. In addition, some may find it analytically difficult to find a statement "compelled" if it
has been induced by a promise to do something nice rather than a threat to do something
unpleasant.
109. Wigmore, who believed that confessions were evidence "of the highest value" and gen-
erally opposed limitations on their admissibility if it was satisfactorily proved that they were
made, dates the doctrine to the late seventeenth century. 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRI-
ALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 818-820, 820b at 304 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970). McCormick,
less hostile to the rules than Wigmore, follows his chronology. C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK
ON EVIDENCE § 147(a) (E. Cleary rev. 2d ed. 1972). Leonard Levy dates the rules from the
seventeenth century or earlier. L. LEVY, supra note 101, at 326-29.
110. Regina v. Baldry, 169 Eng. Rep. 568 (Ct. Crim. App. 1852); McCormick, supra note
101, at 451-57.
111. E.g., Regina v. Garner, 169 Eng. Rep. 267 (Ct. Crim. App. 1848). A large collection
of cases is in 3 J. WIGMORE, supra note 109, § 826.
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sion is not voluntary if it is induced by physical violence or threats of
violence," 2 by promises that no prosecution will be brought if the sus-
pect confesses' 1 3 or by promises of lenient treatment if prosecution is
brought. 114
As a matter of constitutional law, the Supreme Court first subjected
confessions by suspects in state custody to scrutiny under the United
States Constitution-in 1936. In Brown v. Mississippi,"' the Court held
that the defendants had been denied due process of law when they were
convicted on the basis of confessions beaten out of them with a metal-
studded belt. The Court analogized these convictions to convictions ob-
tained by the knowing use of perjured testimony.1 16 The facts of the
cases and the choice of analogy both suggested (although the Court never
said so) that a major concern of the rule announced was the prevention of
convictions based on unreliable evidence. Although this theme occasion-
ally reappeared in later cases, most notably in Stein v. New York,"17 it
was decisively repudiated in the early 1960's when the Court squarely
stated that "the reliability of a confession has nothing to do with its
voluntariness."118
Early Supreme Court cases quickly took up the common-law lan-
guage of "voluntariness," although the facts of the cases-and the variety
of common-law doctrines-leave unclear just how much of the substance
of those doctrines was incorporated within this newly constitutionalized
term. 1 9 The Court was quick to say, quite explicitly, that it was con-
cerned only with "voluntariness" with respect to the state of the confess-
112. E.g., Bonner v. State, 55 Ala. 242, 246 (1876); Regina v. Moore, 169 Eng. Rep. 608
(Ct. Crim. App. 1852). The current edition of Wigmore calls this the "clearest" case for exclu-
sion. 3 J. WIGMORE, supra note 109, § 833, at 457.
113. State v. Williamson, 339 Mo. 1038, 99 S.W.2d 76 (1936); Beggarly v. State, 67 Tenn.
520, 522 (1875); Regina v. Gillis, 11 Cox Crim. Cas. 69, 71 (Crim. App. 1866). It is not clear
whether the objection is to the fact of any promise, or to the falsity of the promise actually
made-when it is fulfilled, no prosecution occurs.
114. E.g., People v. Johnson, 41 Cal. 452 (1871) (lighter punishment); Smith v. State, 125
Ga. 252, 54 S.E. 190 (1906) (same); Commonwealth v. Curtis, 97 Mass. 574 (1867) (hope of
lighter sentence). It may be that part of the objection is to the raising of false hopes.
115. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
116. Id. at 286 (citing Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935)).
117. 346 U.S. 156 (1953), overruled by Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 391 (1964). Justice
Frankfurter, dissenting, expressed the hope that Stein was a "temporary, perhaps an ad hoe,
deviation from a long course of decisions," id. at 201 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), and so it
proved.
118. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 384-85 (1964); accord, Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S.
534, 540-41 (1961). Jackson v. Denno expressly overruled Stein. 378 U.S. at 391.
119. E.g., Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547, 555 (1942). In addition, many of the early cases
were unexplicated per curiam decisions, e.g., Lomax v. Texas, 313 U.S. 544 (1941); White v.
Texas, 309 U.S. 631 (1940).
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ing suspect's mind, not with the legality or desirability of the police
practices that produced the confession. 20 By 1960, however, a few cases
began to sound a contrary theme, 2' which, by the close of that decade,
became the primary theme of involuntary confession law. A confession
was involuntary if it was induced by unconstitutional or otherwise imper-
missible police conduct.' 22
1. The concept of voluntariness
There is an ambiguity underlying the "amphibian" concept of vol-
untariness. 123 Tying the law to voluntariness assumes a free will, and
then asks whether that will has been fettered. But fettered by what?
Speech is not a reflex; it is a willed act. One need not be a determinist to
know that all confessions, except those uttered randomly, are the result
of some kind of internal or external pressure.
The question must be why a confession produced by physical torture
(or the threat of physical torture) is "involuntary," but a confession pro-
duced by a sense of guilt is not. One might say that confessions produced
by torture, unlike confessions produced by guilt, are likely to be untrue.
But the decisive rejection of a reliability rationale for excluding involun-
tary confessions closes off this approach. One might also say that the
effects of torture will drive even an ordinary individual beyond the
bounds of rationality, will deprive him of the most elementary power of
self-control. Certainly, cases do suggest that confessions taken from any-
one in such an aberrant state are involuntary.' 24 But the concept of in-
voluntariness is broader than this. By the late 1940's, the Court excluded
confessions based on evidence that in no way suggested that the accused
was in a state of mind approaching temporary insanity.'25 Ultimately,
one is driven to conclude that a confession is "involuntary" if it is the
result of forbidden pressure. 126 Two questions must therefore be an-
120. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 234-35 (1941).
121. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206-07 (1960); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S.
315, 320-21 (1959).
122. Brooks v. Florida, 389 U.S. 413, 414-15 (1967); Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404, 407
(1967); Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35, 38 (1967); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. at 386-88. Cf
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (effect of unconstitutional search and seizure).
123. The metaphor is Justice Frankfurter's. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 605
(1961).
124. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963) (confession given while under influence of
"truth serum" inadmissible); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960) (confession of insti-
tutionalized mental patient inadmissible); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957) (confession
of schizophrenic inadmissible).
125. E.g., Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949).
126. It appears that philosophers writing about the voluntariness of bargained pleas have,
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swered to determine the voluntariness of a confession: What caused the
confession? Was that cause a forbidden one?
2. Causality
In life as well as law, the concept of causality appears as a smooth
plastic surface surrounding a closely intertwined and perhaps tangled
skein of wire. It may be impossible, even in theory, to unpack and follow
those strands. 2 7 It is certainly hard. Ordinarily, answers to causal ques-
tions will generally depend on the purpose for which the question is
asked.12 In matters of criminal responsibility, causation is quite clearly
more than simply a matter of fact; courts will find causation quickly
when the actor hoped to produce the result he did, and find it more hesi-
tantly when the actor did not. 129
Except perhaps at the bedrock "but-for" level of causation, the no-
tion of cause is not solely a factual question. It requires a judgment of
value. One might, therefore, expect that causation in confession cases
would be similarly tangled, but that the Court would be quicker to find
causation the more reprehensible they viewed the provoking practice.
Certainly the cases are consistent with this notion.' 30 But the Court's
factual analysis of causation is typically so compressed that no certain
judgments can be made. 3'
from their own perspective, generally reached this same conclusion. See Philips, supra note 5
at 209, 222-23; Wertheimer, Freedom, Morality, Plea Bargaining, and the Supreme Court, 8
PHIL. & PUB. Ars. 203, 234 (1979). Contra, Kipnis, Criminal Justice and the Negotiated Plea,
86 ETHICS 93 (1976), replied to, Wertheimer, The Prosecutor and the Gunman, 89 ETHICS 269
(1979).
127. Whether causality exists in the universe is one of the questions that have divided physi-
cists of the calibre of Einstein (yes) and Bohr (no) for more than half a century. Most physi-
cists today are in Bohr's camp. For a good popular account, see J. GRIBBIN, IN SEARCH OF
SCHR6DINGER'S CAT 155-76 (1984). For a more technical discussion see, e.g., M. JAMMER,
THE PHILOSOPHY OF QUANTUM MECHANICS: THE INTERPRETATIONS OF QUANTUM
MECHANICS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1974).
128. Suppose a house bums down because a short circuit, a defective fusebox, the house's
wooden structure and the absence of the fire department all coincided. An insurance company
may say the loss was "caused" by the wooden structure, particularly if the owner was paying
rates for concrete. The fire inspectors may focus on the defective fusebox. A legislative inves-
tigating committee might ask where the fire department was.
129. For discussion and a collection of cases, see W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAW
252-66 (1972).
130. For example, the Supreme Court has never questioned causality when the confession
followed immediately upon police violence.
131. E.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969) (stating facts and conclusion of volun-
tariness, nothing more); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62, 65 (1949) (plurality opinion)
("no other possible conclusion" than involuntariness, but no explanation).
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3. Forbidden and permitted pressures
Internal pressures such as shame and guilt have never been held to
vitiate a confession. 132 So long as hopes, fears and other psychological
factors were not played upon or exploited by the police, these factors
have had no place in the congeries of factors relevant to voluntariness.
133
Some kind of external pressure has always been indispensable to a finding
that the "suction process" has unlawfully produced a confession.1
34
Not every external pressure will vitiate a confession, even if it is the
sole cause of the speech. 135 Implicit in virtually every case of police in-
terrogation is the threat that failure to answer will lead at least to further
questioning, or at least to further attempts to persuade the suspect to
agree to more questioning. Although unduly harsh or long interrogation
or the threatened use of it may invalidate a confession, the mere possibil-
ity of additional questioning or asking the suspect to talk will not.
136
Also implicit in virtually every case of police interrogation is the promise
that if the suspect can provide a sufficiently convincing explanation of
innocence, he will be freed and presumably, the police will concentrate
their attention elsewhere. However, this implicit promise is also insuffi-
cient to invalidate a confession.
137
132. Some opinions do suggest that a different result might be reached in truly pathological
cases. See cases cited supra note 124.
133. Finding that a confession was "spontaneous" has always terminated the inquiry into
voluntariness. E.g., United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65, 69-70 (1944); cf Miranda, 384
U.S. at 478 (dictum) (spontaneity ends voluntariness inquiry).
134. "A statement to be voluntary of course need not be volunteered. But... [w]hen a
suspect speaks because he is overborne ... yielding to questioning... is plainly the product of
the suction process of interrogation and therefore the reverse of voluntary." Watts v. Indiana,
338 U.S. 49, 53 (1949) (plurality opinion) (Frankfurter, J.).
135. Given the underlying uncertainty about concepts of causation, see supra note 127, it
may be difficult to speak of any event as the "sole cause" of another one. See supra note 128. I
use the term here because it is common in everyday speech, and contains none of the cumber-
some and sometimes contradictory baggage attached to all of the technical adjectives--"proxi-
mate," "legal," and so forth-attached to "cause" in legal writing.
136. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975). In extreme cases, this will not always be true.
Ziang Sung Wan, 266 U.S. at 8-14 (doctor testified suspect was in pain and would have signed
"anything" to get questioning to stop). Cf Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74 & 474 n.25.
137. There is still no clear answer to the question when an individual may be detained
against his will for investigation or questioning, how long he may be detained, or under what
circumstances. See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 228-29 (1985) ("difficult to define"
limitations when past criminal activity is being investigated, reserving question whether prob-
able cause is required if crime is not a felony); United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685
(1985) ("no rigid time limitation" on investigative stops). Cf. J. CHOPER, Y. KAMISAR & L.
TRIBE, THE SUPREME COURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 1979-1980: AN EDITED
TRANSCRIPT OF THE SECOND ANNUAL SUPREME COURT REVIEW AND CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW SYMPOSIUM 140-41 (D. Opperman ed. 1981).
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4. Lies and trickery
Social consensus regarding whether (or when) lies and trickery may
be an appropriate means of obtaining a confession is unlikely.'1 8 The
Court's cases reflect society's ambivalence. In Spano v. New York,
139
Spano confessed only after a close friend, under police instructions,
falsely told Spano that the friend and his family would be in serious
trouble if Spano did not admit guilt. The Court held the confession in-
voluntary, and Spano has been interpreted as forbidding the use of con-
fessions obtained by false statements. But the Court's opinion mentioned
Spano's inexperience, and also the fact that the confession was obtained
after indictment and after Spano had requested and had been refused an
opportunity to speak to his lawyer. 14° Four concurring Justices would
have based the decision squarely upon this latter ground.
14 1
On the other hand, in Frazier v. Cupp,142 the Court upheld as volun-
tary a confession which had promptly followed a false police statement
that a companion had confessed and a sympathetic statement that the
victim had probably started the fight.' 4a The Court merely noted that
the false statements were "relevant," but were "insufficient in our view to
make this otherwise voluntary confession inadmissible."'" The only ex-
planation why the false statements were insufficient was that cases in-
volving voluntariness must be decided "by viewing the 'totality of the
circumstances.' ""5 The facts of Frazier make it easy to suspect that the
confession might have been the product not of the lies, but of the sympa-
thetic attitude of the police, or perhaps of other factors. If so, finding the
confession voluntary does not imply that police lies can ever permissibly
138. An extensive body of law, on the other hand, exists expressing hostility to those who
lie to the government. It is a crime to lie to a federal official concerning a matter properly
under investigation, even if the statements are not under oath. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982) (pro-
viding for up to five years in jail as punishment); see Note, Obscene Harpies and Foul Buz-
zards? The FBI's Use of Section 1001 in Criminal Investigations, 78 YALE L.J. 156 (1968).
The Supreme Court has held that unconstitutional compulsion to speak is no defense to a
prosecution for perjury. United States v. Knox, 396 U.S. 77 (1969). It has expressed disap-
proval of lying under oath in the strongest terms. E.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222,
224-25 (1971). For an excellent discussion of society's ambivalence about lying, see S. BOK,
LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE (1978).
139. 360 U.S. 315.
140. Id. at 317-19, 321-23.
141. Id. at 324-27 (Douglas, J., Black, J., Brennan, J., and Stewart, J., concurring). All of
the concurring Justices joined the opinion of the Court.
142. 394 U.S. 731.
143. Id. at 737-39.
144. Id at 739. The Court here was speaking explicitly about the false police statement
that the companion had confessed, and not about the policeman's later sympathetic comments.
145. Id. (quoting Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 708 (1967)).
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produce a voluntary confession. 46 Moreover, a lie may not be believed,
and perhaps the Court's unwillingness ever to state outright that lies will
invalidate a confession goes only to the question of cause. When lies are
shown by the record, the Court has noted or emphasized their pres-
ence.'47 In light of the strong disapproval of lies in other contexts, it
seems fair to read the cases as holding that the government may not lie to
induce a confession, and that if it does and the lie, believed, causes a
confession, that confession is involuntary.1
48
5. Bargains
Involuntary confession cases occasionally state that a confession is
involuntary if it is induced by promises of benefit. 49 But the cases are
146. Frazier cited Clewis v. Texas, which was relevant to Frazier only in that the Clewis
opinion, too, had mentioned that the determination of voluntariness must be made considering
all relevant circumstances. 386 U.S. 707, 708-10 (1967). There were no lies in that case. This,
if anything, strengthens the proposition that the confession in Frazier was upheld because the
Court did not believe the lies "caused" the confession, not because a confession produced by
lies is voluntary.
147. In Watts v. Indiana, the Court held involuntary a confession given by a suspect ar-
rested on a Wednesday and held incommunicado for almost a week in a cell with no place to
sit or sleep except the floor. 338 U.S. 49 (1949). When not in the cell, he was constantly
questioned. However, nothing indicated that Watts was lied to. The same day in Turner v.
Pennsylvania, the Court held involuntary a confession taken from a suspect held in custody for
five days, apparently under tolerable conditions, who was never questioned more than six
hours in any day. 338 U.S. 62 (1949). He was, however, falsely told that other suspects had
implicated him. Id. at 63-64. A plurality of the Court found Watts and Turner indistinguish-
able, a difficult conclusion unless the lies in Turner weighed heavily in the scales. Id. at 65.
In Rogers v. Richmond, the Court held a state conviction invalid because the state courts
had applied the wrong standard of voluntariness. 365 U.S. 534 (1961). Since the Court was
formally reviewing only the standard applied and not the ultimate question of voluntariness,
no specific discussion of the latter point exists. But the Court's discussion of the facts empha-
sized that Rogers confessed only after the police chief feigned a telephone call directing the
police to be ready to bring in Rogers' sick wife for questioning, and later emphasized that she
was about to be arrested. Id at 535-38, 541-43; see also Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528
(1963) (prohibiting either lies or bargains, and perhaps both). For a discussion of Lynumn, see
infra notes 156-65 and accompanying text.
148. In Moran v. Burbine, a divided Court held that a suspect's confession taken after the
police had falsely assured his attorney that he would not be questioned was not involuntary.
475 U.S. 412 (1986). The Court emphasized that the misstatement had not been made-or
otherwise communicated-to the defendant, but only to his attorney.
149. E.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513, 517 (1963). "Threats" and "promises"
are sometimes hard to separate. Is a suspect "threatened" with further violence or "promised"
peaceful treatment if he is being beaten and the police tell him they will quit if he confesses? It
may not be important to distinguish between these two concepts. To the extent that it is, this
Article will use "threat" to mean the threat of more harm than the law permits, and "promise"
to mean the promise of less harm than the law allows. The beaten suspect is being threatened.
If he were told that his confession would get him less than the maximum possible sentence, he
would be getting a promise.
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far more equivocal than that language. Threats of additional question-
ing, or promises of release if a statement proves the suspect's innocence,
have not ordinarily invalidated a confession. 15 In one case, the Supreme
Court explicitly upheld a confession that was the result of a bargain. In
Stein v. New York,"' the suspect, Cooper, confessed to the police only
after he was able to obtain their promise to release his jailed father and
not to charge his brother with parole violation if Cooper confessed.
152
The Court not only approved the lower courts' finding that the confes-
sion was voluntary, 153 but also emphasized that Cooper's desire to sell
his statements was a factor supporting voluntariness. 154 However, Stein
was premised on a reliability-based theory of voluntariness which the
Court has since abandoned.1
5 5
On the other hand, in Lynumn v. Illinois,156 the Court held a confes-
sion induced by threats that the suspect's children would be taken away
if she didn't cooperate, combined with promises of lenient treatment if
she confessed to be involuntary. In Lynumn, the Chicago police arrested
one Zeno for possession of narcotics, and then promised to go easy on
him if he would "set somebody up."1157 He purported to purchase mari-
juana from Lynumn in circumstances suggesting that she might have
been framed."5 8 The police immediately arrested Lynumn and interro-
gated her in her apartment.' 9 Discovering that she had children, one
officer told her that the children might be taken from her if she were
arrested and charged, and that her welfare payments would be cut off."'
However, they said, "if she wished to cooperate, we would be willing to
recommend to the State leniency in her case."' 1 The officers said this
"more than once."' 62 After initially denying any sale, she finally claimed
150. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
151. 346 U.S. 156.
152. Id. at 167.
153. In compliance with the oddities of New York procedure, the jury simultaneously de-
termined voluntariness of the confession and guilt of the accused, but rendered only a general
verdict of guilt or innocence. Thus, there was no clear finding at trial that the confession was
voluntary. The jury could have found the suspect's confession involuntary and disregarded it.
See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) (holding the procedure unconstitutional).
154. Stein, 346 U.S. at 186.
155. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. at 383-85 ("underpinning of Stein ... unequivocally put to
rest"); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961). Stein itself was overruled on another point
in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. at 391.
156. 372 U.S. 528 (1963).
157. Id. at 529.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 529-30.
160. Id. at 531-34.
161. Id. at 532.
162. Id. at 533.
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there had been one-in her words, because of "the hope of saving myself
from going to jail and being taken away from the children."'' 63 She was
convicted of the sale and sentenced to not less than ten (nor more than
eleven) years in the penitentiary.' 6
The Court thought it "clear" that the confession was involuntary,
but never explained why; counsel for Illinois conceded the involuntari-
ness of the confession. 65 The Court may have felt that the promises of
leniency were false (she got ten "lenient" years); or that the statements
about the children were bad law; or that promises of leniency, generally,
would vitiate a confession; or simply that even if everything told her was
true, Lynumn was simply not capable at the time of dealing with the
truth.
Thus the import of Stein and Lynumn is not entirely clear. One
commentator has suggested that they can be reconciled by concluding
that a defendant may bargain away his statements if he is sufficiently in
control of himself to negotiate well, but not otherwise.' 66 This resolu-
tion, however, is insufficient. Stein was decided on the since-rejected the-
ory that a confession not produced by violence or the threat of physical
violence is involuntary only if it is likely to be untrue.' 67 With this no-
tion of voluntariness rejected, the holding stands in limbo, unsupported
by a rationale but not clearly wrong until measured against the proper
concept of voluntariness and found wanting. That concept is that a con-
fession is involuntary if it is the product of illegal pressures.' 68 The ques-
tion therefore becomes whether the pressures involved in the bargaining
process are themselves illegal. Stein has been repudiated, and Lynumn is
too ambiguous to provide an answer. However, one body of law deals
directly with questions of this kind-the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions.
E. Unconstitutional Conditions
The vast bulk of governmental action in the United States is free
163. Id. at 531-32.
164. Id. at 529.
165. Id. at 534-35.
166. Developments in the Law-Confessions, supra note 20, at 978-79.
167. See Stein, 346 U.S. at 182-87. For rejection of the Stein theory, see supra text accom-
panying note 117.
168. The Stein opinion did not wholly reject this notion. Explaining why physical violence
or threats of violence would inevitably void a confession, the Court mentioned that such vio-
lence "serves no lawful purpose." Stein, 346 U.S. at 182. Psychological pressures, on the
other hand, often served entirely proper purposes. Id at 184-86. Furthermore, illegal deten-
tion at the time was solely a matter of state law. Id at 186-88.
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from substantial constitutional scrutiny.169 Burdens and benefits, taxes
and welfare, licenses and jobs are apportioned, granted and withheld
throughout the country on a daily basis. Governments frequently want
to condition the grant of benefits, or the abatement of burdens, on an
agreement to waive, or not to exercise, at least for the time being, some
constitutional right. At one extreme this is indispensable to the opera-
tion of government. We may have a constitutional right to loaf,170 but
the government can insist we give it up in order to obtain a government
job. At the other extreme, however, allowing the government to condi-
tion receipt of any governmental benefit on the waiver of every constitu-
tional right would effectively destroy all such rights.' 7 1 The doctrine
mediating between these competing considerations is known as the doc-
trine of unconstitutional conditions. 172
While uncertainly applied at the outset, 173 by the late 1960's the
doctrine was well developed. If benefits were to be conditioned upon the
waiver of constitutional rights, the state was required to show a purpose
for the waiver that was more than a simple desire to prevent the exercise
of those rights.' 74 Since the right being waived was of constitutional
magnitude, the relationship between the benefit granted and the waiver
demanded had to be far closer than the "rational relationship" tradition-
ally demanded by due process and equal protection analysis. 175 Coerced
169. This does not mean that no constitutional constraints apply, but merely that, after
those constraints have been applied, there remains an immense freedom of choice-whether to
license optometrists at all, for instance, and if so, under what standards.
170. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972).
171. If one expands the notion of "benefit" to mean anything the government is not forbid-
den from doing to an individual, the point is obvious. It would be impossible to survive for
long with no rights but those guaranteed by the Constitution.
172. The doctrine in its heyday generated a vast amount of literature. Among the best
discussions are Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Pivilege Distinction in Constitutional
Law, 81 HARV. L. Rv. 1439 (1968); Note, Another Look at Unconstitutional Conditions, 117
U. PA. L. REv. 144 (1968); Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARv. L. RaV. 1595 (1960).
173. Compare Security Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Prewitt, 202 U.S. 246 (1906) (right of foreign
corporation to conduct business conditioned on waiver of right to remove lawsuits to federal
courts) and Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897), overruled by Terral v. Burke Constr.
Co., 257 U.S. 529 (1922) (access to public property conditioned on waiver of public speaking)
and McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892) (policeman
fired for "talk[ing] politics") with Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S.
583 (1926) (invalidating waiver of right against uncompensated takings as condition of access
to public property) and Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 529 (1922) (partially overruling
Prewitt) and Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1 (1910) (invalidating franchise tax
on corporation's entire stock).
174. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 631 (1969); United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S.
570, 581 (1968) ("patently" unconstitutional if no such showing).
175. For due process purposes, a relationship was "rational" if it was not, demonstrably,
more likely untrue than true. E.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 485-88
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waivers had to be necessary 176 to promote a state interest of substantial
importance. 177
The cases arose in different contexts and occasionally generated dif-
ferent syntax in the opinions. An individual might be required to execute
a formal waiver of rights as a condition for the receipt of benefits, and
subsequently litigate the validity of the waiver. In Garrity v. New
Jersey,17 8 police officers were questioned during an investigation into
ticket-fixing. They were told they had a right to remain silent; that if
they spoke, their statements might be used against them in a criminal
prosecution; and that if they did remain silent, they could be fired for
their silence. The officers spoke and were later convicted of crimes on
the basis of their answers.17 1 Using the language of "coercion," the
Supreme Court held the statements to be involuntary and reversed the
convictions.180
In other cases, an individual asked to waive his rights might refuse,
and thereafter be denied a benefit for his refusal. Subsequent litigation
would concern the propriety of denying the benefit. In Gardner v. Brod-
erick,"'1 a policeman was summoned before a grand jury investigating
police corruption. Asked to sign a waiver of his privilege against self-
incrimination, he was told that he would be fired if he refused to sign.
He refused and he was fired. He brought suit seeking reinstatement and
back pay.182 The Supreme Court held unconstitutional the New York
City Charter provision which commanded the firing of any city employee
who refused to waive the privilege against self-incrimination in any inves-
tigation concerning city affairs. "[T]he great privilege against self-in-
crimination does not tolerate the attempt, regardless of its ultimate
effectiveness, to coerce a waiver of the immunity it confers on penalty of
(1958); Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943). For equal protection purposes, the issue was
similar but not always identical. E.g. Williamson, 348 U.S. at 486-87. See generally Tussman
& tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341 (1949).
176. See generally United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 582-83 (1968); Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479, 488-89 (1960). "Necessary" in this context as in others is a term of art. It did
not mean "absolutely necessary"; the state need not expend all its resources before it condi-
tions a benefit on a waiver. Generally, however, if an equally costly but less burdensome alter-
native was available, the state's choice was not "necessary"; nor was it "necessary" if a more
costly but less burdensome alternative was available, unless the additional cost was wholly
disproportionate to the gain in constitutionally protected liberties. See generally Wormuth &
Mirkin, The Doctrine of the Reasonable Alternative, 9 UTAH L. REV. 254 (1964).
177. See generally Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 634; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
178. 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
179. Id. at 494-95.
180. Id. at 496-500.
181. 392 U.S. 273 (1968).
182. Id. at 274-75.
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the loss of employment."' 83
Finally, as was most often the case, an individual might simply exer-
cise a constitutional right, and thereafter be denied a benefit. A con-
victed criminal defendant might exercise his right to challenge an
unconstitutional conviction.184 After his successful challenge, retrial and
reconviction, the state may respond with a less lenient or more harsh
sentence because he had successfully made the challenge. A family
might exercise its right to migrate and settle in a new state that denies
welfare benefits to newcomers. In North Carolina v. Pearce8 ' and Sha-
piro v. Thompson,1 6 the Court held these practices unconstitutional. In
this latter class of cases, the Court frequently used the language "pen-
alty" or "burden." In doing so, the Court would ask whether the prac-
tice would impermissibly "penalize" or "burden" the exercise of a
particular constitutional right. 187  However, frequent cross-citation
among cases in the several classes reveals that the Court was using a
single analytic form, even though the expression varied. 188 Although
many of the early cases involved rights protected under the first amend-
ment, later cases explicitly and implicitly stated that the doctrines devel-
oped there were applicable to constitutional rights whatever their
source. 1
89
One case particularly pertinent to plea bargaining is United States v.
Jackson. 90 The Federal Kidnaping Act provided that a person con-
victed of kidnaping could be executed if the victim had not been released
183. Id. at 279. Other examples of waiver of constitutional rights include Uniformed Sani-
tation Men Ass'n v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280 (1968) and Spevack v. Klein,
385 U.S. 511 (1967).
184. Although the Court has frequently stated that no absolute constitutional right to ap-
peal a criminal conviction exists, e.g., Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310-11 (1966), it is clear
that once a state makes available a mode of appeal, it cannot exclude federal constitutional
questions from that appeal. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
185. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
186. 394 U.S. 618.
187. E.g., Pearce, 395 U.S. at 723-25; Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 634; Griffin v. California, 380
U.S. 609 (1965).
188. Garrity, a coerced waiver case, said it was controlled by the same principle as Spevack,
a case involving refusal to waive. 385 U.S. at 497. Gardner, also a case involving refusal to
waive, relied heavily on Garrity. 392 U.S. at 277.
Of course, where the question was the validity of an executed waiver, there was always the
additional inquiry whether the impermissible pressure produced the waiver, or whether some
other factor did; and the Court consistently retained this distinction. United States v. Jackson,
390 U.S. at 583; Gardner, 392 U.S. at 278-79; Garrity, 385 U.S. at 498-500.
189. The point is explicit in United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. at 582, and implicit in Sha-
piro, 394 U.S. at 634 (citing, inter alia, first amendment and equal protection cases without
noting a distinction).
190. 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
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unharmed. The penalty was not mandatory, however, and it could be
imposed only if the defendant had a jury trial. Defendants convicted
after a bench trial or on plea of guilty could receive nothing more than
life imprisonment.191
The Supreme Court held this sentencing scheme unconstitutional.
192
Speaking for six members of the Court,193 Mr. Justice Stewart noted that
under the statute as construed, a defendant who waived his right to jury
trial, either by opting for a bench trial or by pleading guilty, was "as-
sured" that he would not be sentenced to death if convicted; but a de-
fendant who "seek[s] a jury acquittal stands forewarned" that he may be
sentenced to death if found guilty.'94 Justice Stewart framed the issue by
stating that:
Our problem is to decide whether the Constitution permits the
establishment of such a death penalty, applicable only to those
defendants who assert the right to contest their guilt before a
jury. The inevitable effect ... is, of course, to discourage asser-
tion of the Fifth Amendment right not to plead guilty and to
deter exercise of the Sixth Amendment right to demand a jury
trial. If the provision had no other purpose or effect than to
chill the assertion of constitutional rights by penalizing those
who choose to exercise them, then it would be patently
unconstitutional. 19'
However, the Court agreed with the government's argument that
this was not the sole purpose of the death penalty provisions of the stat-
ute. The provisions were designed to insure that defendants would be
sentenced to death only if a jury thought they should be.19 6 In the gov-
ernment's view, this beneficent purpose made it irrelevant that the provi-
sion might "have the incidental effect of inducing defendants not to"
fight their cases as hard as they could-by demanding a jury trial. 197 The
Court did not agree. "Whatever might be said of Congress' objectives,
they cannot be pursued by means that needlessly chill the exercise of
basic constitutional rights. The question is not whether the chilling effect
191. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1964) (amended 1972). The Court rejected a proposed construc-
tion of the statute that would have avoided the constitutional question, or presented it in a
different light. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. at 572-81.
192. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. at 572.
193. Justices Black and White dissented. Justice Marshall did not participate. Id. at 591
(Black, J., and White, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 581.
195. Id. (footnote omitted).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 581-82 (citations omitted).
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is 'incidental' rather than intentional; the question is whether that effect
is unnecessary and therefore excessive."' 198 In this particular case, it was
"clear" to the Court that the provision was unnecessary in order to serve
the concededly laudable purpose of restricting life-or-death decisions to
juries.' 99 The statute could easily provide that a jury would be em-
paneled to determine the penalty in every case of conviction, whether
after jury trial, bench trial or plea of guilty.
2 °°
Finally, the Court stated:
It is no answer to urge.., that federal trial judges may be
relied upon to reject coerced pleas of guilty and involuntary
waivers of jury trial. For the evil.., is not that [the statute]
necessarily coerces guilty pleas and jury waivers but simply that
it needlessly encourages them. A procedure need not be inher-
ently coercive in order that it be held to impose an impermissi-
ble burden upon the assertion of a constitutional right. Thus
[this case] ... hardly implies that every defendant who enters a
guilty plea to a charge under the Act does so involuntarily.
2 °0
The power to reject coerced guilty pleas and involuntary jury
waivers might alleviate, but it cannot totally eliminate, the con-
stitutional infirmity in the capital punishment provision of the
Federal Kidnaping Act.202
The general question of plea bargaining was mooted in the United
States v. Jackson briefs. The Court was aware of the problem, and stu-
diously avoided going beyond the case actually presented for decision.
20 3
But a case cannot be removed from the stream of law in which it floats.
After United States v. Jackson, the questions seemed clear even if the
answers remained to be formulated. Plea bargaining involves a system of
inducements for defendants who plead guilty, matched by burdens on
198. Id. at 582 (citations omitted).
199. Id.
200. Id. (citations omitted).
201. At this point, the United States v. Jackson Court observed in a footnote:
"See Laboy v. New Jersey. So, too, in Griffin v. California, the Court held that com-
ment on a defendant's failure to testify imposes an impermissible penalty on the exer-
cise of the right to remain silent at trial. Yet it obviously does not follow that every
defendant who ever testified at a pre-Griffin trial [in states following the California
rule]... is entitled to automatic release upon the theory that his testimony must be
regarded as compelled."
Id. at 583 n.25 (citations omitted).
202. Id. at 583. The Court also rejected an argument that it should save the penalty provi-
sions by simply instructing trial judges to reject all pleas of guilty and jury waivers, "Quite
apart from the cruel impact of such a [rule]," the power to accept guilty pleas was "necessary
for the ... practical ... administration of the criminal law." Id. at 584-85.
203. See infra notes 209-11 and accompanying text.
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defendants who do not.2" United States v. Jackson raised two questions
about this system. First, did a particular system of bargained pleas have
any "other purpose or effect than to chill the assertion of constitutional
rights by penalizing those who choose to exercise them"?" 5 If not, the
system would be "patently unconstitutional." 06 If it did, the second
question would be whether the actual system was "necessary" to imple-
ment whatever other purposes it served. If, as in United States v. Jack-
son, those purposes could be served without "chilling," "burdening," or
"encouraging the waiver of" the constitutional right to plead not guilty,
the system as a whole would be unconstitutional. 0
Of course, a plea bargaining case might arise, unlike United States v.
Jackson, after, instead of before, the plea had been entered. If so, United
States v. Jackson did not directly affect the ultimate test for the validity
of a guilty plea-a plea was still, as before, invalid if it was "involun-
tary." But that question, as it appeared from prior cases, was the same as
the question whether the plea was the product of any unconstitutional
pressure.208 If the particular plea bargaining system in effect when the
plea was entered was not in itself unconstitutional, then pleas produced
by the pressures of the system would, as a general matter, be voluntary
and thus valid.209 But if the system in effect when the plea was entered
was unconstitutional, then the only remaining question would be whether
the particular plea was in fact theproduct of the unconstitutional system,
or whether it had been entered for other reasons-for example, the law-
ful, internal pressure of guilt210
The Court carefully avoided answering those questions beyond the
needs of United States v. Jackson itself. It made no effort to survey the
"purpose or effect" of any plea bargaining system in general. It men-
tioned its belief that the power to accept guilty pleas was "necessary" for
the administration of criminal law, but said nothing about the power to
204. Of course the benefits (and thus the burdens as well) may in fact be illusory. See W.
RHODES, supra note 18, concluding that most defendants in the District of Columbia received
the same sentence whether they pleaded guilty or insisted on trial.
205. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. at 581.
206. Id.
207. Similarly, even if some pressures were necessary to serve permissible purposes, not all
pressures would be necessary. United States v. Jackson therefore suggested that even if plea
bargaining could not be eliminated, the Constitution provided a basis for cabining the prosecu-
tor's power.
208. See supra notes 31-168 and accompanying text.
209. Of course, a weak-minded defendant in a particular case could still be driven beyond
rationality by the problem facing him and thus be incapable of entering a voluntary plea.
210. Similarly, if the system were unconstitutional, defendants who had refused to plead
guilty and received harsher sentences as a result could attack the additional portion of their
sentence as a penalty on their decision to demand trial.
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"coerce" or "encourage" guilty pleas.2 1 On the question of voluntari-
ness, the Court contented itself with the obvious point that not all pre-
United States v. Jackson pleas of guilty to kidnaping were necessarily
coerced. Just as California defendants might have decided to testify in
their own defense for reasons independent of the possibility that the pros-
ecutor might comment on their silence, some pre-United States v. Jack-
son defendants might have decided to plead guilty for reasons
independent of their chances of being sentenced to death.21 2
Examination of the purpose, effect and necessity of plea bargaining
systems thus appeared almost unavoidable in determining their constitu-
tionality. The constitutionality of any particular system of plea bargain-
ing could be raised in several ways. First, it could be raised by a
defendant in Jackson's position, who had not yet pleaded and sought to
challenge the legality of the pressure placed on him to plead guilty. Since
such a defendant would be in a position identical to Jackson's, the ques-
tion would be whether the pressure was "unnecessary [to serve legitimate
purposes independent of a desire to encourage guilty pleas] and therefore
excessive. ' 213 Second, it could be raised by a defendant who had refused
or been unable to plead guilty, and was penalized for his insistence on
trial.21' The question, again, would be whether the penalty was neces-
sary to further a state interest of substantial importance.21 5 Finally, the
question could be raised by a defendant who had pleaded guilty under
the pressures of a plea bargaining system and later sought to challenge
his plea as "involuntary" because of those pressures. The particular plea
might not in fact be the "product" of such a system, and thus would not
raise the question of constitutionality since, if the plea bargaining system
did not produce the plea, the issue of voluntariness would be irrelevant.
However, if the plea was produced by the plea bargaining system, then its
voluntariness, under the previously developed standards, 216 would de-
pend on the legality of the pressures that produced it-raising the same
questions of necessity discussed above.
Only one possibility remained that would avoid examination of
these questions of the necessity of plea bargaining. The guilty plea cases
211. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. at 583.
212. Id at 583 & n.25. The analogy is the Jackson Court's. Id.
213. Id at 582-83; see also supra notes 193-204 and accompanying text.
214. For example, in Pettyjohn v. United States, 419 F.2d 651 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. de-
nied, 397 U.S. 1058 (1970), a defendant accepted a plea bargain, but his plea was refused by
the district court as "involuntary" and, when he was ultimately convicted, he received a sen-
tence greater than he could have gotten had the bargain gone through.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 175-77.
216. See supra notes 31-168 and accompanying text.
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analogized the "voluntariness" of guilty pleas to the "voluntariness" of
confessions. Perhaps the analogy, never closely thought through, would
not hold when closely examined. If "voluntariness" meant a different
thing in the guilty plea context than it did in the context of a confession,
there might be a failure of symmetry. A particular plea could be valid
even if produced by an unconstitutional system. This, however, would
only mean that the constitutionality of the system would not be
presented by a case questioning the voluntariness of a plea already en-
tered. The constitutionality of the system would still be presented by
cases like United States v. Jackson, attacking the system prior to entry of
a guilty plea, or by cases brought by defendants who refused or were
unable to plead guilty and were thereby disadvantaged.
It was against this legal background that the Supreme Court decided
the Brady Trilogy.
III. THE BRADY TRILOGY
The Court at last spoke squarely to the practice of plea bargaining in
three cases handed down the same spring day in 1970.217 The Court
concluded that plea bargaining in general was without constitutional
flaw. What is remarkable about these opinions is not the result they
reached; rather, it is the essential lawlessness218 of the opinions
themselves.
In upholding the legitimacy of plea bargaining, the Court did not
rely on any prior cases, interpreted or reinterpreted, to support the con-
clusion it set forth. Precedent was referred to only to demonstrate its
irrelevance to the problem at hand. In the Court's view, it was called
upon to make law in a vacuum. With the air thus cleared for decision,
the Court announced its conclusions. It did not in any significant sense
attempt to explain or justify those conclusions, except perhaps by infer-
ences that might be drawn from the phrasing and examples which the
opinions contain. At critical points throughout the opinions, the Court
simply puts the question presented, announces its answer, and explains
that answer by nothing more than a statement that it is not persuaded
that a different answer would be correct. On occasion, even this explana-
tion is omitted.
217. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759
(1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970). Brady and McMann are the major
opinions; Parker contains no independent discussion of principles.
218. I use the term "lawlessness" advisedly.
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A. The Voluntariness Standard: Brady v. United States
The Trilogy's lead opinion is attached to Brady v. United States.
219
Brady had been charged in 1959 with capital federal kidnaping under the
sentencing scheme held unconstitutional in United States v. Jackson.220
After a codefendant pleaded guilty and became available to testify
against him, Brady also pleaded guilty and was sentenced to fifty years in
jail.221 In 1967, Brady challenged his plea as involuntary on a variety of
grounds, including the ground that it had been entered in order to avoid
the possibility of the death penalty. 222 The lower courts found the plea
voluntary and the Supreme Court affirmed.223 Expressing some doubt
that the plea was actually entered as a consequence of the unconstitu-
tional sentencing scheme, the Court treated the case as if it had been.224
219. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
220. Id. at 743.
221. Id. at 743-44.
222. Id. at 744.
223. Id. at 745.
224. It is not at all clear just what case, in the ordinary sense, the Court thought was before
it for decision. Ordinarily, a judgment on voluntariness requires two factual determinations
and the application of a legal standard to them. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 603
(1961). One must find the external circumstances, the pressures operating on the defendant
when he made the choice under review-was he beaten, was he lied to, was he drugged and so
forth. Id. Second, one must determine the effect of those pressures on the individual's deci-
sion. Although there may be direct testimony from the defendant on that question, unless his
version is accepted this judgment must be made as a matter of inference from the circum-
stances determined to exist. Id. Finally, of course, the standard of voluntariness must be
applied to the inferences drawn from the facts found. Id.
Typically, the Supreme Court has treated the question of external circumstances as one of
fact, reviewable like any other question of fact determined by the lower courts. It would take
the facts as found so long as the determination was not clearly erroneous on the record. On
the inferences to be drawn from those facts, however, it did not feel itself so bound. Although
it would give some deference to the findings below, it would, where necessary, make its own
independent determination of how the pressures (found by the lower courts) had actually oper-
ated on the individual before it. Id. at 603-06.
What makes for confusion in Brady is that the district court had found that Brady's plea
was not the result of the unconstitutional sentencing scheme, and the Supreme Court's opinion
never clearly said whether the C6urt accepted or rejected that finding-an inference, if you
like. Brady, 397 U.S. at 745. The parties agreed on the external circumstances. Brady knew
that his co-defendant was willing to testify against him, and he knew that if he insisted on a
jury trial he could be sentenced to death. In stating the facts, and reiterating them at the
outset of its opinion, the Supreme Court seemed to accept the inferences drawn by the district
judge. See id. at 745, 747. But the critical language is ambiguous. The lower courts found the
plea "voluntarily made," and "[w]e see no reason on this record to disturb the judgment of
those courts." Id. at 749. This could mean either that the Court accepted the critical infer-
ence or that it found the inference wrong but the plea nevertheless voluntary under the proper
legal standard. Immediately thereafter the Court said "[i]t may be" that Brady pleaded be-
cause of the unconstitutional sentencing scheme, and noted in a footnote that the district court
"seems" to have rejected that possibility. Id. at 749 & n.7. At the end of the opinion, the
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The consequent opinion has three parts. In the first, the Court concludes
that United States v. Jackson is wholly irrelevant to the case before it-
United States v. Jackson neither changed the existing standard for ac-
cepting guilty pleas nor required a new application of the old standard.225
The standard is simply whether the plea was voluntary and intelligent.226
The second part discusses the question of voluntariness.227 Prior cases
concerning voluntariness in the context of confessions are irrelevant, and
the Court "cannot hold" that plea bargaining is unconstitutional. 228 Fi-
nally, the Court concludes that a plea of guilty is not unintelligently en-
tered when it is based on bad legal advice so long as the bad advice came
from a "competent" lawyer representing the defendant.229 Each part of
the opinion requires discussion in greater detail.
1. The irrelevance of United States v. Jackson
Brady's argument, in substance, was that his guilty plea was the
product of the threat of death which was held unconstitutional in United
States v. Jackson, and that it was therefore involuntarily entered. Mr.
Justice White, writing for the Court in Brady, thought this read "far too
much into the Jackson opinion."23 The Court in United States v. Jack-
son had specifically stated that its conclusion "hardly implies that every
defendant who enters a guilty plea to a charge under the Act does so
involuntarily."2'' In support of this statement the Court cited Laboy v.
New Jersey,232 a district court case holding a plea voluntary under the
Act although it was entered in part to avoid the possibility of a death
sentence. Moreover, the United States v. Jackson Court had rejected a
suggestion that the Act could be saved by forbidding all guilty pleas and
jury waivers in possibly capital cases, because "such a rule 'would rob the
Court stated that "Brady's plea of guilty may well have been motivated" to avoid a possible
death sentence. Id. at 758.
The point of all this is that it is simply impossible to tell whether the Court accepted the
inference but decided nevertheless to give its opinion on the facts of a case not before it, or
whether the Court rejected the inference and substituted its own (never articulated) inference,
in which case the Court's somewhat ambiguous conclusions might be clarified by reference to
the factual situation it believed was actually presented. This is a point of some importance in
trying to understand the holding of Brady. See infra notes 275-77 and accompanying text.
225. Brady, 397 U.S. at 745-47.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 749-55.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 756-58.
230. Id. at 746.
231. Id. at 746-47 (quoting United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 583 (1968)).
232. 266 F. Supp. 581 (D.N.J. 1967).
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criminal process of much of its flexibility.' 2)233
The Court concluded:
Plainly, it seems to us, Jackson ruled neither that all pleas of
guilty encouraged by the fear of a possible death sentence are
involuntary pleas nor that such encouraged pleas are invalid
whether involuntary or not. Jackson prohibits the imposition
of the death penalty under § 1201(a), but that decision neither
fashioned a new standard for judging the validity of guilty pleas
nor mandated a new application of the test theretofore fash-
ioned by courts and since reiterated that guilty pleas are valid if
both "voluntary" and "intelligent.
'234
The best that can be said for the Brady Court's discussion of United
States v. Jackson is that it may announce a correct result. However, it
nowhere explains it. The Court, of course, is correct in saying that
United States v. Jackson did not announce, or purport to announce, a
"new standard for judging the validity of guilty pleas."2 5 It is likewise
correct in saying that United States v. Jackson did not purport to rule
that pleas encouraged by the unconstitutional sentencing scheme "are
invalid whether voluntary or not." '236 But neither of those two state-
ments disposes of the issue at hand. That issue is whether pleas of guilty
which were entered to avoid the threat of death found unconstitutional in
United States v. Jackson were involuntary pleas-or, in the Court's
words, whether United States v. Jackson "mandated a new application of
the test theretofore fashioned by courts.., that guilty pleas are" invalid
if involuntary.237 That question simply cannot be answered without ref-
erence to the standard of involuntariness. If a plea is involuntary because
it is the product of an unconstitutional threat, then United States v. Jack-
son, which holds unconstitutional the threat made by the sentencing pro-
visions of the Kidnaping Act, has much to say about application of the
old standard. If the standard of voluntariness is something else, then
United States v. Jackson may or may not "mandate" a "new applica-
tion," depending on just what that something else is. Without reference
to the standard, however, the question cannot be decided.
To be sure, in United States v. Jackson the Court stated that the
conclusion was not logically compelled that "every" defendant who had
233. Brady, 397 U.S. at 747 (citing United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 584 (1968)).
234. Id. at 747 (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969)).
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
PLEA BARGAINING
pleaded guilty under the Act had done so involuntarily.238 But this state-
ment may have meant nothing more than that some defendants may have
wanted to plead guilty for reasons entirely unrelated to the possible pen-
alty. Certainly this is the image suggested by the United States v. Jackson
Court's analogy to a defendant testifying under a rule that allows the
prosecution to comment if he does not take the stand.2 39 Admittedly, the
United States v. Jackson Court cited Laboy v. New Jersey2' as another
illustration of the possibility that a voluntary guilty plea that could be
entered under the Act. However, that citation is a slender reed upon
which to rest since the Court decided Laboy under the explicit assump-
tion that the sentencing scheme in the Kidnapping Act was constitu-
tional.241  Furthermore, elsewhere in the United States v. Jackson
opinion the Court had been exquisitely careful to avoid the question of
plea bargaining in general.242 Most important, the Court's citation of
Laboy only supports the proposition that a guilty plea is voluntary-even
if it is produced by an unconstitutional threat-if either (1) the existing
standard of volutariness would not bar such a plea; or (2) United States v.
Jackson changed the existing standard of voluntariness by its unexpli-
cated, illustrative citation of Laboy in a footnote.243 The second alterna-
tive, of course, is contrary to the Brady Court's conclusion that United
States v. Jackson had not "fashioned a new standard" for thi validity of
guilty pleas. 2' The first alternative merely advances the question:
"What is the standard of voluntariness?" Only after deciding that ques-
tion can one properly consider United States v. Jackson's impact, if any,
on that standard.
2. The question of voluntariness
The Court's discussion of voluntariness is the core of the Brady
opinion. After ambiguously reiterating the facts of Brady's case, the
Court moved on to its analysis. According to the Court, "[t]he volunta-
riness of Brady's plea can be determined only by considering all of the
238. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 583 (1968) (emphasis added).
239. The analogy was drawn by the Court in United States v. Jackson in a footnote explicat-
ing its statement in text. Id at 583 n.25.
240. Id at 583 n.7 (citing Laboy v. New Jersey, 266 F. Supp. 581 (D.N.J. 1967)).
241. Laboy v. New Jersey, of course, was decided before the Supreme Court decided United
States v. Jackson, but after the district court's decision in that case. The Laboy court recog-
nized the existence of United States v. Jackson but disagreed with it. Laboy, 266 F. Supp. at
585.
242. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
243. See supra note 224.
244. Brady, 397 U.S. at 747.
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relevant circumstances surrounding it." '24 5 The Court was at this point
willing to assume that Brady would not have pleaded guilty except for
the unconstitutional sentencing scheme; but "this assumption merely
identifies" that scheme "as a 'but for' cause" of the plea." 2" It "does not
necessarily prove" the plea was involuntary.247 Many pleas are not in-
voluntary although they are encouraged by the state, as when the ac-
cumulation of evidence persuades a defendant to forego the "agony and
expense" of a trial.24 Such a plea is "no more improperly compelled"
than a decision to testify made by a defendant who believes that the evi-
dence is such that he will certainly be convicted if he does not.24 9 "Of
course . . the State may not produce a plea by actual or threatened
physical harm or by mental coercion overbearing the will of the defend-
ant."25 "But nothing of the sort is claimed" here,2"' and the record does
not support any claim that Brady's state of mind was so abnormal that
"he did not or could not, with the help of counsel, rationally weigh" the
factors involved in his decision to plead. 2 Brady's claim was of "a dif-
ferent sort," namely,
that it violates the Fifth Amendment to influence or encourage
a guilty plea by opportunity or promise of leniency and-that a
guilty plea is coerced and invalid if influenced by the fear of a
possibly higher penalty for the crime charged if a conviction is
obtained after the State is put to its proof.
25 3
Having so stated the question, the Court answered it. Little distin-
guishes Brady's situation from four other situations (not before the
Court) where defendants pleaded guilty on the expectation that they will
be more severely punished if they insist on trial by jury.2" 4 The Court
245. Id. at 749 (citing Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513 (1963) and Leyra v.
Derno, 347 U.S. 556, 558 (1954), two coerced confession cases). With one trivial exception
discussed below, see infra note 269, these are the only prior Supreme Court cases cited in
Brady relevant to the question of voluntariness. The very few additional citations are all made
for the purpose of showing the irrelevance of the cited cases to the question presented.
246. Brady, 397 U.S. at 750.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. Since death is certainly physical harm, it is not clear just what the Court meant
here. Either the Court meant to distinguish conditional from unconditional threats in general;
or, more likely, by physical harm it meant something like physical harm not authorized by law
as punishment for conviction.
252. Brady, 397 U.S. at 750.
253. Id. at 750-51.
254. The four situations are:
(1) the defendant, in a jurisdiction where the judge and jury have the same range of
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stated:
We decline to hold, however, that a guilty plea is compelled
and invalid under the Fifth Amendment whenever motivated
by the defendant's desire to accept the certainty or probability
of a lesser penalty rather than face a wider range of possibilities
extending from acquittal to conviction and a higher penalty au-
thorized by law for the crime charged.255
The opinion then moves to a general discussion-"the issue ... is
inherent in the criminal law... because guilty pleas are not constitution-
ally forbidden" and because given the characteristic range of the avail-
able sentences, the state and the defendant (particularly the defendant
who sees little chance for acquittal) often find it mutually advantageous
to trade shorter sentences for guilty pleas.256 This "perhaps" explains
the prevalence of guilty pleas in the United States today.
Of course, that the prevalence of guilty pleas is explainable does
not necessarily validate those pleas or the system which pro-
duces them. But we cannot hold that it is unconstitutional for
the State to extend a benefit to a defendant who in turn extends
a substantial benefit to the State and who demonstrates by his
plea that he is ready and willing to admit his crime and to enter
the correctional system in a frame of mind that affords hope for
success in rehabilitation over a shorter period of time than
might otherwise be necessary.257
The Court then turned to the coerced confession cases, explaining
why they did not stand as a bar to its conclusions on plea bargaining.
258
One case stands for all. The Court chose Brain v. United States25 9 which
sentencing power, who pleads guilty because his lawyer advises him that the judge
will very probably be more lenient than the jury; (2) the defendant, in a jurisdiction
where the judge alone has sentencing power, who is advised by counsel that the judge
is normally more lenient with defendants who plead guilty than with those who go to
trial; (3) the defendant who is permitted by prosecutor and judge to plead guilty to a
lesser offense included in the offense charged; and (4) the defendant who pleads guilty
to certain counts with the understanding that other charges will be dropped.
Id. at 751. The Brady Court carefully noted that it was making "no reference" to several other
situations which were also not before it. Id. at 751 n.8.
255. ME at 751.
256. Id. at 751-52.
257. Id. at 752-53. In the next paragraph, the opinion states that a contrary rule would
"require" governments to forbid guilty pleas entirely, or at least to forbid allowing guilty pleas
to lesser included offenses, reduced charges, or selected counts of an indictment. Id. Having
stated this, it repeats: "The Fifth Amendment does not reach so far." Id. at 753.
258. Id.
259. 168 U.S. 532 (1897). See supra notes 99-106 and accompanying text for further discus-
sion of Bram.
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stated the strictest of all the standards. Under Bram, a confession must
not be " 'obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor
by the exertion of any improper influence.' "260 But Bram is "not incon-
sistent" with the holding here, because Bram was "in custody, alone and
unrepresented by counsel."' 261 Brain did not hold that the "promise was
an illegal act as such;" rather, defendants in such circumstances are "too
sensitive to inducement." 262 The "possibly coercive impact" of promises
of lenience, however, can be "dissipated by the presence and advice of
counsel. '263 Here, however, there were "no threats or promises [made]
in face-to-face encounters with the authorities. '' 21 Brady had a lawyer
and time to weigh his decision. "[T]here was no hazard of an impulsive
and improvident response to a seeming but unreal advantage." '265 In
short, the presence of counsel and time to reflect before entering a guilty
plea make the coerced confession cases irrelevant.266
Finally, the Court squarely faced the question what is the test of
voluntariness for pleas of guilty. It did not discuss the question. It did
not analyze it. It merely stated that the standard "must be essentially
that defined by" the Fifth Circuit thirteen years before.267
"[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct con-
sequences, including the actual value of any commitments
made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must
stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue im-
proper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or
unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their
nature improper as having no proper relationship to the prose-
cutor's business (e.g. bribes)."
268
260. Bram, 168 U.S. at 542-43 (quoting 3 W. RUSSELL, A TREATISE ON CRIMES AND
MSDEMEANORS 478 (6th English ed. 1896) (this quotation was also cited by United States v.
Brady, 397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970)).
261. Brady, 397 U.S. at 754.
262. Id.
263. Id. Supporting this proposition, the Court in a footnote quotes Miranda v. Arizona.
Id. at 754 n. 12. The passage quoted states that "[i]n all the cases before us today" the presence
of counsel would have been adequate to protect the privilege against self-incrimination. Id.
Immediately preceding the quoted passage, the Miranda Court identified the vice in the inter-
rogation process as the uncounseled defendant's belief that he was not entitled to remain silent.
Therefore, it is sensible to assume that the Miranda Court was speaking only to this question.
Id. at 754. How the presence of counsel can remedy any harm coming from, for instance, a
threat of death or 30 years in jail is, at least, a different question.
264. Id. at 754.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 753-55.
267. Id. at 755.
268. Id. (quoting Shelton v. United States, 242 F.2d 101, 115 (Tuttle, J., dissenting), judg-
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It is difficult to know what to say about this remarkable perform-
ance. The discussion of voluntariness in Brady is a discussion without
law. The Court began by citing two coerced confession cases, u69 thereby
suggesting the relevance of at least those two cases and perhaps the entire
line. But when the Court returned to its discussion of coerced confession
cases, it distinguished the entire line as irrelevant because they involved
unrepresented defendants and threats presented in "face-to-face" en-
counters rather than by operation of statute.
Indeed, the proposition for which the two coerced confession cases
were cited is that voluntariness must be determined in light of all the
relevant circumstances of the case. Yet the Brady Court flatly rejected
this approach. The Court decided not only Brady's case and similar
ones, but explicitly purported to rule on four classes of cases which in no
way were presented by the record before it.2 T0 The Court relied on Mi-
randa v. Arizona us ' for the proposition that the appointment of counsel
can dissipate the coercive impact of some threats.u7 u In context the reli-
ance is overdrawn;2 73 but even accepting that the citation can bear all the
weight placed on it by the Court, it served only to distinguish the coerced
confession cases, and not to provide affirmative support for Brady. Be-
yond this, no support exists.274
ment set aside, 246 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1957) (en bane), rev'd on other grounds, 356 U.S. 26
(1958)). The dissent's view was adopted by a majority of the Fifth Circuit when Shelton was
reheard en banc. 246 F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th Cir. 1957) (en bane). When Shelton petitioned for
certiorari, the Solicitor General confessed that his plea might have been improperly entered
(listing a variety of reasons) and the Supreme Court reversed on that confession of error.
Shelton, 356 U.S. 26 (1958).
269. See supra note 245. Immediately before turning directly to the question of voluntari-
ness, the Court did observe that guilty pleas must be voluntarily entered, citing in a footnote
four guilty-plea cases and one coerced confession case. Brady, 397 U.S. at 748 n.5 (citing
Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962); Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104
(1942); Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 286 (1941); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227
(1940); Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927)). None of these cases is used in
any way in discussing what "voluntariness" means, and none is even adverted to during the
Court's discussion of the question.
270. See supra note 254.
271. 384 U.S. at 466.
272. See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
273. See supra note 263; Alschuler, The Supreme Court, the Defense Attorney, and the
Guilty Plea, 47 U. COLO. L. REv. 1, 51-58 (1979).
274. At the conclusion of its discussion, the Court does cite the Fifth Circuit's decision in
Shelton v. United States, as stating the proper standard. But coming at the end of discussion,
the Shelton statement appears more as a felicitous coincidence than as doctrinal support. Un-
reviewed lower court dictum in a concededly erroneous case is not much to rest decision on.
In any event given the Court's holding in United States v. Jackson, it is not clear that the
Shelton standard supports the Court's conclusions. See infra note 281.
Finally, at the end of its opinion the Court notes that most lower federal courts have
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This legal vacuum is matched by a factual one. At the outset of its
discussion, the Court assumed that Brady would not have pleaded guilty
but for the unconstitutional sentencing scheme. But that the "statute
caused the plea in this sense does not necessarily prove that the plea was
coerced .... ,,27  This suggests that something more than but-for causa-
tion from an unconstitutional threat is required to invalidate a plea. If
so, it is important to know what (if anything) more than this but-for
causation is present in Brady's case. But the Court never precisely iden-
tified the assumptions it was making in the case before it.2 76 In any
event, on the basis of the Court's ultimate resolution of the issue, the
whole exercise is misdirected. The Court ultimately concluded that the
kind of threat involved in Brady is constitutionally insufficient to invali-
date a guilty plea unless it drives the defendant insane.277 Otherwise,
even the closest imaginable causal connection-for example, where the
threat is the only reason the defendant decided to plead guilty-is
insufficient.
The opinion looks in two directly opposite directions. United States
v. Jackson, which deals with the legality (indeed, the constitutionality) of
the sentencing scheme which produced Brady's plea, was discarded in
the first part of the Court's opinion as irrelevant to the question of volun-
tariness.2 78 Brain, which deals directly with the question of voluntari-
ness, was distinguished partly on the ground that it did not hold that
"the promise [given in Brain] was an illegal act as such .... If this
distinction is pertinent, it means that the legality vel non of the threat or
promise is critical to the determination of voluntariness. 280 If so, United
States v. Jackson, which squarely held the practice involved in Brady un-
constitutional, is directly on point. Yet the Court had already rejected
reached the same conclusion. Brady, 397 U.S. at 755 n.14. Even the Court does not press this
point very strongly (their "conclusion... seems to coincide"); and when, in one of the com-
panion cases, the opposite was true, the Court merely noted the fact without comment and
proceeded with its analysis. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 765 n.10 (1970). The
Court, in other words, appears to have regarded the matter as a happy coincidence and not the
exhibition of a body of law supporting the conclusion it reached.
275. Brady, 397 U.S. at 750.
276. See supra note 224.
277. Brady, 397 U.S. at 750 ("could not.., rationally" decide about a plea). The Court
also reserves judgment on cases where the prosecutor or judge have possibly illicit motives. Id.
at 751 n.8.
278. Id at 747-48.
279. Id at 754.
280. The dissenters, attempting to determine the Court's standard of voluntariness, were
understandably puzzled by this. Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 800 n.2 (1970)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
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United States v. Jackson as irrelevant."z '
The whole line of confession cases, whether under the fifth amend-
ment or the fourteenth, is distinguished from the plea-bargaining situa-
tion in which the defendant is represented by counsel and has time for
consideration and reflection before he is called upon to enter his plea.
The Brady Court never explored the relevance of this distinction. It did
however, suggest two possibilities: first, that the effect of even mild
promises or threats on the uncounseled defendant in custody is "too
great to ignore and too difficult to assess"; and second, that for the coun-
seled defendant pleading guilty, "no hazard of an impulsive and improvi-
dent response to a seeming but unreal advantage" exists.28 2 Neither
statement, however, is of much use in the context of voluntariness. It is
hard to see how the appointment of counsel makes the effect of a threat
or promise any less "difficult to assess," and in any event the Court in
Brady eschewed particularized assessment. The psychological support a
lawyer might provide could defuse the impact of some or many threats,
but it could hardly render all threats (such as the threat of death, here
involved) so trivial that they could be ignored.2"3 Following this distinc-
tion would require analysis of the degree of the particular threat and
perhaps evaluation of counsel's role in emphasizing or belittling it. How-
ever, by treating Brady as raising the question of plea bargaining in gen-
eral, divorced from the particular threat or inducement offered, the
Court rejected those possibilities.28 a
It is certainly true that competent counsel and time for reflection
should reduce or eliminate the hazard of "impulsive and improvident"
responses to "a seeming but unreal advantage." But that consideration
goes to the question of the defendant's knowledge of the available alter-
natives, a question that the Court in Brady separated from the question
281. The Brady Court's citation of Shelton and its standard further suggests the relevance
of the legality of the underlying threat. The Shelton standard would invalidate pleas that were
the product of" 'threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment)'" or "'promises
that are by their nature improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor's business
(e.g., bribes).'" Brady, 397 U.S. at 755 (quoting Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572
n.2 (5th Cir. 1957) (en banc), rev'd on other grounds, 356 U.S. 26 (1958)). The common ele-
ment here seems to be illegality: "proper" harassment may continue, but "improper" harass-
ment may not. "Improper" promises are also not permitted to induce pleas of guilty (at least,
"perhaps"). If United States v. Jackson correctly decided that the threat was unconstitutional,
it hardly can be said that such threats have a "proper" relationship to the prosecutor's busi-
ness, or that continuing such a threat is not "improper harassment."
282. Brady, 397 U.S. at 754.
283. Cf North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). Alford upheld on the basis of Brady
a guilty plea entered by defendant who simultaneously protested his innocence and said, "they
said if I didn't they would gas me for it, and that is all." Id. at 28 n.2.
284. See supra notes 245-53 and accompanying text.
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of voluntariness and treated as an independent issue.285 As will appear
later, it may be that the underlying premise of the Trilogy is that a truth-
ful confession of guilt is the universal solvent which dissolves constitu-
tional objections to the plea bargaining process.28 6 Yet the coerced
confession cases "unequivocally" rejected the notion that the truth of a
confession diminished constitutional objection to the process by which it
was obtained, and thus to its voluntariness. 28 7 Why the presence of
counsel should lessen (or eliminate) the constitutional concern for values
other than truth in the process of determining guilt is not adequately
explained and is not discussed-indeed, it is not even considered.
All of these criticisms could be said to be peripheral to the main
point in Brady. Taken at their very strongest, they say no more than that
Brady was wrong in its vision of plea bargaining as an issue sui generis
for which prior law provides no helpful principles for decision. Perhaps
these criticisms are wrong, or perhaps, although prior law is relevant,
plea bargaining when clearly faced shows that prior law was based on
wrong principles. What, then, can be said of the Court's opinion in
Brady, taking the case as the Court saw it, as presenting for decision the
propriety of plea bargaining in most or all of its contexts?
The opinion is still inadequate. Conceding that plea bargaining is an
issue sui generis is only to pose, not to answer, the question of constitu-
tionality. The Brady Court answers the question, but never explains or
justifies its answer. Such implications as can be drawn from the opinion
are, unfortunately, incoherent. After posing the question as the validity
in general of pleas imposed by the bargaining process, the Court first
notes that the issue presented is "inherent" in the administration of crim-
inal law."8 This suggests an argument of necessity.2 89 But although the
Court notes that guilty pleas are common, and speculates that they fre-
quently serve the interests of both defendants and prosecutors, it explic-
285. Brady, 397 U.S. at 748, 756-58. See infra notes 307-54 and accompanying text.
286. See infra notes 420-49 and accompanying text.
287. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 384 (1964). See supra notes 118-19 and accompany-
ing text.
288. Brady, 397 U.S. at 751-53.
289. If the United States v. Jackson analysis were pertinent, one might think to ask, neces-
sity for what? Of course, the Court in United States v. Jackson found the sentencing scheme
unnecessary for the only constitutionally permissible purposes it could see in the statute.
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. at 591. In Brady, the Court's refusal to focus on the pres-
sures producing Brady's plea, and its insistence on treating the question as one of plea bargain-
ing in general-a subject explicitly avoided in United States v. Jackson-may reflect the
Court's underlying feeling that necessity was indeed the key issue. By focusing on plea bar-
gaining in general it was thus able to avoid explicit conflict with United States v. Jackson's
conclusion that the particular scheme before the Court was unnecessary for any constitution-
ally legitimate purpose.
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itly disavows reliance on this part of the opinion as answering the
question of constitutionality. 9 0 "Of course, that the prevalence of guilty
pleas is explainable does not necessarily validate those pleas or the sys-
tem which produces them."29' Constitutionality, then, is still an open
question. It is closed by the next sentence, but the explanation remains
obscure. The Court "cannot" hold it impermissible for the state to ad-
vance a benefit to one who
extends a substantial benefit to the State and who demonstrates
by his plea that he is ready and willing to admit his crime and
to enter the correctional system in a frame of mind that affords
hope for success in rehabilitation over a shorter period of time
than might otherwise be necessary.29 2
One is compelled to ask why not. The first of the factors-benefit
for benefit-only states the issue; it does not explain its resolution.293
The second factor-benefit for admission of guilt-only particularizes
the issue of "benefit for benefit." 294 The third factor-benefit (shorter
sentences) for defendants who can be quickly rehabilitated-is relevant
and at least superficially appealing. But the easy phrase packs together a
congeries of assumptions about facts and values that cry out for explana-
tion and it has implications nowhere developed in Brady or in the cases
following it.
295
The notion seems to be that in a penal system directed towards reha-
bilitation, offenders who can be quickly rehabilitated should serve shorter
sentences. If so, then at best, this explanation speaks only to the constitu-
tionality of plea bargaining in penal systems in which rehabilitation is an
element, and perhaps only in systems in which rehabilitation is a signifi-
cant element. Assuming that all American sentencing schemes contain
290. Brady, 397 U.S. at 752. If the Court had thought of this portion of the opinion as
supporting constitutionality, it would, one expects, have engaged in more serious considera-
tion. The only support other than speculation for the Court's statements is an "estimate" of
the frequency of guilty pleas in 1966. Id. at 752 n.10. The estimate does not purport to deal
with the reason those pleas were entered. Id. The Court's own speculation is vague and tenta-
tive: mutual advantage "perhaps" explains the frequency of guilty pleas; "a great many" are
motivated "at least in part" by hope for lenience. Id. at 752.
291. Id. at 752-53.
292. Id. at 753 (emphasis added).
293. Could the state offer cash for guilty pleas? One suspects that the Brady Court would
hold not. See Brady, 397 U.S. at 755 (quoting Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 n.2
(5th Cir. 1957) (en banc), rev'd on other grounds, 356 U.S. 26 (1958) (Shelton standard)).
294. The Court subsequently found admission of guilt unnecessary to validate a guilty plea.
Alford, 400 U.S. 25.
295. An excellent discussion of plea bargaining considered as a sentencing device is con-
tained in Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, supra note 5, at 652-83, 718-23.
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sufficient elements of rehabilitation to call this rationale into play,296 the
explanation justifies plea bargaining only to the extent that defendants
who have pleaded guilty are more easily rehabilitated than those who
insist on trial.29 7 However, there is good reason to believe that most de-
fendants who plead guilty promptly deny their guilt thereafter, which
diminishes if not eliminates the argument that those defendants are more
easily rehabilitated. 29  The fundamental objection to this rationale is
that it is hardly consistent with the operation of many American sentenc-
ing schemes with respect to major crimes, particularly in 1970 when
Brady was decided. For a defendant sentenced to "flat time, ' 299 the ra-
tionale might hold-more easily rehabilitable defendants would be sen-
tenced to shorter terms.3° But the majority of American criminal
sentences, where the crime is a felony and probation is denied, are for
some indeterminate period of imprisonment between the stated minimum
and maximum terms.3 01 In this area of indeterminacy, the decision to
release the prisoner is in the hands of a parole board, directed to deter-
mine release on grounds that amount to a decision whether the prisoner
has been "rehabilitated."
Justifying plea bargaining based on the judgment that defendants
willing to plead guilty are more quickly rehabilitable is at least dubious in
such cases. It means that the admittedly difficult decision on rehabilita-
tion must be made in advance, by the prosecutor, instead of after obser-
vation by the parole board. 0 2 Of course, it is possible that in such
296. This assumption, doubtful in 1970 when Brady was decided, is even more questionable
today. A growing body of literature has called for the end of indeterminate sentencing
schemes and denied that rehabilitation is, or should be, a significant goal of penal systems. See,
eg., N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974); E. VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING
CRIMINALS (1975); A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE (1976).
297. Cf Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, supra note 5, at 661-69. The
Court's rationale also suggests that individuals admitting guilt and eager for rehabilitation
might have a right to a bargained plea if they desire it.
298. The New York State Study Commission appointed in the wake of the Attica prison
riots concluded that: "Even though an inmate may receive the benefit of a shorter sentence,
the plea bargaining system is characterized by deception and hypocrisy which divorce the
inmate from the reality of his crime," hardly a condition likely to lead to quicker rehabilita-
tion. NEW YORK STATE SPECIAL COMMISSION ON ATTICA, ATTICA 30-31 (1972).
299. Flat time is a determined period of months or years, fixed at the outset and thereafter
modifiable (if at all) only by mechanical computation for want of offensive behavior in prison.
300. The same applies, of course, when the sentence is to probation (no jail time) instead of
imprisonment.
301. In some jurisdictions, all felony sentences are indeterminate. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 9A.20.020 (West Supp. 1987).
302. This is not to say that either the prosecutor or the parole board makes the decision
well (or badly, for that matter). It is only to say that, especially when long terms of years are
concerned, it is difficult to imagine the decision being made more reliably at the outset than
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schemes, plea bargaining defendants will receive no real benefit-that is,
the actual sentence that they serve will be the same as it would have been
if they had insisted on trial. But if this is so, then the rehabilitative ra-
tionale disappears and plea bargaining is based on persuading defendants
to sell their chance of acquittal for an illusory pot of gold. Thus, if some-
thing about a defendant's willingness to plead guilty is relevant to any
permissible purpose of a criminal sentencing scheme, the matter requires
more discussion than the single brief portion of a sentence devoted to the
matter in Brady.
The Brady opinion contains one final paragraph that might be
thought of as elucidating the result:
A contrary holding would require the States and Federal Gov-
ernment to forbid guilty pleas altogether, to provide a single
invariable penalty for each crime defined by the statutes, or to
place the sentencing function in a separate authority having no
knowledge of the manner in which the conviction in each case
was obtained. In any event, it would be necessary to forbid
prosecutors and judges to accept guilty pleas to selected counts,
to lesser included offenses, or to reduced charges. The Fifth
Amendment does not reach so far.30 3
This final castle is also made of sand. Once more, the Brady Court
merely poses the question and answers it-any explanation must be in-
ferred by the reader. The statements in the first sentence are dubious.
They rely on unexamined, unexplicated assumptions that sentencers
would not follow a rule forbidding plea bargaining unless their discretion
were removed or the information on which they would have to rely were
denied them.3 1 The Court itself does not seem to rely heavily on this.
The main point is in the second sentence, where it asserts that to forbid
plea bargaining one would have to forbid guilty pleas to selected counts
or lesser included offenses.
after the passage of 10, 20 or 30 years. Cf Dershowitz, Background Paper in TWENTIETH
CENTURY FUND: TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING 128 (1976) (effects of early or late
determination of sentence). Nevertheless, for an instructive study suggesting that some such
decisions may be made equally well at the outset, see A. VON HIRSCH & K. HANRAHAN, THE
QUESTION OF PAROLE (1979).
303. Brady, 397 U.S. at 753.
304. Such assumptions are not common in the law. Although some kinds of evidence, such
as confessions are thought sufficiently prejudicial that juries may not be presented with a possi-
bly inadmissible confession and told to disregard it if involuntary, judges are trusted in this
regard, and indeed in many others. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964). The Court has
never held as a general matter that forbidding racial discrimination requires that decisions be
made by people unaware of the applicant's race; and it has never even hinted that if this were
so it would support rejecting the rule forbidding racial discrimination.
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This last argument is simply nonsense. All that would be required
would be to forbid prosecutors to dismiss selected counts or greater levels
of offenses on the condition that the defendant plead guilty.3"5 Thus, this
last point is nothing but a bare tautology-to forbid plea bargaining
would require us to forbid bargained pleas. True enough, but hardly an
explanation.
3. Summary
Although the Court in Brady purports to uphold plea bargaining in
terms of a pre-existing standard of voluntariness, the Court's opinion ac-
tually cuts that standard loose from its moorings in prior case law. The
Court finds the prior cases irrelevant in the context of plea bargaining.
In place of the rejected standard of voluntariness, the Court presents no
analytical foundation for measuring the voluntariness of bargained
pleas.30 6 It does little better in considering the knowledge that an indi-
vidual defendant must have before he can intelligently enter a guilty plea.
That question is discussed immediately below.
B. The Question of Intelligence
In the terms chosen by the Court in the Trilogy, a guilty plea may
constitutionally provide the basis for criminal punishment only if it is
both "voluntarily" and "intelligently" made.317 "Voluntariness" in these
terms deals with forbidden and permitted pressures to plead guilty, and
with their effect on the defendant's will. "Intelligence" deals with the
defendant's knowledge of the law and facts bearing on the decision to
305. This rule could easily be policed by giving the defendant the opportunity to withdraw
his plea after the prosecutor had irrevocably consented to dismiss the remaining counts or
more serious charges.
306. The Court does set forth the form of words setting a standard for voluntariness in
Shelton, 246 F.2d at 572 n.2. But the key terms are undefined and no attempt is made to
explain why the particular standard should have been adopted. See supra note 268 and accom-
panying text. Not surprisingly, the Court has made little use of the Shelton standard since
Brady.
307. On other occasions the Court has included both of these factors within the term "vol-
untarily." E.g., McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969) (plea not "truly volun-
tary" unless made with an "understanding of the law in relation to the facts"). It has
sometimes phrased the requirement that a plea be "voluntary and knowing," id., or "volunta-
rily and understandingly" made. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244 (1969) (quoting
Boykin v. State, 281 Ala. 659, 207 So. 2d 412 (1968)). At least one case discusses voluntariness
as if the concept related only to the defendant's knowledge of the law and facts. Henderson v.
Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645 n.13 (1976). And cases involving voluntariness outside the guilty
plea context often merge "intelligence" with the concept of voluntariness. Schneckloth v. Bus-
tamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (knowledge of right to refuse to be searched); Lynumn v. Illinois,
372 U.S. 528 (1963) (knowledge of law and of probable sentence; confession case).
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plead guilty. In one sense, intelligence only requires knowing the an-
swers to two simple questions: What will happen to me if I plead guilty?
What will happen to me if I do not? But each of the answers is a predic-
tion. Unless the case is a very simple one, the answers can not be known
but only estimated by answering a host of often excruciatingly difficult
questions: What will a court find to be the elements of the charged of-
fenses? What evidence does the prosecution have? What evidence will
be admitted? How will it strike the fact finder?-and so on. Obviously
related to the constitutional requirement of the "assistance of counsel,"
the rule that a plea must be "intelligently" entered seeks to assure that
the defendant pleading guilty has at least some minimum understanding
of the available alternatives.
The Court's discussion of intelligence in the Trilogy, like its discus-
sion of voluntariness, denies the relevance of prior doctrine and rests
wholly upon its own intellectual foundation. The discussion is wrenched
from the factual situations presented by the cases, and the problem is
treated as an exercise in abstraction and generality. The discussion of
intelligence is split between two opinions-Brady v. United States,30 in
which the petitioner argued his plea was unintelligent because he hadn't
known that the Kidnaping Act's death penalty provisions (which he
pleaded guilty to avoid) were unconstitutional, and McMann v. Richard-
son,30 9 an opinion covering three cases in which prisoners sought to at-
tack their pleas on the ground that the pleas were the result of
unconstitutionally obtained confessions. 310 The opinions in both cases
submerge issues that should have been considered as problems of collat-
eral attack or retroactivity. Like its discussion of voluntariness, the
Court's discussion of intelligence offers little analysis. There are only
conclusions.
1. Brady
The essence of Brady's claim was that, as it turned out, he had
traded his right to trial for a mess of pottage. He claimed that he had
entered his guilty plea to avoid the risk of death attendant on a jury trial.
Contrary to his belief, however, he could not have been executed in any
event under the rule of United States v. Jackson. Therefore, according to
308. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
309. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
310. This statement slightly simplifies the actual allegations. See infra notes 322-28 and
accompanying text. The third case, Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970), involved
both voluntariness and intelligence. However, Parker was merely resolved on the basis of
Brady and McMann, and adds nothing significant to them.
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his argument, his guilty plea was not a constitutionally intelligent act
because he did not know that he was getting nothing for his bargain.
It is questionable whether Brady's claim should be considered to
raise a question of an unintelligent guilty plea. Rather, it seems to pres-
ent the question whether United States v. Jackson should be retroactively
applied in the context of guilty pleas. United States v. Jackson was not
decided until 1968; and although the doctrine of unconstitutional condi-
tions has its roots in the nineteenth century, the United States v. Jackson
Court primarily relied on cases not decided until the 1960's.311 Brady
was charged, and he pleaded guilty in 1957. Had he been advised at that
time that the Kidnaping Act's sentencing structure was unconstitutional,
he might well have been executed before his claim was vindicated.
Whether the argument in United States v. Jackson would have been ac-
cepted years earlier if Brady had been tried, convicted and sentenced to
death (or whether he could have survived long enough to ultimately ben-
efit from United States v. Jackson) is probably an unanswerable ques-
tion.3 2 It is at least quite possible that Brady was, in fact, quite
accurately informed what law would be applied to his case. If so, the
question presented by Brady is not how to deal with a plea based on
imperfect knowledge, but whether United States v. Jackson should be ret-
roactively applied to invalidate guilty pleas entered to avoid a threat of
death which was only later determined to be unconstitutional.
The Brady opinion feints in the direction of retroactivity, but ulti-
mately seems to treat the problem as one of intelligence. 3 3 However, the
Court's view of the facts is unclear 14 and this brief segment of the opin-
ion contains nothing but conclusions. Therefore, it is hard to be sure
exactly what the Court had in mind. After accurately stating that guilty
pleas are often "heavily influenced by the defendant's appraisal of the
311. In United States v. Jackson, the Court relied primarily on United States v. Robel, 389
U.S. 258 (1967); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); and Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479 (1960). See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 582-83 (1968).
312. The last federal execution in the United States was in 1963. See H. BEDAU, THE
DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 56 (3d ed. 1982).
313. Introducing the discussion of this aspect of the case, the opinion stated: "The record
before us also supports the conclusion that Brady's plea was intelligently made." Brady, 397
U.S. at 756. Moreover, in McMann, the Court appeared to deny the relevance of retroactivity
doctrine to changes in the law affecting the decision to plead guilty. 397 U.S. at 773.
314. As noted above, see supra note 224, the district court in Brady had found that the
possible death penalty played no part in Brady's decision to plead guilty, and it is impossible to
say whether or not the Supreme Court accepted this view of the facts. On the one hand, the
Court says that Brady pleaded "perhaps" to insure that he would get no more than "life im-
prisonment or a term of years." Brady, 397 U.S. at 756. On the other hand, it states that
"Brady was aware of precisely what he was doing when he admitted that he had kidnaped the
victim and had not released her unharmed." Id. (emphasis added).
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prosecution's case," and that "such considerations frequently present im-
ponderable questions for which there are no certain answers, ' 315 the
opinion merely repeats, six times in six consecutive sentences, its conclu-
sion that Brady's plea was not invalid. The closest the opinion comes to
an explanation appears in the third of these sentences. "More particu-
larly, absent misrepresentation or other impermissible conduct by state
agents, a voluntary plea of guilty intelligently made in light of the then
applicable law does not become vulnerable because later decisions indi-
cate that the plea rested on a faulty premise. 316
This is an inadequate explanation. The reference to "misrepresenta-
tion," in this context is at best, a red herring. If it was "misrepresenta-
tion" to say that Brady could have been executed if convicted after a jury
trial, then certainly the "misrepresentation," which was contained in the
statute, is attributable to the government. Nevertheless, Brady was accu-
rately informed about the law as it then stood. The real question con-
cerns the retroactivity of United States v. Jackson.31 7 In other contexts,
315. Id.
316. Id. at 757 (citation ommitted). The remaining sentences are:
[E] The rule that a plea must be intelligently made to be valid does not require that a
plea be vulnerable to later attack if the defendant did not correctly assess every rele-
vant factor entering into his decision. [2] A defendant is not entitled to withdraw his
plea merely because he discovers long after the plea has been accepted that his
calculus misapprehended the quality of the State's case or the likely penalties at-
tached to alternative courses of action .... [4] A plea of guilty triggered by the
expectations of a competently counseled defendant that the State will have a strong
case against him is not subject to later attack because the defendant's lawyer cor-
rectly advised him with respect to the then existing law as to possible penalties but
later pronouncements of the courts, as in this case, hold that the maximum penalty
for the crime in question was less than was reasonably assumed at the time the plea
was entered.
[5] The fact that Brady did not anticipate United States v. Jackson, ... does not
impugn the truth or reliability of his plea. [6] We find no requirement in the Consti-
tution that a defendant must be permitted to disown his solemn admissions in open
court that he committed the act with which he is charged simply because it later
develops that the State would have had a weaker case than the defendant had
thought or that the maximum penalty then assumed applicable has been held inappli-
cable in subsequent judicial decisions.
Id.
In this section of the opinion, as elsewhere, the Court found no prior law relevant to its
decision. The only citations were to United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968) (cited for
information only), and Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948) (cited in order to be
distinguished).
317. Elsewhere, see the fourth sentence quoted in supra note 316, the Court suggests that
the rule might be different for an uncounseled defendant. But it is hard to see why that should
make a difference. If, as argued here, Brady in fact received good advice from his lawyer, his
plea would hardly be less "intelligent" if he received equally good advice from a layman. And
if he received bad advice, it is hard to see why the bad advice would make a plea "unintelli-
gent" if received from a layman but "intelligent" if received from a lawyer. Of course, right-
to-counsel principles could explain why a lawyer should be provided to criminal defendants
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the Court has found the concept of retroactivity too complex to be dealt
with in a single general statement-and rightly so.318 Of course, holding
United States v. Jackson to be retroactive in this context would open
some bargained pleas under the Kidnaping Act to collateral attack.3 19
However, this only restates part of the problem of retroactivity; it does
not solve it. Although the government has an interest in keeping guilty
kidnapers in jail, the prisoners have interests as well.320 Normal practice
in retroactivity cases-what was lacking in Brady-is to provide some
kind of reasoned explanation why the balance of interests with regard to
the particular claim presented does or does not call for retroactive
application.3 2'
2. McMann
Three cases, decided together under the name McMann v. Richard-
son,322 involved prisoners who sought habeas corpus on the general
ground that their bargained pleas were the results of unconstitutionally
obtained confessions.323 Richardson alleged that he had been beaten into
confessing, but had pleaded guilty after his lawyer told him that he
and why action taken without one could be invalid. But they do not explain the Court's sug-
gestion that a difference in the intelligence of the two pleas would result.
318. E.g., Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667 (1971). For good discussions indicating
the complexity of the issue, see Mishkin, Forward: The High Court, the Great Writ, and the
Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REv. 56 (1965); Wellington, Common Law Rules
and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973).
319. Not all such bargained pleas would be subject to attack. Pleas entered (as Brady's may
have been) for reasons independent of the death penalty provisions would not be rendered
vulnerable by retroactive application of United States v. Jackson.
320. Among others, one interest is not having to give up the right to trial in order to obtain
nothing more than the Constitution guarantees. It is worth noting that Brady does not appear
to be a case where, conscious of uncertainty on the point, the parties struck a bargain in order
to avoid the uncertainty. Apparently, both parties believed that the death penalty provisions
were constitutional. In those circumstances, the doctrine of mutual mistake in civil contract
cases would often allow rescission of the bargain.
321. Even if Brady were ultimately viewed as a case involving inaccurate advice on a debat-
able legal question rather than retroactivity, no explanation is given for the result in the opin-
ion. The Court analogizes the case presented to ordinary judgments about the admissibility of
evidence, the strength of the prosecution's case and so forth. See supra note 314. But the
analogy is not self-evident. Constitutional and nonconstitutional error are treated differently
in a variety of contexts, particularly collateral attack. See supra note 71. Even if the analogy
holds, the opinion never explains why any, some, or all bad judgments about evidence, for
example, should not invalidate a plea of guilty. If a defendant charged with treason knows the
government can produce only a single witness against him and does not know that two wit-
nesses are required for conviction of treason, has he "intelligently" pleaded guilty?
322. 397 U.S. 759.
323. Each of the three defendants pleaded guilty to less than he was originally charged
with. Richardson, indicted for first-degree murder, pleaded guilty to second-degree murder.
Id. at 762. Dash, indicted for first-degree robbery, pleaded guilty to second-degree robbery.
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should plead and litigate his confession claim on habeas corpus. 3 24 An-
other prisoner, Dash, claimed he had been beaten and refused counsel
until he confessed, but was advised by counsel to plead guilty because he
"didn't stand a chance" given the confession.3 25 The third prisoner, Wil-
liams, said his confession was obtained when he was handcuffed to a desk
and threatened with a pistol.3 26 His lawyer advised a guilty plea, but
Williams said nothing regarding any advice he may have received specifi-
cally about his confession.32 7 In each case, the district court denied relief
without a hearing. The Second Circuit remanded for hearings, conclud-
ing inter alia that a guilty plea was constitutionally invalid if it was the
"consequence" of an involuntary confession-at least if the plea was
taken in New York at a time when the state procedure for challenging a
confession at trial was constitutionally inadequate.328
The Supreme Court recited and then ignored the specific allegations
of each prisoner in McMann. Instead, it identified the "core" of the Sec-
ond Circuit's holdings as "the proposition that if in a collateral proceed-
ing a guilty plea is shown to have been triggered by a coerced
confession-if there would have been no plea had there been no confes-
sion-the plea is vulnerable at least in cases coming from New York
where the guilty plea was taken prior to Jackson v. Denno .... 329
Id. at 761. Williams, indicted for five felonies, pleaded guilty to second-degree robbery. Id. at
763.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 762.
326. Id. at 764.
327. Id. Each of the respondents in McMann had claims other than those described here.
For example, the heart of Williams' claim was that his lawyer categorically refused to investi-
gate his alibi defense, and told him that he was pleading guilty not to a felony but to a misde-
meanor. Id.
328. United States ex reL Ross v. McMann, 409 F.2d 1016 (2d Cir. 1969) (en banc) (defend-
ant Dash), vacated, McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970); United States ex rel. Rich-
ardson v. McMann, 408 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1969), vacated, McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759
(1970); United States ex rel. Williams v. Follette, 408 F.2d 658 (2d Cir. 1969), rev'd, McMann
v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
Before 1964, New York's procedure for challenging a confession as involuntary was to
present the evidence on voluntariness, as well as the confession, to the trier of fact (judge or
jury) during the trial. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 374-75 (1964). The jury would be
instructed to determine whether the confession was voluntary, and if it was not, to disregard it
when considering the question of guilt. This procedure was upheld in Stein v. New York, 346
U.S. 156 (1953), but later condemned in Jackson v. Denno, which overruled Stein. The Court
condemned the procedure primarily because it asked too much of the jury to disregard a con-
fession it found involuntary, but true, in a close case, and required that trial judges make an
independent determination of voluntariness before submitting the question to the jury. It ap-
pears that some New York trial judges were doing this even before Jackson v. Denno. Reply
Brief for Petitioner at 10 & 10-11 n.*, MeMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
329. McMann, 397 U.S. at 766. This characterization substantially overstates the Second
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Because the McMann opinion divorced the issues from the facts of
any of the cases, 330 and because it considered any prior doctrine, other
than Brady, irrelevant to the conclusion it reached, 331 it is uncertain just
how the Court viewed the question presented. However, citation of
Brady and reference to competently counseled defendants suggests that
the Court saw the question as involving the intelligence of a plea entered
to avoid the probability of conviction at trial on the basis of an involun-
tary confession. 32 In essence, the opinion replays Brady: "the decision
to plead guilty before the evidence is in frequently involves the making of
Circuit's holding in Richardson's case, and may be misleading as to the others. The Richard-
son opinion was written by Judge Moore, who dissented from the en banc decision involving
the others. United States ex reL Richardson, 408 F.2d 48. Judge Moore ordered a hearing on
Richardson's allegation that his lawyer had told him that the proper way to raise his coerced
confession claim was to plead guilty and litigate the matter on habeas corpus. Id. at 53. The
court reasoned that if this were the advice Richardson was given, he could in no way be said to
have knowingly bypassed the state procedures for raising his claim. Id.
In its en banc opinion involving Dash's case, the Second Circuit started from "the well-
established doctrine that if the [guilty] plea is voluntary, it is an absolute waiver of all non-
jurisdictional defects in any prior stage of the proceedings...." United States ex rel. Ross, 409
F.2d at 1019. A voluntary guilty plea is a waiver of such claims because by pleading guilty the
defendant "'has deliberately failed or refused to raise his claims by available state procedures
....'" Id at 1022 (quoting United States ex rel. Rogers v. Warden, 381 F.2d 209, 213 (2d Cir.
1967)). However, waiver is inapplicable "when the state fail[s] to afford a constitutionally
acceptable means of presenting [the] claim," as was the case in New York state prior to Jack-
son v. Denno. Id at 1024. In these circunstaces, a defendant "'cannot be deemed to have
entered a voluntary plea of guilty if the plea was substantially motivated by a coerced confes-
sion the validity of which he was unable, for all practical purposes, to contest.'" Id. This rule
disposed of Dash's case, id. at 1024, and of Williams' as well. United States ex rel Williams,
408 F.2d at 660.
330. In discussing the question of intelligence, the Court never says that it should be an-
swered by looking at the totality of the circumstances. Cf. Brady, 397 U.S. at 749 (voluntari-
ness). However, in Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976), the Court dealt with an
inadequate-knowledge claim under the rubric of voluntariness and returned to the totality-of-
the-circumstances language. Id. at 644.
331. The McMann Court cited McCarthy v. United States for the truism that a guilty plea
normally involves an admission of the crime charged. McMann, 397 U.S. at 766 (citing Mc-
Carthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969)). The Court also cited Jackson v. Denno,
Pennsylvania ex rel. Herman v. Claudy, and Chambers v. Florida, and claimed that they were
irrelevant. Id. at 771, 774-75. Stein v. New York was cited to show that counsel would not
have been incompetent prior to Jackson v. Denno for advising that the New York confession
procedure was constitutionally valid. Id. at 774. Several cases were cited to show that felony
defendants are entitled to effective counsel, and one lower court case is cited to note that its
facts would present a different question. As affirmative support for the conclusion reached, the
Court cited only Brady.
332. See McMann, 397 U.S. at 770. However, the Court's persistent, but understandable,
emphasis on the fact that the pleas are being collaterally attacked some time after they were
entered, eg., id. at 771, 773, suggests that the question of "intelligence" might be viewed differ-
ently when a trial judge is making the initial decision whether to accept a plea. For reference
to the "good sense and discretion of trial [judges]," see id. at 771.
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difficult judgments.... Waiving trial entails the inherent risk that the
good-faith evaluations of a reasonably competent attorney will turn out
to be mistaken .... ,333 Jackson v. Denno is irrelevant because a defend-
ant who pleads guilty
is convicted on his counseled admission in open court that he
committed the crime charged against him. The prior confes-
sion is not the basis for judgment .... Whether or not the
advice the defendant received in the pre-Jackson era would
have been different had Jackson then been the law has no bear-
ing on the accuracy of the defendant's admission that he com-
mitted the crime.334
Failure to challenge the New York confession procedures cannot be be-
low the required level of legal advice because such a claim had previously
been rejected by the Supreme Court.335
Given Brady, the Court may have been correct in concluding that a
coerced confession does not provide a basis for attacking a guilty plea,
even if the confession was the basis for the entry of the plea. When the
defendant is competently represented, this weakness in the prosecution's
case should be one of the elements entering into the particular bargain
struck between the prosecution and defendant. Trying later to undo the
bargain, the McMann defendants were less appealing than Brady, who
sought to undo his bargain because it was entered under a mutual mis-
take.336 And if, as Brady holds, the Constitution permits the prosecution
to encourage defendants to bargain away arguable claims of innocence in
order to obtain assured benefits in sentencing, it is difficult to see why
arguable claims that a confession was coerced may not also be purchased
by the prosecution in exchange for sentence discounts.
331
Particularly troubling about the McMann opinion was the abstract
treatment of the questions presented, and the opinion's heavy reliance on
the unexamined, unexplicated standard set for the competence of coun-
sel. To begin with, the opinion did not explore the problems presented
by the particular allegations actually before the Court.338 The precise
333. Id. at 769-70.
334. Id. at 773.
335. Id. at 772-73.
336. See supra notes 308-11 and accompanying text.
337. For attempts to draw lines between those rights which are, and those rights which are
not, waived by a plea of guilty, see Saltzburg, Pleas of Guilty and the Loss Of Constitutional
Rights: The Current Price of Pleading Guilty, 76 MICH. L. REv. 1265 (1978); Westen, Away
from Waiver: A Rationale for the Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75
MICH. L. REv. 1214 (1977).
338. One could say that the McMann Court was merely dealing with general standards, and
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question presented was whether the three prisoners were entitled to relief
if everything alleged in their petitions was true. Accepting their allega-
tions, that their confessions-induced by beatings and threats of immedi-
ate death-were not even arguably voluntary, no minimally competent
lawyer in the past quarter century could have advised that confessions so
obtained could lawfully be introduced in evidence. On their facts, there-
fore, at least Dash's and Richardson's allegations present cases not dis-
cussed by the Court-cases of defendants, acting on incompetent advice
from their attorneys, and pleading guilty because of a clearly unconstitu-
tional confession.339
Reality, of course, is rarely simple. Coerced confession cases are not
decided on the facts; they are decided on what the trial judge finds to be
the facts, which may be a very different thing. Confessions are typically
taken in private, with only the defendant and state employees (police,
sometimes a prosecutor, and-at the end of the process-occasionally a
stenographer) present. The state's witnesses often show uncanny ability
to frame their testimony on suppression motions so that it barely fits
within the most recent legal guidelines.3"4 Lawyers ordinarily and quite
properly advise their clients what the lawyer believes will happen, not
just what should happen. It is quite possible that Dash was accurately
relating what had happened to him, while his lawyer was accurately pre-
dicting that the confession would be admitted if Dash went to trial.34 ' In
this light, Dash was well advised by his lawyer. But so viewed, a very
real question arises whether such abuses are too frequent to be tolerably
swept under the rug by a process which makes guilty pleas invulnera-
that the factual problems were left for exploration on remand. However, the courts below
seem to have read the McMann opinion as conclusively resolving all claims arising from the
confessions against the prisoners. See United States ex rel. Williams v. Follette, 453 F.2d 745,
on remand, United States ex rel. Richardson v. McMann, 340 F. Supp. 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1971),
aff'd per curtam 458 F.2d 1406 (2d Cir. 1972). This is particularly troubling in Richardson's
case. See supra text accompanying note 324.
339. Dash pleaded guilty after his lawyer told him he "'didn't... [have] a chance... [in
view] of the... confession....'" McMann, 397 U.S. at 762. Richardson's lawyer told him
that the proper procedure to follow was to plead guilty and challenge the confession on habeas
corpus. Id at 763. Some discussion whether this was or was not inadequate advice entitling
Richardson to plead anew was surely called for.
340. Occasionally judicial skepticism about such testimony breaks into reported opinions,
as when District of Columbia police testified to a rash of "spontaneous apologies" by suspects
to their supposed victims after th" Court of Appeals held such testimony admissible, See
Veney v. United States, 344 F.2d 542, 543 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (Wright, J., concurring) (collecting
at least eight such apologies, all credited by the trial courts).
341. It is also possible, of course, that Dash's allegations were not true. The Court's opin-
ion, however, never suggests this as a basis for dismissal. The problem of dishonest collateral
attack deserves exploration, but not blanket rules dismissing true claims with bad ones.
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ble.3 42 At the least, one would hope for more than a rueful statement
that fact-finding is a difficult process.
Second, reference to guilty pleas as a waiver of trial and the rights
associated with trial 3 suggests that the body of law regarding defend-
ants who deliberately forego presentation of their claims to an available
state forum is relevant. 3 " That problem is particularly poignant in Rich-
ardson's case, where his lawyer told him that plea and collateral attack
was the proper way to raise his claim. If, as it appears, the Court did not
regard this advice as falling below the standard demanded by counsel,
345
the case raises complicated questions concerning when a defendant can
be irrevocably bound by his lawyer's actions.346 Indeed, if a defendant
can be bound by such a mistake on counsel's part, it is hard to under-
stand the Court's quick dismissal of prior cases as irrelevant where de-
fendants had not been represented by counsel.3 47 If two defendants
receive identical bad advice and act on it, it is not obvious why subse-
quent claims should be barred if, and only if, the identical bad advice
came from an attorney. There may be reasons, but the Court nowhere
explains them. 48
The last troubling aspect of the Court's treatment of the intelligence
342. In setting forth the prophylactic rules of Miranda v. Arizona, the Court emphasized
the hazards of fact-finding in traditional interrogations where only the suspect and the police
were present. 384 U.S. 436, 445-48, 466 (1966).
343. McMann, 397 U.S. at 768, 770.
344. Cf. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (failure to appeal state conviction does not neces-
sarily bar assertion of claim on federal habeas corpus); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464
(1938) (waiver requires "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right"). The
point is not that such cases would compel a different result from the one reached in McMann;
if plea bargaining is to be allowed, compromise of at least some claims seems proper. But so
great a departure from prior law calls at least for a search for distinctions and intermediate
grounds, not wholesale neglect of prior cases. And in fact, subsequent to McMann, the Court
significantly weakened Johnson and Fay. See Wainright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); Tigar,
The Supreme Court, 1969 Term-Foreword: Waiver of Constitutional Rights: Disquiet in the
Citadel, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1970).
345. McMann, 397 U.S. at 774. The Court merely remanded for consideration of "other
claims," language which the courts below read as excluding all aspects of the coerced confes-
sion claims. Id. at 774-75; United States ex rel. Williams, 453 F.2d 745.
346. Compare the Court's struggle with a similar issue in Wainwright. 433 U.S. 72 (7-2
decision with five different opinions filed).
347. In Pennsylvania ex rel. Herman v. Claudy, the Court reviewed an involuntary confes-
sion claim on habeas corpus brought by a state prisoner who had not challenged the confes-
sion, but had pleaded guilty. 350 U.S. 116 (1956). The McMann Court found Herman
irrelevant because the defendant in Herman did not have a lawyer. McMann, 397 U.S. at 767
(citing Pennsylvania ex reL Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116, 116 (1956)).
348. In Brady, the Court concluded that threats which would invalidate an uncounseled
confession would not invalidate a counseled guilty plea because the presence of counsel pre-
vented the "hazard of an impulsive and improvident response.... ." Brady, 397 U.S. at 754.
Assuming this is true, it does not automatically carry over to the situation in McMann, where
820 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:757
requirement is the deus ex machina on which it relied to uphold guilty
pleas entered on bad estimation of the facts or law applicable to the case:
an attorney who gives advice "within the range of competence demanded
of attorneys in criminal cases."34 9 This unilluminating language was
snatched from the air; the Court was not relying on a standard that has
been given content (or even given voice) by its application to facts in
previous cases.35 ° It is not even clear whether the Court was setting the
same or different standards for trials and guilty pleas.3 1  Nor was the
amorphous standard significantly fleshed out, as it might have been, by
careful application to the facts of the cases. The advice given Richardson
and Dash on their coerced confession cases is nowhere discussed; the
only actual application of the standard is to the Jackson v. Denno
point." 2 The Court quickly resolved this issue on the ground that reli-
ance on an existing Supreme Court decision cannot be advice below the
required standard. 3  Since relatively few claims of inadequate advice
the defendants allegedly were receiving bad advice from their lawyers. McMann, 397 U.S. at
767.
349. McMann, 397 U.S. at 771. Elsewhere the Court uses different language, without any
indication that a substantive difference is intended: "so incompetently advised" as to allow a
new plea, id. at 769; "good-faith evaluations of a reasonably competent attorney," id. at 770;
"incompetent or ineffective," id.; "reasonably competent advice," id.; "incompetent counsel,"
id. at 771; "gross error on the part of counsel," id. at 772; "serious derelictions on the part of
counsel sufficient to show that his plea was not.., a knowing and intelligent act," id. at 774.
Some of the formulations, such as the first and last quoted here, are obviously circular.
350. In general, the Court prior to McMann had studiously avoided extensive consideration
of the standards for effective assistance of counsel. E.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42,
53-54 (1969) (refusing to make independent judgment on the issue); cf. id. at 55-60 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
351. McMann, 397 U.S. at 771 n.14. The cases cited in the McMann opinion's footnote
suggest that the standard would be the same. However, the variety of novel phrases and the
Court's insistence that trials are very different from guilty pleas, suggest a different standard.
Id. at 773.
352. That is, the point that New York had no constitutionally acceptable procedure for
challenging involuntary confessions when the pleas were entered. Id. at 771-72 (citing Jackson
v. Denno, 378 U.S. at 377).
In Parker v. North Carolina, the Court also applied its standard to conclude that Parker
had received advice "well within" the required range of competence. 397 U.S. at 797. The
Court supplied no analysis or discussion; having recited the facts, the Court merely held that,
"[biased on the facts of record relating to Parker's confession and guilty plea, which we have
previously detailed, we think the advice he received was well within the range of competence
required of attorneys representing defendants in criminal cases." Id. at 797-98.
353. I may overstate the clarity of the opinion on this point. The Court stated that Rich-
ardson, Dash and Williams would have to demonstrate "gross error on the part of counsel," to
obtain relief. Id. at 772. "Such showing cannot be made," since a constitutional challenge to
the New York procedure "was presented to the New York courts and to this Court in Stein v.
New York, and in 1953 this Court found no constitutional infirmity .... Counsel ... cannot
be faulted for not anticipating Jackson v. Denno or for considering the New York procedures
to be as valid as the four dissenters in that case thought them to be." 397 U.S. at 772-73.
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can be resolved by such a rule, this particular application of the standard
offers little guidance. If the standard for counsel's assistance were a pe-
ripheral matter, of only critical importance in an occasional case, the
Court's Delphic obscurity would be regrettable but not serious. But the
assistance of counsel is the linchpin holding the whole opinion
together.35 a
3. Summary
The Trilogy's discussion of guilty pleas is without anchor in prece-
dent and without the rudder that careful analysis and explanation could
provide. The Court's discussion of voluntariness denies the relevance of
a very considerable body of prior law; as an a priori matter, it fails to
justify the conclusions reached. The discussion of intelligence consists
simply of assertions. The Court paints with a broad brush, submerging
factual differences that would seem critical. The opinions, in short, are
unjustified by the criteria of reason and explanation traditionally de-
manded of courts. What the opinions do is treat plea bargaining as a
problem sui generis divorced from the fabric of American constitutional
law.
Maybe it is. When a case, for the first time, chums up issues not
previously perceived, it may be asking too much of the Court to provide
a fully considered explanation for the result it reaches. It is surely better
for the Court to give heed to the felt imperatives of the case at hand and
decide it rightly rather than unthinkingly force the law into a Procrus-
tean mold of irrelevant doctrine. If the Court finds the right result in the
first case, explanation and doctrinal development can fairly wait for full
development in later cases.
This has not, however, been the history of plea bargaining at the
hands of the Supreme Court. The Court's initial cases on plea bargain-
ing, whether or not they reach correct results on the facts before the
Court, are lacking in the reasons we ordinarily think necessary to provide
a foundation for the principled development of constitutional rules. Un-
fortunately, so are the Court's later cases. They look back to the Trilogy
for support, but none is there. These later cases are chronicled in the
next section.
354. It was the presence of counsel that allowed the Court, in both McMann and Brady, to
distinguish as irrelevant prior cases that were otherwise analogous. Perhaps more important,
considering the results of the cases, the advice of counsel is the only bulwark that protects a
defendant against the unwitting loss of all of his legal and factual claims.
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IV. DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE TRILOGY
The Supreme Court has not added any analytical clarity to its treat-
ment of plea bargaining since it decided the Trilogy in 1970. Indeed, the
cases since then have been radically inconsistent. The Trilogy's sugges-
tion that guilty pleas can be valid even though they would be invalid
under traditional notions of "voluntariness" because they represent relia-
ble admissions of guilt was jettisoned in less than seven months.3"' But
this suggestion continues to bob up in later opinions. 6 One line of cases
wholly eschews questions of "voluntariness" and "intelligence," relying
instead on the Court's view of how a functioning system of plea bargain-
ing should be structured-an approach reminiscent of the one taken in
United States v. Jackson, but emphatically rejected in Brady as irrelevant
to the question of bargained pleas.357 At the same time other cases have
insisted on a pure voluntariness approach, and refused on occasion even
to consider claims relating to the system as a whole. 358 Cases in this
second line sometimes affirm and sometimes deny the relevance of tradi-
tional notions of waiver to guilty pleas.35 9 When the Court was urged to
consider the relationship of plea bargaining to capital sentencing
schemes, the Court's prevailing opinion flatly denied the possibility of
any effective regulation of the process.
The result of this doctrinal free-for-all has been the withdrawal of
the Constitution as a source of law governing most aspects of plea bar-
gaining.3 6 1 The only substantial constitutional rule seems to be that
355. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
356. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978); Henderson v. Morgan, 426
U.S. 637, 648 (1976) (White, J., concurring).
357. See infra notes 372-90 and accompanying text.
358. See infra notes 391-98 and accompanying text.
359. Compare Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306 (1983) (denying waiver basis for guilty plea
cases); and Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266 (1973) (plea valid, though "undoubtedly"
it would be invalid in traditional waiver terms) with Henderson, 426 U.S. at 645 n.13 (citing
classical waiver cases to explain the standard for guilty pleas).
360. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 & n.50 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Stevens &
Powell, J3.).
361. The Court once, however, suggested that guidance could be found in A. CORBIN, CON-
TRAcrs § 578 (2d ed. 1960), Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75 n.6 (1977). It has since
used contract law language in referring to the "executory" nature of plea agreements until the
defendant has actually pleaded guilty or otherwise relied on the agreement to his detriment.
Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504 (1984).
More recently, the Court has suggested that in federal cases, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure may contain considerable law governing the plea bargaining process.
See United States v. Benchimol, 471 U.S. 453, 456 (1985) (Rule 11 may or may not "allow[]
bargaining about [the] degree[] of enthusiasm" with which a prosecutor makes his recommen-
dation for sentence, and "may well" allow agreement that the prosecutor state his reasons for
the bargain on the record.).
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prosecutors must either keep their promises or allow the defendant an
opportunity to withdraw his plea.36 To be sure, the defendant must or-
dinarily be represented by counsel, but the lawyer can certainly give bad
advice and ignore substantial defenses without discussing the matter with
the client.36 3 And the substance of the bargain, the size and nature of the
club which the prosecution can wield, remains in a constitutional blind
spot.
A. The Plea as Admission of Guilt
A plea of guilty, the Court said in the Trilogy, is a "solemn admis-
sion[ ] in open court that ... [the defendant] committed the act with
which he is charged. ....;36 and similar language continued to appear
in later opinions.36 I argue below that this admission of guilt, "[c]entral
to the plea and the foundation for entering judgment against the defend-
ant," '366 could provide a tenable basis for the development of a rational
body of plea bargaining law.367 However, barely seven months after the
Trilogy, the Court found admissions of guilt were in fact unnecessary to
support guilty pleas.
In North Carolina v. Alford,368 Harry Alford, charged with the pos-
sibly capital offense of first-degree murder, pleaded guilty to second-de-
gree murder. Alford stated: "I ain't shot no man, but I take the fault for
the other man.... I just pleaded guilty because they said if I didn't they
would gas me for it, and that is all."369 The Court found the plea valid,
simply arguing (on the basis of cases holding that prison sentences may
be imposed upon a plea of nolo contendere), that there was no constitu-
tional bar to the imposition of a prison sentence on a "consenting" de-
362. In addition, the defendant must be told the elements of the offense to which he is
pleading guilty, Henderson, 426 U.S. 637, and the possible sentence he can receive if he pleads
guilty, Blackledge, 431 U.S. 63. The record of the plea-taking procedure must meet the stan-
dards set forth in Boykin, 395 U.S. 238. Federal defendants must meet the standards of Rule
11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Failure to follow Rule 11, however, is error
that ordinarily can be raised only on direct appeal from the conviction. Haring v. Prosise, 462
U.S. 306 (1983).
363. See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973) (failure to investigate grand jury racial
composition); Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (defendant told death sentence certain); McMann v. Rich-
ardson, 397 U.S. 759, 769-75 (1970); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 756-58 (1970).
364. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757 (1970).
365. Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645 n.13 (1976); Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S.
258, 267 (1973).
366. Brady, 397 U.S. at 748; see also McMann, 397 U.S. at 773.
367. See infra notes 420-49 and accompanying text.
368. 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
369. Id. at 28 n.2. The statements were not made on collateral attack, but during the plea-
taking proceedings.
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fendant who nevertheless denies his guilt. 7°
The Alford Court's reasoning misses the point. Brady did not up-
hold the validity of bargained pleas of nolo contendere; it upheld the
validity of bargained pleas of guilty, emphasizing several times that the
plea's basis, a counseled admission of guilt, served to distinguish prior
law that would have otherwise seemed relevant.37" ' With that basis ab-
sent, one would expect either a discussion of what other reasons justify
bargained pleas of this kind or at least an explanation why the prior law,
no longer avoidable on the basis that the plea represented an admission
of guilt, was avoidable on other grounds. But no such discussion was
forthcoming.
B. Systemic Considerations: The Irrelevance of Voluntariness
Although the Trilogy had emphasized voluntariness and intelligence
as the only questions relevant to bargained pleas, in the first major plea
bargaining case decided after the Trilogy, the Court entirely avoided con-
sidering whether the plea at issue was voluntary. In Santobello v. New
York,372 the defendant, Rudolph Santobello was indicted on two felony
gambling charges. He agreed to plead guilty to a misdemeanor charge on
the condition that the greater charges be dismissed and that the prosecu-
tion make no recommendation as to sentence. At the sentencing hearing,
however, a different prosecutor was present and recommended that
Santobello receive the maximum sentence, which he did.373 Not surpris-
ingly, the Court felt that something was wrong. What makes the opinion
interesting is the difficulty the Court had in explaining just what.
The Santobello opinion never stated what constitutional provision
was violated by Santobello's conviction and sentence.374 Although the
opinion stated that guilty pleas "must... be voluntary and knowing,
'375
370. Id. at 31, 33-38.
371. I do not suggest that bargained pleas of nolo contendere should not be permitted,
particularly if bargained pleas of guilty are. If anything, the special nature of the nolo con-
tendere plea-which at least in the federal system, cannot be subsequently used against the
pleader to support, for example, civil damages or enhanced punishment would seem to
strengthen the argument that bargained pleas are permissible. My point is merely that if they
are proper, it is certainly not because they represent an admission of guilt. FED. R. CRIM. P.
11(e)(6).
372. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
373. The Court concluded that the prosecution's breach of its agreement was "inadvertent."
Id. at 262.
374. For an interesting discussion of this problem, see Westen & Westin, A Constitutional
Law of Remedies for Broken Plea Bargains, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 471 (1978), arguing that
Santobello implicitly recognized a constitutional right that the government fulfill its contracts.
375. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 261.
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the Court did not hold the plea involuntary or unknowing. Instead, the
Court wrote a page and a half of explanation why it believed that plea
bargaining was both "essential" and "highly desirable. 37 6 Then, stating
that plea bargaining "must be attended by safeguards to insure the de-
fendant what is reasonably due in the circumstance[s]," 377 the Court con-
cluded "that the interests of justice and appropriate recognition of the
duties of the prosecution in relation to promises made in the negotiation
of pleas of guilty will be best served by remanding the case" 378 to the
New York court to determine whether, in the discretion of the state
court, Santobello's plea should have been vacated (so that he would plead
anew to the original charges) or whether he should have gotten "specific
performance" of his original agreement.379
SantobelIo cannot be explained by assuming that the Court found
the plea either involuntary or unintelligent. Such a finding is not obvious
under the Trilogy.3 0 More important, if the plea was involuntary or
unintelligent, it was invalid when entered and New York did not have,
without the defendant's consent, the option of resentencing Santobello on
the basis of the invalid plea. Therefore, Santobello necessarily held that
the Constitution contains not only law regulating the voluntariness and
376. Id. at 260-61 (citing only Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751-52 (1970)). Recent
commentators agree that whether plea bargaining is "essential" or not is a question of some
complexity. For a good recent review of the relevant literature, see Schulhofer, supra note 5.
377. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262.
378. Id. at 262-63.
379. Id. at 262. "Specific performance" was understood by the Court to mean that
Santobello would be resentenced by a different judge at a sentencing hearing where the prose-
cution would make no recommendation regarding sentence. One can only wonder whether
this is really what Santobello bargained for. If trial judges read the United States Reports, or
even gossip with their colleagues, the new sentencing judge might well know that the prosecu-
tion had previously recommended the maximum.
380. On one hand, Brady quoted the Shelton standard, which condemned pleas as involun-
tary if induced by "'misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises).'"
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970) (citing Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d
571, 572 n.2 (5th Cir. 1957) (en banc), rev'd on other grounds, 356 U.S. 26 (1958)). On the
other hand, the Court in the Trilogy was insistent in analytically separating "involuntary"
from "unintelligent" pleas of guilty, and Santobello's plea seems much more "unintelligent"
than "involuntary." He could have argued that his plea was unintelligent because his lawyer
presumably had failed to warn him that the prosecution might negligently not live up to its
bargain. But under the Trilogy, the plea would be vulnerable to this attack only if the attor-
ney's failure to give such a warning was below the "range of competence demanded of attor-
neys in criminal cases," McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970). The Court's
grudging application of this standard makes it unlikely that counsel could be faulted for failing
to give such a warning. McMann, 397 U.S. at 773; Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 268-69
(1973) ("slim" chance of making the required showing since Tennessee attorneys would never
have thought to challenge the racial composition of the grand jury at the time the plea was
made).
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intelligence of guilty pleas, but also law regulating other aspects of the
process, and that this law is relevant at least in determining the remedies
available to one who has pleaded guilty and now regrets the fact. The
source and nature of this law are both obscure. The Court noted that
plea bargaining "must be attended by safeguards."'3 81 Whether this
"must" be so because of considerations of efficiency (defendants other-
wise would too often refuse to plead guilty), of fairness (defendants
otherwise could be unfairly treated), or for other reasons, was never ex-
plained by the Court.382 But at the bedrock level, Santobello held that
some such considerations-considerations which I shall refer to as "sys-
temic" considerations-can sometimes control the result.
Similarly, in Lefkowitz v. Newsome,383 the Court upheld federal
habeas corpus relief to a defendant who had pleaded guilty with the
assistance of counsel, without finding the plea either involuntary or unin-
telligent. The defendant, Newsome, had unsuccessfully sought to sup-
press in state court the evidence of heroin and narcotics paraphernalia
found during a search of his person. When the New York court denied
his motion, he pleaded guilty to a charge of attempted possession of dan-
gerous drugs.384 New York law, at the time, allowed the appeal of un-
successful suppression motions after conviction whether the conviction
was on plea of guilty or at trial. When the New York courts rejected his
claim, Newsome obtained federal habeas corpus. The Supreme Court
affirmed his discharge, holding that such claims could be raised on fed-
eral habeas corpus, notwithstanding a voluntary and intelligent plea of
guilty, where state law allowed the claim to be appealed after conviction
on the plea.385
381. Santobello, 414 U.S. at 262.
382. Because the opinion in Santobello takes some pains to emphasize the importance of
plea bargaining to the criminal process, one is tempted to speculate that the basis for the result
is efficiency. Id. Given the opinion, however, this cannot be more than speculation.
383. 420 U.S. 283 (1975).
384. Newsome was originally charged with possession of the drugs; his plea, presumably
the result of a bargain, was to a lesser offense included under the original charge. Id. at 284.
385. Newsome claimed that the search, justified as incident to his arrest, was unconstitu-
tional because the statute under which he was arrested was itself unconstitutional. Id. at 284-
86. The Supreme Court has since rejected claims of this kind. See Michigan v. DeFillippo,
443 U.S. 31 (1979). In addition, the Court since Newsome has held claims of unconstitutional
search and seizure generally unavailable for state prisoners, so long as they had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate their claims in the state courts. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
Although Stone formally phrases its holding in terms of evidence introduced at trial, see 428
U.S. at 482, 494, its reasoning would apply to Newsome's situation as well, and the courts of
appeals have so held. Phillips v. Attorney General, 594 F.2d 1299 (9th Cir. 1979); Kahn v.
Flood, 550 F.2d 784 (2d Cir. 1977). However, on the general point that guilty pleas do not
waive claims which local law permits to be retained, Newsome has not been questioned.
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It is extremely difficult to fit Newsome into the mold of an unintelli-
gent guilty plea. Newsome's plea could be considered unintelligent be-
cause he entered into it expecting that federal collateral review would be
available when it was not available. But this theory is directly contrary
to the Court's conclusion in Richardson that a guilty plea was both vol-
untary and intelligent, the defendant relied on his attorney's advice that
the way to challenge his confession was to plead guilty and raise the
confession on collateral attack.386 To find that Newsome's plea was "un-
intelligent" under the Trilogy required a finding that his attorney, who
relied on the apparent promise of the New York statute, was giving ad-
vice "below the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal
cases"; it would also mean that, in the future, states could not hold out
the promise that defendants could plead guilty without thereby losing
their right to federal collateral review.387 The Court was unwilling to do
this since it would "frustrate the State's policy."3 "Many defendants"
would insist on trial "solely to preserve the right to an ultimate federal
forum," which would "eviscerate New York's commendable efforts" to
cut down on trials "in a manner that does not diminish the opportunity
for the assertion of rights guaranteed by the Constitution."38 9 Thus,
Newsome was entitled to his release for reasons of policy relating solely
to the practical operation of the system as a whole.3 9
C. Voluntariness Only: The Irrelevance of Other Considerations
On the other hand, in cases decided both before and after Santobello
and Newsome, the Court has insisted on considering only voluntariness
and intelligence, to the exclusion of the systemic considerations that were
decisive in Santobello and Newsome. Thus, in Tollett v. Henderson,9 ' the
Court held that claims that an indictment had been returned by a racially
discriminatory grand jury were lost by a counseled guilty plea. Notwith-
standing Santobello, it made no difference that the injury, in such cases,
386. See supra notes 322-54 and accompanying text.
387. Newsome, 420 U.S. at 292. Moreover, holding such pleas unintelligent would have had
the unwelcome consequence of invalidating all such pleas by New York defendants, whether
or not their underlying search-and-seizure claims were invalid-unless the Court somehow
could qualify its holding by concluding that if the underlying claims were invalid, the unconsti-
tutionality of the guilty plea was harmless error.
388. Newsome, 420 U.S. at 292.
389. Id. at 293.
390. Three of the four dissenters, including Justice White, the author of the Court's opin-
ions in the Trilogy, read McMann as having established the "substantive proposition" that a
voluntary and intelligent guilty plea conclusively established "the defendant's guilt... and the
State's consequent absolute right to incarcerate them .... " Id at 296.
391. 411 U.S. 258 (1973).
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"is not limited to the defendant-[that] there is injury to the jury system,
to the law as an institution, to the community at large, and to the demo-
cratic ideal .... ,392 After a counseled plea of guilty, the defendant "may
only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea.
3 93
Similarly, in Bordenkircher v. Hayes,394 the Court found no constitu-
tional objection when the prosecutor, hoping to persuade a defendant to
plead guilty to forgery of a check for $88.30, threatened that if the de-
fendant did not plead guilty, he would reindict the defendant as a third
felony offender, subjecting him to mandatory life imprisonment upon
conviction.395 Central to the Court's reasoning was its conclusion that
the case was "no different" from one in which the more serious indict-
ment had been returned prior to commencement of the plea negotia-
tions. 396 From the defendant's perspective, the point is at least arguably
true.397 However, this kind of charging behavior can have a corrosive
effect on the charging and sentencing process, as the four Bordenkircher
dissenters pointed out.3 98 If systemic considerations were relevant to de-
cision of the case, one would expect the Court to meet these arguments
and reject them. It did not.
D. The Utility of Plea Bargaining
After United States v. Jackson, but before the Trilogy, the constitu-
tionality vel non of plea bargaining apparently depended on the question
whether bargained pleas were essential to the operation of the criminal
392. Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946); see generally Rose v. Mitchell, 443
U.S. 545 (1973).
393. Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267 (emphasis added). The Court did not mention Santobello.
394. 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
395. Id. at 358-59.
396. Id. at 360-61.
397. One can only speculate whether, as a general matter, defendants would be more likely
to plead guilty if heavy charges were initially brought, and the prosecutor offered to reduce
them, or if lighter charges were first brought, and the prosecutor threatened to increase them,
Probably the differences, if any, would depend greatly on the psychological makeup of the
individual defendant.
398. In some cases, at least, the prosecutor's threat to bring heavier charges is an empty
one. The grand jury might consider the new indictment out of proportion to the offense, and
refuse to indict. Moreover, if the prosecutor had to bring the charges before the negotiations, it
would be a matter of public record that he was bringing heavy charges in those circumstances,
and political pressures could be brought to bear against him by those citizens who thought he
was being too harsh. Since plea negotiations are typically conducted in private and are unre-
corded, the prosecutor will have much greater freedom, in practice, if he can threaten the
defendant with additional charges once negotiations have begun. This need not, of course,
command a different result in Bordenkircher. But if systemic considerations are relevant, the
differences are great enough to warrant mention.
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justice system. 399 The issue of utility and necessity of bargained pleas has
often been discussed in the literature.' In the Trilogy, however, the
Court refused to examine the question, dismissing it as irrelevant.4"
Since then the Court has never undertaken even a cursory investigation
of that question, but, beginning with Santobello v. New York," 2 the
Court's opinions are full of paeans of praise for the process. Plea bar-
gaining "is not only an essential part of the process but a highly desirable
part for many reasons." 3  "Properly administered, [pleas] can benefit
all concerned."'  This happy conclusion has been reached through a
simple bootstrapping process." The Court has never considered the
empirical data, as it did elsewhere when it decided factual questions of
constitutional importance." 6
E. Plea Bargaining as Sui Generis
In the Trilogy, the Court held, effectively, that the entry of a bar-
gained plea was an event sui generis. Doctrines such as that of United
States v. Jackson." developed in other contexts, were found irrelevant to
determining the validity of a bargained plea. That conclusion was a
sword with two edges-if legal doctrines developed outside the context of
plea bargaining were completely irrelevant to such plea bargains, then
legal doctrines developed in the context of plea bargaining were irrele-
399. See supra notes 7-216 and accompanying text.
400. There is enormous literature on the subject. Particularly interesting empirical studies
include W. RHODES, supra note 18; Rubinstein & White, Alaska's Ban on Plea Bargaining, 13
LAW & Soc'Y Rrv. 367 (1979), Schulhofer, supra note 5. The American Bar Association has
taken a position in support of the practice if it is regulated. ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PLEAS OF GUILTY 60-78 (Approved Draft, 1968). The National
Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals has opposed it. NAT'L ADVI-
SORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, REPORT ON COURTS 42-49 (1973).
401. See supra notes 230-42 and accompanying text.
402. 404 U.S 257 (1971).
403. Id. at 261.
404. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977).
405. The Court in Brady noted that some plea bargains may benefit both the prosecution
and the defendant. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970). In Santobello, Brady
was cited for the proposition that plea bargaining is both "essential" and "highly desirable."
Santobello, 404 U.S. at 261. Thereafter the courts' primary source for touting the benefits of
plea bargaining has been Brady and Santobello.
406. Compare the extensive canvass of evidence on the deterrent effects of the death penalty
in the several opinions in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
The empirical data is not entirely pleasing. At least one estimate is that, in some federal
courts, as many as one-third of the defendants pleading guilty would have been acquitted had
they gone to trial. Finkelstein, A Statistical Analysis of Guilty Plea Practices in Federal Courts,
89 HARV. L. REv. 293, 309-10 (1975). For specific, anecdotal examples see Alschuler, The
Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 50, 60-62 (1968).
407. 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
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vant outside that context. The bargained plea became a black hole, disas-
sociated with the remainder of the constitutional universe.
Since the Trilogy, this black hole has expanded. United States v.
Jackson has never been overruled and indeed is occasionally cited with
approval for the proposition that "if the only objective of a state practice
is to discourage the assertion of constitutional rights it is 'patently uncon-
stitutional.' "" Based on United States v. Jackson, it would appear that
if a charge were brought against a defendant solely in order to "discour-
age" his assertion of a right to trial, imprisonment on that charge after he
insisted on trial would be "patently unconstitutional."'4 9 Not so. In
Bordenkircher v. Hayes,410 the Court stated that "in the 'give-and-take' of
plea bargaining," '411 such doctrines have no relevance "so long as the
accused is free to accept or reject the prosecution's offer."' 412 Since the
accused in Bordenkircher had rejected the prosecution's offer and was
sentenced to life imprisonment, the Court's dismissal of the United States
v. Jackson line of cases as irrelevant expanded the sui generis character of
plea bargaining to include bargains that were rejected as well as those
accepted as long as the defendant can either accept or reject the offer.
However, the Bordenkircher qualification barely outlived its creation. In
Corbitt v. New Jersey,4"3 the Court rejected the qualification and held that
the United States v. Jackson doctrine did not apply even when the ac-
cused was not free to accept the prosecution's offer.4 14
Although the Court has consistently decided plea bargaining cases
as a law unto themselves,a1 5 it has never explained why these cases are
different. The Court's lack of an explanation has created an unusual ten-
408. Chaffin v. Stynchecombe, 412 U.S. 17, 32-33 n.20 (1973) (citing Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618, 631 (1969) (quoting United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968))). United
States v. Jackson, however, may be in decline. It has not been cited for this point since
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978), and in recent years has been used in opinions of
the Court only for the proposition that unconstitutional statutes are sometimes severable. E.g.,
Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641 (1984).
409. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. at 581.
410. 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
411. Id. at 363.
412. Id Astoundingly, the Court in Bordenkircher incorrectly paraphrased a passage from
Chaffln and changed the word "discourage" to "penalize" and then distinguished such cases
on the ground that there was no "penalty." Id For the text of the passage from Chaffin, see
supra text accompanying note 408.
413. 439 U.S. 212 (1978).
414. Corbitt involved a defendant who went to trial under a statutory scheme allowing
lighter sentences for defendants who waived trial. The Court noted that, so far as the record
disclosed, Corbitt might have attempted to plead guilty but had been refused the chance. Id. at
223.
415. Occasional small departures occur. See supra notes 355-56 and accompanying text.
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sion in the law. This tension is highlighted when the fact of plea bargain-
ing is argued to be relevant to other doctrines. For example, in Gregg v.
Georgia,416 the petitioners argued that Georgia's capital punishment stat-
utes were unconstitutional under Furman v. Georgia4 17 because the un-
regulated power of prosecutors to bargain pleas (among other factors)
introduced too much unstructured discretion into the system to meet the
fuzzy standards of Furman. The prevailing opinion did not try to meet
this argument. It simply denied any possibility of control:
In order to repair the alleged defects pointed to by the peti-
tioner, it would be necessary to require that prosecuting author-
ities charge a capital offense whenever arguably there had been
a capital murder and that they refuse to plea bargain with the
defendant.... Such a system, of course, would be totally alien
to our notions of criminal justice. 18
The Gregg Court's response to the petitioner's relatively modest
claim that the prosecution's decision whether or not to offer a bargained
plea in capital cases should be subject to some standards bespeaks the
confusion about why the law is as it is. Only two years later, the senior
author of the quoted passage observed, for the Court, that "undoubt-
edly" the Constitution limits the prosecution's discretion whether or not
to offer a bargained plea.4" 9 The Court has insisted that bargained pleas
are an element foreign to the considerations that govern other aspects of
constitutional law. But it has never explained why they are foreign.
Without such an explanation, the Court is understandably at a loss to
explain how plea bargaining can be integrated into a general body of
constitutional doctrine.
416. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
417. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
418. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199-200 n.50 (Stewart, J., announcing judgment). Justice White,
joined by the Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, disposed of the claim as
unsupported by any facts... [to show] that prosecutors will be motivated in their
charging decision by factors other than the strength of their case and the likelihood
that a jury would impose the death penalty if it convicts. Unless prosecutors are
incompetent in their judgments, the standards by which they decide whether to
charge a capital felony will be the same as those by which the jury will decide the
questions of guilt and sentence.
Id. at 225 (White, J., concurring). Although the passage refers only to the "charging" deci-
sion, it presumably applies to plea bargaining as well, since immediately before the quoted
passage the opinion promises to deal with plea bargaining, and no other arguably relevant
language appears. Within a year, these three Justices joined an opinion expressly rejecting any
arguments that a prosecutor's decision whether and how to bargain pleas must be based on the
strength of the prosecution's case. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364-65.
419. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 365. The Court has never said what these limits are.
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F. Summary
The Court's plea bargaining cases rest on a foundation of sand. The
Trilogy, the foundation on which all subsequent cases attempt to rest, is
incoherent in virtually everything except its result. Furthermore, later
cases have not developed any coherent, consistent theme or theory that
explains the rationale of plea bargaining, regulates its practice and inte-
grates its doctrine into the general tapestry of constitutional law. In-
stead, the Court has responded on an ad hoc basis, repeatedly developing
themes in one case only to see them ignored in the next. The following
section suggests one possible direction for development.
V. THE ADMISSION OF GUILT
If the language of the Trilogy opinions is to be credited, the only
question relevant to the validity of a bargained plea is what the Court
views as the traditional inquiry into the defendant's state of mind at the
time the plea was entered. Was the plea "voluntary"? Was it "intelli-
gent"? At the same time, a second theme runs consistently through the
cases. Pleas of guilty are "grave and solemn" acts that are valid because
they represent "the defendant's admission in open court that he commit-
ted the acts charged .... "4 2o So long as this admission is sufficiently
reliable,421 the government may impose punishment on the basis of this
admission and consider the matter finally resolved. The point is most
fully developed in Brady where the Court stated:
This is not to say that guilty plea convictions hold no
hazards for the innocent or that the methods of taking guilty
pleas presently employed in this country are necessarily valid in
all respects .... [W]e take great precautions against unsound
results, and we should continue to do so, whether conviction is
by plea or by trial. We would have serious doubts about this
case if the encouragement of guilty pleas by offers of leniency
substantially increased the likelihood that defendants, advised by
competent counsel, would falsely condemn themselves. But our
view is to the contrary and is based on our expectations that
courts will satisfy themselves that pleas of guilty are voluntary
and intelligently made by competent defendants with adequate
advice of counsel and that there is nothing to question the accu-
420. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). Presumably the Court's failure to
mention the state of mind with which the acts were committed-a critical factor in criminal
liability and previously one crucial to the validity of a guilty plea is inadvertent. See McCar-
thy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969).
421. See Brady, 397 U.S. at 758; MeMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 773 (1970).
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racy and reliability of the defendants' admissions that they
committed the crimes with which they are charged.422
This theme, although abandoned by the Court within seven
months,423 may represent the real basis of the Trilogy.424 When coupled
with the Court's refusal to find any relevance in prior law developed in
the context of prosecutions that went to trial, it presents a view of the
guilty plea process as a procedure sui generis, founded upon and its dif-
ferences justified by the defendant's admission that he is, in fact and in
law, guilty of the crimes to which he is pleading. It is of course possible
to quarrel with this view of the guilty plea process. But this vision is at
least an arguable one.425 If consistently followed, this theme would pro-
vide a rationale of sufficient coherence to bring bargained pleas back into
the constitutional universe.
426
A. A View of the System
Perhaps the most important aspect of this vision of the guilty plea
process is that it reintroduces consideration of the system of plea bar-
gains as a functioning whole. This is not the same view that would have
followed from application of cases such as United States v. Jackson; these
cases require the Court to inquire whether the plea bargaining process
422. Brady, 397 U.S. at 757-58 (emphasis added).
423. It was, in my view, abandoned in North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), where
the Court upheld a guilty plea entered by a defendant who, at the time he pleaded guilty, said
he was innocent and was pleading guilty only to avoid execution. The Court did note the
presence of a "strong factual basis" for the plea, but it surely must have realized that authoriz-
ing convictions on a "strong factual basis" will lead to conviction of far more innocent people
than the ordinary, reasonable doubt standard will authorize. Id. at 38.
424. The Court emphasized this with unusual fervor. See, e.g., Brady, 397 U.S. at 757
("solemn admissions in open court"); id. at 758 ("solemn admission of guilt"); McMann, 397
U.S. at 766 ("defendant's own admission in open court"); id. at 773 ("counseled admission in
open court").
425. It is not one I prefer, since I share Professor Alschuler's opinion that plea bargaining is
an "inherently unfair and irrational process." Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining De-
bate, supra note 5, at 652. We do not generally say that almost anything goes as long as the
defendant is guilty. But I believe that a system convicting primarily the guilty is, in any event,
to be preferred over a system that convicts substantial numbers of innocent defendants as well
as guilty ones.
426. I do not mean to imply that this vision of the plea bargaining process would adequately
explain the results in cases the Court has so far decided. Those cases, I believe, are incoherent
and cannot be made otherwise. Cf. Saltzburg, supra note 337, at 1307 ("[Nlone of the
Supreme Court's guilty-plea cases come to grip with the real problems of bargained-for jus-
tice.") I do believe, however, that it is consistent with some of them, and not contrary to the
general thrust (though perhaps to some of the particular results) of the Trilogy. I also specu-
late that such a belief was important to the Court in the Trilogy, since I do not believe they
would so cheerfully have placed a constitutional imprimatur on a system they believed would
lead to wholesale conviction of the innocent.
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"needlessly encourage[s]" guilty pleas.427 But the implication of the
above-quoted passage from Brady is that another question, not directly
related to the "voluntariness" or "intelligence" of the defendant's plea as
those terms are defined in the Trilogy, should be asked. Does the system
for producing guilty pleas create a substantial likelihood that innocent as
well as guilty defendants will plead guilty?
This question provides a basis for the principled development of
standards which delineate permissible, and impermissible, inducements
for guilty pleas. More broadly, explicit adoption of such an approach
allows consideration of problems beyond the scope of an inquiry into the
pleading defendant's state of mind at the time the plea was entered. It
provides a standard for measuring the prosecutor's presently uncon-
trolled decision of whether or not to offer concessions for a guilty plea.
And it allows at least some consideration of the defendant who refuses a
bargain, leading to the development of standards that would place some
limits on the additional penalty imposed on a defendant for his insistence
on going to trial.
B. Some Boundaries of Permissible Inducement
A defendant who is offered a discount on punishment in exchange
for a plea of guilty is not faced with a choice between a certainly lesser
sentence and a certainly greater one.428 The choice is actually between
pleading guilty and getting the concession, and pleading not guilty and
going to trial. Trial presents a range of possible outcomes from acquittal
through conviction, and usually a range of possible sentences if the de-
fendant is convicted. A premise of the system is that innocent defendants
will be acquitted if they insist on trial.429 The initial focus therefore
should be on such a defendant. What would induce a plea of guilty from
a defendant who would, if tried, be acquitted?
The general answer is that an innocent defendant would plead guilty
only if the prosecution offered some benefit more valuable than what the
defendant can get by going to trial and obtaining an acquittal. The
model proposed here leads to the conclusion that such inducements,
which would substantially increase the likelihood that an innocent de-
427. See supra notes 169-216 and accompanying text.
428. To speak of a defendant being "offered" a plea bargain, as if the initial negotiating
steps always came from the prosecution, oversimplifies reality; the initial move is frequently
made by defense counsel. For present purposes, however, the simplification is adequate.
429. See infra text accompanying notes 443-44 for the implications of imperfection in this
model.
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fendant would plead guilty, should ordinarily be forbidden. How this
would apply in practice requires further discussion.
1. Lenience for other defendants
On occasion the prosecution will offer to drop or reduce charges, or
to provide other benefits, not to the pleading defendant but to a third
party, such as the defendant's spouse. Lower courts have invariably up-
held such bargains.430 Obviously these inducements will only be effective
when the defendant has a close relationship with the third party. When
the defendant has such a relationship, however, the effectiveness of the
inducements will not be muted by the innocence of the pleading defend-
ant. No matter how innocent the defendant, acquittal at the defendant's
trial will not provide acquittal or any reduction in charges for third
parties.
No doubt altruism has its limits, and inducements of this kind will
not always persuade an innocent defendant to plead guilty. But they
should never be allowed. However rational it may be in a rehabilitation-
based penal system to give a discount to defendants willing to admit their
guilt, no reason exists to reduce punishment for defendant A if defendant
B is willing to forego trial.43 Inducements of this kind present a very
real possibility of inducing innocent people to plead guilty, and serve no
other purpose than to persuade defendants to waive their constitutional
right to trial. Such inducements should be outside the bounds of
propriety.
2. Reduction or dismissal of other charges
More often, a bargain is struck whereby a defendant, charged with
several offenses, agrees to plead guilty to one (or a few) counts in ex-
change for dismissal of other charges which may or may not be related.
One could deal simplistically with this situation in one of two ways. The
first alternative is to argue that concern should be with the defendant
430. E.g., United States v. Castello, 724 F.2d 813, 814 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1254
(1984) (threat to prosecute codefendant as" 'special dangerous offender,'" increasing liability
sixfold); Harman v. Mohn, 683 F.2d 834 (4th Cir. 1982) (dismissal of charges against wife);
United States v. Tursi, 576 F.2d 396 (1st Cir. 1978) (recommend probation for son); Plunkett
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 465 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1972) (dismissal of charges
against wife); Crow v. United States, 397 F.2d 284 (10th Cir. 1968); Cortez v. United States,
337 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1964), cerL denied, 381 U.S. 953 (1965); Kent v. United States, 272
F.2d 795 (1st Cir. 1959). But cf. United States v. Nuckols, 606 F.2d 566 (5th Cir. 1979)
(remanding for evidentiary hearing).
431. One is tempted to suspect that prosecutors are most willing to enter into this kind of
agreement.when, in fact, they have no desire to proceed against the third party anyway.
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who is innocent of the actual charges to which he is pleading. In this
situation, however, allowing dismissal of other charges would create a
significant inducement for defendants to plead guilty to charges of which
they were innocent. Therefore, this type of inducement should not be
permitted.432 Alternatively, one could argue that concern should be lim-
ited to defendants who are innocent of all charges. In this situation, de-
fendants would still be expected to refuse the proffered bargain and go to
trial. Therefore, inducements of this nature would be permissible.
But, the choices need not be limited to these two alternatives. In the
ordinary case, the major problem with inducements of this kind is not
how precisely the crime pleaded to corresponds with the crime actually
committed4 33 -assuming the defendant is guilty of some of the charges-
but rather with the extent to which the availability of such inducements
allows the prosecution to present the defendant with an offer too good for
even an innocent defendant to refuse, by making the risks attendant on
conviction intolerably high. I deal with the problem immediately below.
3. Limits to the inducement
Assuming that a defendant innocent of all the charges brought will
in fact be acquitted if he insists on a trial, it is not necessary to consider
at length the difference between the probable outcome upon conviction
and the bargain actually offered. So long as complete acquittal is better
than the prosecution's offer, and so long as complete acquittal is a known
certainty for the innocent defendant, it does not matter how horrifying
the consequences would be if the defendant were convicted after trial.
Given these assumptions, the defendant need not fear the consequences
of conviction.
At this point in the analysis, however, reality rears its complicated
head. The trial process is not perfect. Particularly in the case of much
street crime, where conviction or acquittal turns primarily on the jury's
weighing of eyewitness identification from witnesses unfamiliar with the
432. In fact, defendants frequently seem to plead guilty to offenses that they did not com-
mit. See, eg., D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION 100-01 (1966) (routine bargaining of nighttime bur-
glary to lesser charge of daytime burglary). They occasionally plead guilty to nonexistent
offenses. E.g., People v. Foster, 19 N.Y.2d 150, 225 N.E.2d 200 (1967) (nonexistent offense of
attempted second-degree manslaughter; plea upheld).
433. In exceptional cases, we may rightly be concerned with accuracy regarding the precise
offense pleaded to. It would have been disturbing, to say the least, had James Earl Ray been
offered a bargained plea to an unrelated crime in exchange for dismissal of the charges that he
murdered Dr. Martin Luther King. Even in unexceptional cases, some would argue that the
system is poisoned, in less dramatic ways, when it induces defendants to plead guilty to crimes
they did not commit in exchange for dismissal of accusations of crimes they did commit.
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defendant against alibi testimony from friends and relatives. Many inno-
cent defendants will have a realistic fear of possible conviction. No
doubt, there are limits on what can be done to alleviate the problem, and
no doubt, the best solution would be to improve the accuracy of the trial
process. However, a genuine concern for innocent defendants requires
that there be at least some scrutiny of the degree of inducement offered
for a guilty plea. Except for the fact that Brady explicitly rejected such a
claim, one might hazard, as an initial matter, that questions of life or
death should be removed from the plea bargaining process. 4 34 If any
realistic prospect of a death sentence upon conviction exists, even an in-
nocent, life-loving defendant will be sorely tempted to plead guilty unless
the case for acquittal-at least of the capital aspect of the charges-is
open and shut.435 Similarly, when the choice is between an extremely
light sentence-particularly one involving no additional imprisonment-
and a substantial term of years, as may increasingly be the case under
statutes that provide for mandatory minimum terms on conviction, one
can realistically expect that a substantial number of even innocent de-
fendants would prefer to plead guilty rather than face the possibility of
conviction and the certainty of extended incarceration.436 Concern that
innocent defendants not be frightened into pleading guilty does not, with-
out more, dictate a particular result. It does, however, focus attention on
the question that should be asked and explored, and provides a basis for
at least some principled limitations on the inducements that the prosecu-
tion can legitimately offer.437
434. Compare the plea-taking procedure recorded in United States v. Runge, 427 F.2d 122
(10th Cir. 1970), where the trial judge exerted considerable effort to remove the fear of death
from the defendant's decision. Id. at 123-24 n.4.
435. Not only is one's death uniquely difficult to contemplate with equanimity, it is
uniquely final. The innocent defendant considering wrongful imprisonment can at least hope
that sufficient evidence of his innocence will appear to justify a pardon, or provide a foundation
for early parole. But posthumous vindication gives little satisfaction.
436. The same is true when the prosecution brings a multiplicity of charges and offers to
drop most in exchange for a plea. One prosecutor of my acquaintance reported charging a
defendant with 140 years of offenses in order to persuade her to plead guilty of a misdemeanor,
for which he intended to recommend probation-which he thought was the just sentence for
her complicity. Of course, it is important to consider not only the potential, but also the
probable sentence after trial. Maximum consecutive terms are rare.
437. Obviously, any workable rules in this regard will to a great extent be rules of thumb,
difficult to develop, and even more difficult to test. Some innocent defendants may resist virtu-
ally any pressure to plead guilty; others may plead guilty for pottage. But that a perfect an-
swer is impossible does not mean that the question should not be asked, or that no answers can
be ventured. I would, for instance, hope that the practice of offering incarcerated defendants
immediate release if they plead guilty, and continued incarceration if they insist on trial, be
forbidden. See infra text accompanying note 439.
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4. Speed and cost
A guilty plea almost always can be entered more quickly, and more
cheaply, than a defense can be presented at trial. An innocent defendant
can thus save time and money by pleading guilty, and these inducements
cannot be entirely eliminated without banning guilty pleas altogether.
438
No doubt many mail-in pleas of guilty to parking offenses are entered by
innocent defendants too busy to take the time for trial. For major of-
fenses, this may be tolerable if it is unlikely that a defendant will accept a
long sentence to save a relatively small amount of time at trial or that he
will do so to save the substantial legal costs of defense. For very minor
cases, such as parking offenses, this may be tolerable because we are sim-
ply not that offended by the possibility of wrongful convictions.
There remains, however, a large and troubling middle ground.
Where lengthy pretrial delays are common, guilty pleas are often entered
upon the promise that the plea will be accepted promptly, and (for de-
fendants unable to make bail) the sentence will be for no more than the
amount of time already served. If the defendant insists on trial, however,
he will stay in jail for a considerable period before his case comes to trial.
As one astonished defendant said: "You mean if I'm guilty I get out, but
if I'm innocent I stay in jail?"43 9 In such circumstances the pressure even
on innocent defendants to plead guilty may be overwhelming. At the
same time, it is hard to see how the prosecution can obtain more than a
purely statistical benefit from the conviction obtained in such a
manner.
4 4 0
The only problem with outlawing such clearly intolerable induce-
ments is the problem of control. Forbidding time-served sentences
would worsen the plight of defendants jailed pending trial, defendants
who are already considerably worse off than their counterparts on the
street." Perhaps the only real solution is to require pretrial release (or
trial) after significantly shorter periods than is presently the case, at least
438. So far as money is concerned, we could of course reimburse innocent defendants after
their acquittal for the costs of the trial. This is proposed in Note, Costs and the Plea Bargain-
ing Process: Reducing the Price of Justice to the Nonindigent Defendant, 89 YALE L.J. 333
(1979).
439. Mills, "I Have Nothing to do WithJustice," Life, Mar. 12, 1971, at 57, 62. The defend-
ant in question had been in jail 10 months pending trial; with time off for good behavior, a one-
year sentence would result in his immediate release.
440. Conversations with prosecutors indicate that they are indeed concerned with this sta-
tistical benefit of cases terminated with conviction and what is recorded as a jail sentence.
Occasionally, they are concerned with recording a felony conviction which will make the de-
fendant liable to harsher sentences in the event of a subsequent conviction.
441. See, ag., Rankin, The Effects of Pre-Trial Detention, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 641 (1964).
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for offenses where time-served sentences are a realistic possibility.442 The
point is that genuine concern for innocent defendants should lead us to
eliminate bludgeons that can compel them to plead guilty.
5. Other Considerations
For many defendants, the major value of a bargained plea may be
the extent to which it reduces the uncertainty inherent in the trial and
sentencing process, particularly in jurisdictions where without a bargain
the allowable (and generally unreviewable) range of sentencing possibili-
ties is extremely broad. Although some innocent defendants may plead
guilty to lesser charges rather than risk conviction and a higher sentence,
it is impossible to deal with this aspect of the problem short of modifying
the sentencing scheme or requiring all defendants to go to trial." 3 Un-
certainty about the sentence that may be received, however, is somewhat
more tractable. Basically, the problem is similar to the problem of un-
limited inducements. Concern for preventing false guilty pleas does not
dictate any particular result; it does, however, suggest that limits on sen-
tencing discretion are appropriate, particularly for relatively trivial
offenses.444
If one views the system of plea bargaining as a functioning whole,
rather than as a collection of isolated acts by those involved in the pro-
cess, two other considerations assume substantial importance. First is
the problem of defendants who refuse bargains they are offered.
Whatever additional sentence they receive is a direct consequence of
their insisting on trial and is a penalty for demanding one of the most
basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution. If plea bargaining is to exist
at all, there must be some differential;44 but that there must be some
differential is not to say that no limits should exist. Indeed Brady, which
442. If the prosecution is in fact willing to have the defendant released to the street immedi-
ately upon plea of guilty, it is difficult to understand what considerations would require the
defendant to remain incarcerated pending trial.
443. One might think that the current trend toward fixed determinate sentences for particu-
lar crimes will help. I am less certain, however, since typically the possible sentence for most
criminal activity is enormous, and the prosecutor's charging discretion virtually unchecked.
For the argument that determinate sentencing schemes unwisely increase the prosecutor's
power, see Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial Power: A Critique of Recent Propos-
als for "Fixed" and "Presumptive" Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 550 (1977).
444. For different reasons, the California Supreme Court held unconstitutional a sentence
of one day to life for indecent exposure. In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal.
Rptr. 217 (1972).
445. It may be that a system of plea bargaining can continue to function without actual
penalties for going to trial, either because defendants are misinformed or because they are
willing to plead guilty solely in exchange for an increase in certainty. See supra note 18.
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distinguished as irrelevant but did not question United States v. Jackson,
seems to say as much.44 6 An analysis similar to that in United States v.
Jackson could provide a basis for limiting the penalties that can be im-
posed on defendants who refuse or are unable to accept a proffered bar-
gain.' 7  Ultimately, this would effectively provide limits to the
inducements that can be offered as part of bargained pleas even if pleas
agreed to for greater inducements themselves remain valid. United States
v. Jackson itself did as much for future defendants charged under the
Federal Kidnaping Act. Indeed, defendants who refuse proffered plea
bargains may often represent the most appealing case for lenient treat-
ment, since the genuinely innocent defendant will often refuse any offer
and insist on trial. The reality is that some of these defendants will be
convicted. Yet in any rational sentencing scheme these are the defend-
ants least deserving of harsh sentences.
Finally, to view the system as a functioning whole provides a basis
for setting standards for the prosecutor's decision whether or not to bar-
gain in the first place, and what kind of bargains to offer., 8 Increasingly,
a bargained guilty plea is the normal outcome of criminal cases, and trial
followed by acquittal or conviction is the abnormal event. This places an
awesome amount of power in the prosecutor because the prosecutor has
unguided and unchecked discretion to make offers and to bargain over
pleas.' 9 The problem is related to the problem of prosecutorial charging
power in general. However, it is more serious because the prosecutor's
discretion to charge is at least limited by the fact-finding process when
cases go to trial, by the publicity attendant on trials and (in major cases
in many jurisdictions) by the grand jury. Where, however, the outcome
is a bargained plea, by definition no extensive public fact-finding process
occurs; the only check is the trial judge, who must act on the sparse
record ordinarily presented when pleas are taken.
446. United States v. Jackson, however, may not have substantially survived Corbitt v. New
Jersey, 439 U.S. 212 (1978). See id. at 228-33 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
447. Or are unable to accept one. Cf Pettyjohn v. United States, 419 F.2d 651, 660 (D.C.
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1058 (1970) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehear-
ing en bane). In Pettyjohn, an incarcerated defendant sought to plead guilty to second-degree
murder because he found the conditions of his pretrial detention intolerable and the plea, if
accepted, would get him into new quarters. Id. The trial judge refused the plea and the de-
fendant was convicted of first-degree murder, which carried a mandatory life sentence. Id.
448. Prosecutors have themselves on occasion set such standards. See, e.g., Kuh, Sentencing
Guidelines for the Manhattan District Attorney's Office, I 1 CRIM. L. BULL. 62 (1975).
449. See Alschuler, supra note 443.
PLEA BARGAINING
VI. CONCLUSION
In upholding plea bargaining in the 1970 Brady Trilogy, the
Supreme Court concluded that plea bargaining was a process sui generis,
wholly divorced from the body of constitutional law previously devel-
oped in other contexts. Specifically, the Court refused to consider the
plea bargaining system as a whole, insisting instead that the only ques-
tion that should be considered was the state of mind of the individual
pleading defendant at the time he entered his plea. The end result was
not law by reason; it was law by fiat.
Since then, the Court has made no substantial progress toward pro-
viding reasons. In deciding cases about the constitutional constraints on
bargained pleas, the Court has continued to refer back to the Trilogy to
provide a foundation for its decisions. However, no foundation is there,
and later cases, viewed together, are as unreasoned as the Trilogy and not
even as consistent.
The search for reasons, for some principled basis that would not
only explain or justify existing decisions but also provide guidance for the
future, is not an impossible one. This Article has sketched one plausible
principle, and indicated some of the directions in which the law could
move were that principle adopted. Other possibilities exist. There has
been ample time for consideration and reflection. The Court will have
shirked its duty to us all if, in the future, it fails to provide some explana-
tion and justification for its plea bargaining decisions.
To those who cherish the rule of law, it is important that the Court
provide reason and explanations. The American criminal process
promises extensive safeguards to criminal defendants who plead not
guilty and go to trial. But most criminal defendants, in most jurisdic-
tions, never see a trial. The net effect of the Trilogy, and the cases fol-
lowing it, has been to make the plea bargaining process, which
determines their fate, a Kafkaesque process entirely ungoverned by the
Constitution. If we are serious in our desire to protect criminal defend-
ants-and particularly innocent criminal defendants-from the whims of
the marketplace and the impersonality of naked force, we should do
more.
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